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Abstract
Low turnout is a growing concern among the industrial democracies. Compulsory 
voting has achieved very high turnouts in several countries, but it has been mostly 
neglected as a solution to the problem of low turnout elsewhere. This thesis considers 
the usefulness of compulsory voting for industrial democracies. I argue that, for it to be 
useful, compulsory voting must be effective on two levels. First, compulsory voting 
must be effective in increasing turnout. Second, the high turnout resulting from 
compulsory voting must improve the total utility of the people—defined here as the 
well-being of the people—otherwise compulsory voting will not ultimately be useful.
Rational choice models are constructed and operationalised in order to describe, 
explain and evaluate compulsory voting. Although data analysis is undertaken for a 
range of industrial democracies in order to test these rational choice hypotheses, the 
major focus of this research is on Australia, which has achieved very high turnout 
levels (around 95% of the registered voters) since the introduction of compulsory 
voting for federal elections in 1924. Furthermore, by examining the case of Australia, 
this thesis determines the conditions and necessary adjustments for compulsory voting 
to work effectively in practice. Finally, compulsory voting is tested with rational choice 
theory and data analysis on the actual industrial democracies in order to see whether 
this system is applicable under globally varying conditions.
The conclusion of the analysis is that compulsory voting seems to be useful for 
several industrial democracies in theory and also seems to be workable in practice. 
However, some subjective judgement needs to be introduced for a full cost-benefit 
analysis to be made about compulsory voting.
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Preface
Compulsory voting (CV) might be regarded as a gimmick rather than as a real option, 
but I have been attached to this topic for a long time. I am from a white-collar worker 
family in Japan, and I have long thought that white-collar workers’ interests are 
under-represented in politics, despite the large number of white-collar workers. They are 
not well-organised, they do not donate funds to political parties, and their turnout is low. 
As a result, their interests are not accurately represented in politics. On the other hand, 
many minority interests are well-organised, they donate election funds, and their turnout 
is high. Naturally, their interests are more likely to be represented politically. There is 
nothing wrong about respecting minority interests: members of minority-interest groups 
are citizens, and so their interests should be respected. However, white-collar workers 
are also citizens, and so their interests should also be respected—more so given their 
large numbers. Nevertheless, the system does not achieve that.
I understand that the under-representation of white-collar workers is partly a 
result of their low turnout. When I was a child, I used to advise my parents to vote. 
However, they said that their single vote would make no difference in politics and so 
they would not bother to turn out. In fact, they rarely voted. I now think that they were 
rational. I failed in persuading them to vote, and I thought that we were trapped and 
there was no way to escape. Therefore, when I encountered CV later, I was delighted 
that I finally found what appeared to be a solution to this conundrum. CV would realise 
our interests more accurately and would make a major contribution to the best interests 
of the whole population. I hope that this thesis can advance the understanding of CV 
and contribute to its wider acceptance as a real option rather than as a gimmick.
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Abbreviations
AV alternative voting
CV compulsory voting
IV inducement voting
JSCEM Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters
PR proportional representation
SMP single member plurality
VV voluntary voting
Introduction
Almost all of the industrial democracies have experienced a long-term decline in 
turnout, and this has led to a growing concern about how to remedy the problem. 
Compulsory voting (CV) is the most straightforward solution to the problem, and CV 
has achieved high turnout in several countries. Nevertheless, it has been mostly 
neglected elsewhere. Moreover, it seems that CV has not even been regarded as a real 
option (Jones 1954, 25; Mayo 1959, 323; Wertheimer 1975, 278). Although Lijphart 
demonstrated the usefulness of CV by combining scientific methods and values 
(Lijphart 1997) and his work drew new attention to CV (Hirczy de Mino 2000, 45), no 
other major academic advancement has been made on this topic since then. Although 
many papers have been published on CV in the past and several of them can be regarded 
as classics (e.g. Hughes 1966; Lijphart 1997; Robson 1923), there has been no 
comprehensive work about what impact the introduction of CV would have on the 
society. In order to fill this gap, this thesis aims at assessing the overall usefulness of 
CV for industrial democracies.
CV must be effective on two levels for it to be useful. First, CV must be effective 
in increasing turnout. Second, the high turnout resulting from CV must be effective in 
improving the well-being of the people. If these two requirements are not fulfilled, CV 
will not ultimately be useful. Although it is a matter of argument what the well-being of 
the people is, this thesis defines it as the total utility of individuals. However, for 
technical reasons, this thesis will use the total utility of electors as the value standard 
instead of that of all individuals. Moreover, CV must be workable for it to be useful in 
practice. If CV is useful on the two levels in theory but is unworkable in practice, CV 
cannot actually be applied. Therefore, this thesis tries to determine the conditions and 
necessary adjustments for CV to work effectively in practice.
The major methods used in this thesis are rational choice theory and data analysis. 
First, data analysis is performed to observe the reality. Second, rational choice theory is 
utilised to build a hypothesis. Third, data analysis is again performed to test this 
hypothesis in the real world. This thesis repeats this cycle in each stage of its research 
procedure though the first part of this cycle is occasionally fieldwork or examination 
into documents rather than data analysis. Although data analysis is undertaken for a
11
range of industrial democracies in order to test the hypotheses, the major focus of this 
research is on Australia, which has achieved very high turnout (around 95% of the 
registered electors) since the introduction of CV in 1924. Furthermore, by examining 
the case of Australia, this thesis tries to determine conditions and necessary adjustments 
for CV to work effectively in practice.
In order to achieve the research purpose with the methods and research subjects 
above, this thesis takes several steps and has eight chapters. First two chapters (i.e. 
Chapters 1 and 2) present the context of this thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the effect 
of CV on turnout. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are about the effect of CV on public policy. 
Chapter 8 is the evaluation of the findings of this research project. More details of these 
chapters are as follows:
•  Chapter 1: Assesses the level of turnout decline in the industrial democracies, 
and provides an overview of the effectiveness of major solutions to low turnout 
(inclusive of CV).
•  Chapter 2: Provides an overview of the practice of CV across the world, and 
then reviews the previous studies of CV.
•  Chapter 3: Develops a formula that provides the reason that CV achieves high 
turnout, and then tests this hypothesis on empirical data.
•  Chapter 4: Determines the conditions for CV to effectively improve turnout and 
necessary adjustments to meet these conditions.
•  Chapter 5: Builds a model showing the effect of CV on the median voter 
position in the left-right dimension, and then tests this hypothesis on the data.
•  Chapter 6: Builds a model showing the effect of CV on party policy positions in 
the left-right dimension, and then tests this hypothesis on the data.
•  Chapter 7: Examines whether the high turnout resulting from CV would be 
useful for the industrial democracies under globally varying conditions in order 
to improve the total utility of electors.
•  Chapter 8: Produces an inventory of the findings and the gaps in this research 
project. The chapter then evaluates to what extent this research has succeeded in 
assessing the overall usefulness of CV for industrial democracies.
The overall conclusion of this thesis is that CV is likely to be useful for some 
industrial democracies though not for others. First, CV would achieve high turnout. 
Several conditions are necessary for CV to effectively realise its potential in this regard,
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but the industrial democracies would have sufficient resources to meet these conditions. 
Second, the high turnout resulting from CV would improve the total utility of electors, 
which can be equated to the well-being of the people, in several industrial democracies. 
Although the actual industrial democracies exist under a variety of conditions, CV is 
versatile and would be useful for many of them. Meanwhile, the main shortcoming of 
this thesis is that the objective cost-benefit analysis of CV tends to be partial and some 
subjective judgement needs to be introduced to perform a full cost-benefit analysis.
It should be noted that the majoritarian model of democracy is used as the 
underlying assumption throughout this thesis. This assumption is characterised by a 
two-party system, in which the two major parties alternate in power, and is also featured 
by a majoritarian electoral system. More details of this underlying assumption is 
addressed as the ‘default environment’ in 7.2 of Chapter 7 in preparation for engineering 
the ‘best’ electoral system in this hypothetical environment. The choice of this 
underlying assumption inevitably limits the research scope of this thesis. More 
specifically, this thesis mles out alternative forms of democracy, such as consensus 
democracy characterised by a proportional representation (PR) electoral system, which 
is more common among industrial democracies and is appreciated by some leading 
scholars (e.g. Lijphart 1999). As a result, the viewpoint of this thesis is limited within 
this majoritarian assumption. All hypotheses of this thesis are formulated and are 
comparatively tested in this assumptive framework. Therefore, although this thesis 
analysed several countries and systems that do not share many characteristics with this 
majoritarian model, the reader should assess the relevance of this thesis to them (e.g. PR 
systems) with caution.1
1 T he  au th o r chose  the  m ajoritarian  assum ption as the theoretical fram ew ork  o f  th is  thesis  because it is the  m ost 
com m only-used  one. H ow ever, th is choice could also be attributed to  h is personal expec ta tion  for the  adversaria l tw o-party  system  
to  break  the  m o d est consensus betw een vested interests achieved at the  cost o f  the  general public.
PART I 
Context
CHAPTER 1 
Decline in Turnout: Evaluating the Solutions
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, democratisation has been a worldwide 
political trend in countries ranging from the former socialist regimes to former 
dictatorships. According to Huntington (1991, 26), 24.6% of the total number of 
countries (30 countries out of 122) were democratic in 1973, and 45.4% of the total (59 
countries out of 130) were democratic in 1990, excluding countries with a population of 
less than one million.2 Huntington (1991, 3-30) calls this trend ‘the third wave’ of 
democratisation (starting in 1974), following ‘the first wave’ which took place around 
the late nineteenth century (1828-1926) and ‘the second wave’ in the post World War II 
period (1943-62). He describes this third wave of democratisation as follows, ‘Overall, 
the movement toward democracy was a global one. In fifteen years the democratic wave 
moved across southern Europe, swept through Latin America, moved on to Asia, and 
decimated dictatorship in the Soviet bloc’ (Huntington 1991,25).3
Despite the major trend of democratisation during the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, industrial democracies, which have a tradition of democracy accompanied by 
liberalism and economic prosperity, have been experiencing a long-term decline in 
political participation, such as turnout and party identification (Dalton 2000). Although 
there are many forms of political participation, the decline in turnout has drawn special 
attention from political students (e.g. Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Blais et al. 2004; 
Cassel and Luskin 1988; Gray and Caul 2000; Lijphart 1997, 5-7). If ‘the democratic 
method is,’ as Schumpeter ([1976] 1996, 269) defines, ‘that institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote,’ it will be natural that turnout is 
one of major concerns for political scholars (see Franklin 2002, 148; Lijphart 2000, 
314) though the electoral process actually comprises many aspects other than voting 
(e.g. political funds, election campaigns, and the mass media).
2 A cco rd in g  to  Freedom  H ouse (K aratnycky 2 0 0 2 ,9 ) , e lectoral dem ocracies covered 40 %  o f  coun tries  in the  w orld  (66  ou t o f  
164) in th e ir  1987-88 survey and  then this figure increased to  63%  (121 o u t o f  192) at the  end  o f  2001.
3 L eD uc, N iem i and  N orris  (1 9 9 6 ,1 )  refers to  the  sam e trend  as ‘a g lobal surge to w ard  d em ocracy .’ A cco rd ing  to  Freedom  
H ouse  (1999), the  last quarte r o f  the  tw entieth  century is often called the ‘dem ocratic  ag e ’ by  political scholars.
15
In the process of democratisation in history, franchise expansion was pursued (e.g. 
Chartism in the UK). However, if politics is open to the public but the public does not 
participate in politics, politics would end in minority rule rather than majority rule and 
so the country would hardly be a democracy in any proper sense. Therefore, it seems to 
be reasonable that the long-term decline in turnout among these successful democracies 
has been regarded as a serious problem. Political students have had three concerns in 
relation to low turnout:
(1) Causes of low turnout,
(2) Consequences of low turnout, and
(3) Solutions to low turnout.
Among these three concerns, the main research topic has been the causes o f  low turnout. 
When there is a problem, it would be normal first to find the causes of the problem and 
then to eliminate or control those causes (Abraham 1955, 8). In order to identify the 
variables related to voting and the mechanisms of voting, numerous data analyses have 
been exercised (e.g. Campbell et al. [1960] 1980; Miller and Shanks 1996) and rational 
choice theory has been utilised (e.g. Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). 
However, the causes of low turnout are still unclear (see Niemi and Weisberg 2001, 
chap. 2), and this orthodox approach has not been productive in solving the problem of 
low turnout. Meanwhile, the consequences o f low turnout do not appear to have drawn 
much attention, probably because it has been simply normal to regard low turnout as a 
problem to tackle in democracies (but see Lijphart 1997; Verba 2003).
The solutions to low turnout have drawn much less attention from researchers 
compared to its causes. However, the pragmatic approach to try to find effective 
solutions to low turnout without substantial knowledge about its causes (see Lijphart 
1997, 7-10; Lijphart 2000, 321; Niemi and Weisberg 2001, 32) might be more 
productive in tackling with low turnout than the orthodox approach to try to find its 
causes first. There are several potential solutions to low turnout (e.g. automatic 
registration, weekend voting, machine voting, absentee voting and civic education), but 
CV has not been widely used and has not been seriously discussed though CV has 
recently drown new attention (see Hirczy de Mino 2000, 45).4 CV might have been 
regarded as an unsophisticated measure, and so it might have been disregarded.
4 T h is  new  atten tion  can  be attributed to Lijphart 1997.
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However, taking the unceasing slide in turnout among industrial democracies into 
consideration, it seems to have been the time to pay a real attention to CV.
This thesis aims at assessing the overall usefulness of CV for industrial 
democracies. For this purpose, this thesis performs a full cost-benefit analysis of CV. 
However, before moving on to the evaluation of CV, this chapter first observes whether 
turnout among industrial democracies has actually been declining because, if  the 
problem is not real, research into solutions to this problem would not make sense. The 
chapter then provides an overview to all the major solutions to low turnout because, if 
moderate measures are effective enough to achieve high turnout, we would not need to 
seriously consider using strong measures like CV. This chapter finds that CV should be 
combined with easy-voting devices and civic education in order to achieve high turnout.
1.1. The Decline in Turnout among 
the Industrial Democracies
When people claim that turnout has been declining among the industrial democracies, 
they tend to mention several examples of extremely low turnout only, such as the 1995 
Japan upper-house election turnout of 44.5%, the 1996 USA presidential election 
turnout of 49.1%, or the 2001 UK general-election turnout of 59.4%. Although recent 
record-low turnouts might signify a general downward trend in turnout among industrial 
democracies, this kind of argument in itself is often misleading. Johnston and Pattie 
(2000, 1) argue that the extent of the decline in turnout might have been exaggerated. 
The general long-term trend in turnout among industrial democracies should be assessed 
with long-term records of turnout in all those countries.
In order to calculate turnout, the number of votes is divided by the total number 
of registered electors. However, the detailed calculation method is often a matter of 
judgement by researchers, whose research orientations are different from each other. 
Several academic works about the long-term trend in turnout among industrial 
democracies have been published. Nevertheless, as Norris (1999, 258) argues, these 
studies are divided about the comparative pattern (i.e. 3-10 percentage-point decline in
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turnout).5 This diversity results from five causes: (a) selected countries (e.g. Western 
countries only or all industrial democracies in the world), (b) selected elections (e.g. 
presidential elections or parliamentary elections), (c) time span, (d) numerator (e.g. 
invalid votes are included or not), and (e) denominator (e.g. the number of registered 
electors or the voting age population). In order to meet the purpose of this research, this 
thesis will design its own method for calculating turnout and will then assess the results.
Calculating Turnout
In order to know the long-term trend in turnout among industrial democracies, this 
thesis will design a method for calculating turnout as follows.
Selected countries: 18 industrial democracies. The objects of observation are 18 
industrial democracies: the USA, Japan, Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Canada, 
Australia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, New Zealand and Norway. The World Bank (2001, back cover) categorises 
these countries as ‘high-income OECD members.’ The World Bank (2001, back cover) 
also categorises Spain, Portugal, Greece, Iceland and Luxembourg as ‘high-income 
OECD members,’ but this thesis sets aside these countries. Spain, Portugal and Greece 
have not continuously had democratic competitive elections since 1951, though this 
thesis wants to observe the long-term trend in turnout.6 Iceland and Luxembourg have 
small populations of less than one million, and so this thesis excludes them in order to 
control conditions.
Selected elections: first-order elections. Presidential elections are observed for the 
USA, but parliamentary elections (lower house elections in the case of bicameral 
system) are observed for the other 17 industrial democracies.
Time span: 1951-2000. The average turnout for each decade from 1951 to 2000 is 
calculated. Turnouts after 1951 are used in order to avoid the confusion of the post 
World War II period. However, turnouts after 2000 are not included because we do not 
yet have a complete decade in order to produce an average. Using the average from 
2001 to the present would be misleading.
5 Po litica l scho lars have found  a  variety o f tren d s  in tu rnou t am ong industrial dem ocracies: T o p f  (1 9 9 5 ,4 0 -4 1 ), 3 
p ercen tag e -p o in t decline; D alton  (1996 ,44 -45 ), 6 percen tage-po in t decline; In ternational ID E A  (P in to r and  G ra tschew  2002 , 85), 7 
percen tag e-p o in t decline; G ray  and Caul (2000 ,1094-95 ), around 10 percen tage-po in t decline; W attenberg  (2000 , 71), 10 
p ercen tag e -p o in t decline.
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Numerator: the vote inclusive of invalid votes. The vote inclusive o f invalid votes 
is used as the numerator. There are two widely-used types of numerators: the vote 
inclusive of invalid votes and the vote exclusive of invalid votes. This thesis uses the 
vote inclusive of invalid votes when it is available, because the purpose is to understand 
the level of participation in voting and invalid voting can be regarded as a form of this 
participation.7
Denominator: voting age population. This thesis uses the voting age population as 
the denominator when calculating turnout for this section. There are two widely-used 
types of denominators: the number of registered electors and the voting age population. 
This thesis wants to know to what extent the government reflects the will of the people, 
and so its main concern around turnout is the consequences of abstention and the 
possible solutions to it. Therefore, we are interested in the fact of voting/abstention 
itself, and so what we want to know is not the level of participation in voting among
o
registered people but among all of those who are eligible to vote.
Turnout in 18 Industrial Democracies
Table 1.1 shows the turnout averages by decade between the 1950s and 1990s in 18 
industrial democracies. The result support the conventional wisdom that turnout has 
been declining in industrial democracies. The average turnout in 18 industrial 
democracies was 78.6% in the 1950s. The figure slightly increased by 0.4 percentage 
point in the 1960s. However, it started declining in the 1970s and reached 71.1% in the 
1990s. The average decrease of 5.0 percentage points in the 1990s was relatively 
substantial. In total, there was a decline of 7.5 percentage points on average between the 
1950s and 1990s. The average decline between the 1960s and 1990s was 7.9 percentage 
points. Although there have been a variety of trends in these countries, the general 
downward trend is clear between 1951 and 2000, particularly in the most recent 
decades.
6 Portugal and Spain had  an authoritarian  regim e until late 70s. G reece had a  m ilitary  regim e betw een  1967 and 1974.
7 In the case o f  the  U SA , the  num ber o f  votes inclusive o f  invalid  votes is no t availab le  and so th is  thesis  uses the  n u m b er o f  
votes exclusive o f  invalid  votes for the  USA.
8 T he vo ting  age population  is used  as the  denom inato r here. H ow ever, the num ber o f  registered  e lecto rs is used w hen the  
e ffectiveness o f  C V  in im proving  tu rnou t is assessed in this thesis.
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Table 1.1: Turnout in 18 Industrial Democracies between the 195Cs and 1990s
1951-60 
Av. (%)
1961-70 
Av. (%)
1971-80 
Av. (%)
1981-90 
Av. (%)
1991-00 
Av. (%)
1951-00
Total
1961-00
Total
Switzerland 60.6 53.4 
(- 7.2)
42.1
(-11.3)
40.4
(-1.7)
36.8
(-3.6) (-23.8) (-16.6)
Netherlands 87.9 90.1
(+2.2)
84.8
(-5.3)
81.9
(-2.9)
72.7
(-9.2) C-15:2) (-17.4)
Austria 89.3 89.9
(+0.6)
87.2
(-2.7)
87.0
(-0.2)
76.9
(-10.1) (-12.4) (-13.0)
Japan 73.2 70.2
(-3.0)
72.6 
(+ 2.4)
71.3 
(- 1-3)
61.7 
(- 9.6) (-11.5) (- 8.5)
Canada 69.6 71.9 
(+ 2.3)
68.0
(-3.9)
66.9 
(- 1-1)
58.5 
(- 8.4) (-11.1) (-13.4)
France 71.3 67.2
(-4.1)
67.0
(-0.2)
64.0
(-3.0)
60.6 
(- 3.4) (-10.7) (-6.6)
Germany 84.1 82.6 
(- 1.5)
84.8 
(+ 2.2)
76.4 
(- 8.4)
73.9 
(- 2.5) (-10.2) (- 8.7)
New Zealand 89.3 82.7
(-6.6)
83.1
(+0.4)
84.1 
(+ 1.0)
79.1 
(- 5.0) (- 3.6)
USA 60.6 61.4
(+0.8)
53.8 
(- 7.6)
51.6 
(- 2.2)
50.6 
(- 1.0)
imiM'Miiiiii.1
H(-10.0) Wmm
Finland 76.3 84.7
(+8-4)
82.0
(-2.7)
79.2 
(- 2.8)
69.4 
(- 9.8) ( J 49) (-15.3)
UK 78.2 73.4 
(- 4.8)
75.2
(+1.8)
73.5
* 1 .7 )
72.4
(-1.1) (-5.8) B 1.0)
Belgium 88.9 87.4
(-1.5)
88.0 
(+ 0.6)
89.0
(+1.0)
83.8 
(- 5.2) (- 5-l) (-3.6)
Ireland 73.4 74.2
(+0.8)
81.5
(+7.3)
76.1 
(- 5.4)
70.2 
(- 5.9) (-3.2) (-4.0)
Norway 78.3 82.6
(+4.3)
79.7
(-2.9)
82.5
(+2.8)
75.7
(-6.8) (-2.6) (-6.9)
Italy 92.7 94.2
(+1.5)
94.3
(+0.1)
93.1
(-1.2)
90.2 
(- 2.9) (- 2.5) (- 4.0)
Australia 82.6 84.4
(+1.8)
84.6
(+0.2)
82.9
(-U7)
82.6
(-0.3) (+0.0) (- !-8)
Denmark 80.6 87.1
(+6.5)
86.5
(-0.6)
84.3
(-2.2)
82.4
(-1.9) (+1-8) (- 4.7)
Sweden 78.3 84.9
(+6.6)
87.1
(+2.2)
85.8
(-1.3)
81.4
( - 4 . 4 , (+3.1) (-3.5)
Average 78.6 79.0 77.9 76.1 71.1
(+0.4) (-1.1) (-1.8) (- 5.0) (-7.5) (-7.9)
Increase 11 states 9 states 3 states 0 states 2 states 0 states
Decrease 7 states 9 states 15 states 18 states 15 states 18 states
Notes:
1. Seven m ajor countries are underlined.
2. Figures in parentheses are turnout changes in percentage points.
3. The 1971 Switzerland election turnout is not included into the calculation because o f  the unavailability o f  appropriate voting age population.
4. The 1995 Japan election in the source below is not included because it is an upper-house election.
Source: International IDEA (Pintor and Gratschew 2002,117-69).
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Turnout in Seven Major Industrial Democracies
It would be meaningful to extract seven major industrial democracies from 18 countries 
and to observe their trends in turnout. By limiting the number of countries in 
comparison, it becomes possible to graph the turnout change in each country in order to 
show national-level differences. The seven major industrial democracies are underlined 
in Table 1.1, and Figure 1.1 presents a graphical representation of turnout in these 
countries. The change in average turnout of these seven countries is added to this figure 
(75.5% in the 1950s, 74.4% in the 1960s, 73.7% in the 1970s, 71.0% in the 1980s, and 
66.8% in the 1990s). The average turnout declined continuously from 75.5% to 66.8% 
over the whole period. Moreover, almost all seven major industrial democracies 
experienced a significant decline in turnout during that period.
Figure 1.1: Turnout in Seven Major Industrial Democracdies 
between the 1950s and 1990s
100%
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Source: International IDEA (Pintor and Gratschew 2002, 117-69).
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Judging from Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1, it is clear that the industrial democracies 
have experienced a long-term downward trend in turnout. Although the seven
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democracies had a variety of patterns of turnout between over the four-decade period, 
the general downward trend is clear. Furthermore, despite the globalisation of 
democracy during the last quarter of the twentieth century, which Huntington called ‘the 
third wave’ of democratisation, the decline in turnout among the industrial democracies 
was particularly clear during the same period (i.e. the 1980s and 1990s). It is a 
widely-accepted assumption that low turnout is a problem for democracy (e.g. Franklin 
2002, 148; Lijphart 2000, 314-15). Facing this long-term downward trend in turnout, 
the solutions to low turnout have—particularly recently—drawn some attention of 
scholars. The next section will overview the potential solutions to low turnout.
1.2. Solutions to Low Turnout
While election is in effect a collective action to deliver proper representation of the 
people, voting in itself is very much an individual action. Therefore, even if high 
turnout is desirable for the society, it will not be achieved unless each individual is 
sufficiently motivated to vote. In other words, unless each individual estimates that the 
expected individual benefits from voting exceed the expected individual costs of voting, 
they will not vote and high turnout will not be achieved (see Models 1 and 2 in 3.1 of 
Chapter 3 for more theoretical descriptions). Therefore, there are two categories of 
solutions to low turnout as follows:
(1) Measures to diminish the expected individual costs of voting, and
(2) Measures to improve the expected individual benefits from voting.
This section presents an overview of the major potential solutions to low turnout from 
this view point and will also review empirical studies into the effectiveness of these 
solutions in improving turnout.
Easy-Voting Devices
If the expected cost of voting is diminished, turnout would improve (see Models 1 and 2 
in 3.1 of Chapter 3). There are many potential institutional devices for reducing the cost 
of voting, such as automatic registration, machine voting, short ballots, long polling 
hours, weekend voting, multiple polling days, postal voting, absentee voting, and 
less-crowded and close polling places. Empirical studies show that such easy-voting
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devices would improve turnout to some extent (Franklin 2002, 158-60; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980, 61-88). Therefore, it will be reasonable to conclude that easy-voting 
devices are reliable and effective solutions to low turnout. Moreover, the introduction of 
easy-voting devices does not accompany any major change in the political system (see 
Lijphart 2000, 321). Although the administrative cost is a potential problem for the 
adoption of easy-voting devices, this is less of a problem for the established industrial 
democracies. However, the cost of voting is already low in most of the industrial 
democracies (Aldrich 1993, 261-62; Niemi 1976, 115-16), and so any further reduction 
in the cost of voting would not dramatically improve turnout in these countries.
Concentration of Power
If the significance of election result (e.g. the power of parliament) is higher, an 
individual elector will gain more differential benefit when their preferred 
party/candidate wins (see Models 1 and 2 in 3.1 of Chapter 3). The concentration of 
power (e.g. the abolition of second chambers, federal systems, local governments, 
presidential systems and referendums) would be useful in improving the differential 
benefit from the electoral outcome. However, this differential benefit will be inevitably 
discounted by the probability of a single vote to change the electoral outcome, and this 
probability is infinitesimal. Therefore, any increase in the significance of an election 
through the concentration of power would not substantially improve the individual 
benefit from casting a single vote in theory, and so it would hardly improve turnout. 
Nevertheless, empirical studies show that the concentration of power would have some 
positive effect in improving turnout though this effect is not substantial (Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998, 246-47, 250; Franklin 2002, 158-60; R. Jackman 1987, 412, 416; R. 
Jackman and Miller 1995, 474, 476). However, the division of power has been 
implemented as a means to avoid despotism and to protect the freedom of citizens. 
Therefore, any prospect of a slight improvement in turnout is not likely to justify the 
drastic concentration of power in liberal democracies (see Lijphart 2000, 321).
Small Population Size
If the size of the population were smaller, the probability of a single vote changing the 
electoral outcome would be larger. Therefore, the expected individual benefits from 
voting would be larger, and so turnout should be higher (see Models 1 and 2 in 3.1 of
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Chapter 3). The very high turnout levels found in Malta is an interesting example of this 
hypothesis (see Hirczy 1995). Empirical studies indicate that the small size of a 
population has some positive relationship with turnout, but the size of the population 
needs to be very small in order to make any substantial improvement in turnout 
according to these studies (Blais and Carty 1990, 176-77; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, 
247-48, 250; Franklin 2002, 158-60). The territory and population of a country has 
usually been determined in relation to its history, culture, language, ethnicity, religion, 
relationship with neighbouring countries, etc. Therefore, an improvement in turnout 
would hardly legitimise division of an already-large country into smaller units. As 
Lijphart (2000, 321) argues, this finding about the relationship between the small 
population size and turnout is clearly not useful at all for countries with a large 
population.
Proportional Representation (PR)
PR would reduce the probability of wasted votes, and so PR should improve the 
probability of a single vote influencing the electoral outcome. As a consequence, PR 
should improve the expected individual benefits from a single vote and should in turn 
improve turnout (see Cox 2000b, 236; Lijphart 2000, 318). This hypothesis sounds 
plausible, but it actually has a fatal defect. Although a vote cast by an individual elector 
does not end up as a so-called wasted vote under PR, it will still be highly unlikely that 
this single vote secures an additional seat for their favourite party. Therefore, the 
probability of a single vote to change the electoral outcome is still extremely small (see 
Models 1 and 2 in 3.1 of Chapter 3). Although empirical studies are divided over the 
level of its contribution to turnout, they still suggest that PR might have some positive 
effects on turnout (Blais and Carty 1990, 176-77; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, 246-48, 
250; Franklin 2002, 158-60; R. Jackman 1987, 412, 416; R. Jackman and Miller 1995, 
474, 476).
However, the adoption of PR is a major electoral reform and is not likely to be 
accepted for the sole reason of improving turnout, particularly for a minor improvement 
in turnout. If a country has a homogenous society, in which people share political ends 
and means (Almond 1956, 398), and already has a combination of a single member 
plurality (SMP) electoral system and a two-party system, the adoption of PR is very 
unlikely (see Lijphart 2000, 321). The two major parties, which largely benefit from
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SMP and are in a position to reform the present electoral system, have strong motivation 
to inhibit any major electoral reform because this electoral reform could erode their 
political/electoral domination (Reynolds 2000, 62).9 Moreover, the introduction of PR 
might result in a difficult political situation for the nation, such as a multi-party system, 
a succession of coalition governments, and possible instability of the government (see 
Cox 2000b, 236).
Civic Education
Some people might find pain in abstention and/or pleasure in voting, independently of 
the electoral outcome. This kind of pain/pleasure should have a positive effect on 
turnout (see the explanation about the D term in Model 2 in 3.1 of Chapter 3). The 
problem is that this kind of pain/pleasure is largely a matter of political culture or 
political socialisation, and so it is difficult to manipulate it compared to institutional 
devices (see Lijphart 1997, 7). However, civic education could be instrumental for this 
purpose (see Almond and Verba [1963] 1989, 370-71; Denver and Hands 1990, 271-72; 
International IDEA 1999, 46-52; McAllister 1998, 11). Many countries provide children 
with some form of civic education (Ellis et al. 2006, 22-23). However, research into 
civic education as a solution to low turnout is underdeveloped, and it is not clear what 
type of civic education would be most useful in improving turnout. Moreover, it is even 
doubtful whether civic education has been, with a clear idea about the nature of voting, 
designed to motivate children to vote when they reach voting age and thereafter.
As Denver and Hands (1990, 271) argue, the assumption might have been that 
political awareness, exposure and discussion increased by civic education would result 
in more political participation. Their paper provides some empirical evidence supportive 
of this assumption in the UK (Denver and Hands 1990, 271-72). Although it could have 
been true that civic education has positive effect on turnout, it is also true that the UK 
has—particularly recently—experienced a long-term decline in turnout. Therefore, civic 
education is not likely to be a reliable measure to improve turnout at present, and a rapid 
technical development in this area is unlikely (see the next section for more explanation 
of civic education in this regard).
9 N ew  Z ealand  abo lished  SM P and adop ted  PR  in 1995, but this w as an ex traord inary  case  (see E lectoral C om m ission , N ew
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Compulsory Voting (CV)
CV imposes sanctions on abstainers, and CV provides electors with a disincentive to 
abstain. Therefore, CV should improve turnout (see Models 3 and 4 in 3.1 of Chapter 3 
for its theoretical grounds). While an individual elector has to bear the cost of voting if 
they vote, they have to incur the sanction against abstention if they do not vote under 
the CV system. Although very high turnout has not been achieved in all CV countries 
(see Table 2.1), empirical studies (i.e. regression analyses) indicate that CV tends to 
improve turnout by 6-15 percentage points (Blais and Carty 1990, 176-77; Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998, 246-77, 250; Franklin 2002, 158-60; R. Jackman 1987, 412, 416; R. 
Jackman and Miller 1995, 474, 476). If the cost of voting is low in industrial 
democracies as Niemi (1976, 115-16) and Aldrich (1993, 261-62) argue, some minor 
sanction against abstention would be sufficient to motivate electors to turn out.
1.3. Evaluating the Solutions
Among the major solutions to low turnout outlined above, CV is the most promising 
one (see Lijphart 2000, 321). CV has achieved very high turnout in several industrial 
democracies but it has mostly been neglected elsewhere. Moreover, the practice of CV 
has been declining across the world as Hirczy de Mino (2000, 45) argues. The 
Netherlands, which introduced CV in 1917, abolished it in 1970 (Mackie and Rose 1991, 
322). The number of Swiss cantons with CV has declined to one (Gratschew 2004, 
28-29). In Austria, three provinces had CV for national-level parliamentary elections but 
the CV system was abolished altogether in 1992 (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 
Austria 2007).10 CV is seen as an unsophisticated means of improving turnout and it is 
understandable that popularly-elected politicians and well-educated scholars have 
hesitated in discussing and proposing CV.
Solutions to low turnout must be adaptable and effective. Measures to improve 
the differential benefit from the electoral outcome (e.g. concentration of power) and 
measures to improve the probability of changing the electoral outcome by a single vote
Z ealand  2006).
10 N a tionw ide  C V  for p residential e lections w as abo lished  in 1982, and the C V  system  w as th en  up to  prov inces bu t the  last 
C V  prov ince abo lished  it in 2004  (Federal M in istry  o f  the  In terior, A ustria  2007).
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(e.g. division of a large country into small units, and adoption of PR) are ineffective 
and/or impractical (see Lijphart 2000, 321). The remaining options are as follows:
(1) Easy-voting devices to reduce the individual cost of voting,
(2) Civic education as a ‘soft power’ measure to motivate people to vote, and
(3) Compulsory voting as a ‘hard power’ measure to motivate people to vote.
Evaluating Easy-Voting Devices
Easy-voting devices are unlikely to provoke much fundamental objection, though they 
might have some practical/technical difficulties (e.g. administrative cost) and some of 
the easy-voting devices might not be adopted in the end. Any reduction in the cost of 
voting would have some effect of improving turnout, and empirical studies support this 
hypothesis (see the last section). However, these empirical studies also indicate that the 
effectiveness of easy-voting devices is not substantial. It will be impossible to reduce 
this cost to zero even if all possible easy-voting devices were adopted. Moreover, the 
cost of voting seems to be already low in most of the industrial democracies (see 
Aldrich 1993, 261-62; Niemi 1976, 115-16). Therefore, the government’s flexibility to 
introduce this measure is limited, and so the effect of this effort would also be limited. It 
seems that some other measures to motivate electors to vote need to be combined with 
the adoption of easy-voting devices in order to substantially improve turnout.
Evaluating Civic Education
Civic education might be the most respectable solution to the problem of low turnout. It 
might be a democratic ideal that citizens be well-informed about politics, be interested 
in politics and voluntarily participate in politics (see Katz 1997, 5; Pateman 1970, chap. 
2). However, the major problem of civic education is that it does not appear to be 
sufficiently effective in improving turnout compared to institutional devices (Lijphart 
1997, 7). First, it would be difficult to remould the belief system and the mindset of 
adults, and so civic education will be ineffective for the bulk of the population. Second, 
civic education could possibly be effective on children, but it would be technically 
difficult to design a curriculum that would motivate children to vote when they reached 
the voting age and thereafter. While election represents a collective action, voting in 
itself is an individual action. Therefore, even if civic education succeeded in convincing 
children that an election is important for the society and high turnout is socially
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desirable, civic education might fail in motivating them to individually cast a vote, 
whose probability to change the electoral outcome is infinitesimal. Hence, electoral 
education would not be sufficiently effective in motivating children to vote though it 
could possibly have some positive effect on turnout (Denver and Hands 1990, 271-72).
Therefore, civic education also needs to be moral education for this purpose. A 
curriculum for this moral education should be designed to implant into children (1) a 
feeling of guilt if they failed to vote and/or (2) a feeling of satisfaction when they do 
vote. The current civic-education curricula of most industrial democracies do not appear 
to have achieved this goal judging from the fact that turnout has been decreasing. It is 
even doubtful whether civic education has ever been designed as moral education for 
this purpose with any clear understanding about the nature of voting as individual action. 
A simple intensification of current civic education is therefore not likely to substantially 
increase turnout.
It would be difficult to design an effective curriculum for moral education even if 
it were possible (see Lijphart 1997, 7). From an ethical viewpoint, it would be difficult 
to perform challenging experiments on children or young adults. Moreover, it would be 
difficult to identify and control the variables other than civic education.11 Furthermore, 
each cycle of experiment would inevitably be long, and curriculum designers cannot get 
a proper feedback from their experiment before tested children reach the voting age. 
Moreover, civic education might be insufficiently effective in improving turnout even if 
a proper curriculum were designed and implemented. Therefore, industrial democracies 
that already have a problem of low turnout would need to consider using other solutions 
to low turnout in addition to easy-voting devices and civic education.
Evaluating Compulsory Voting (CV)
In contrast to the two other devices, CV would achieve an immediate, substantial 
increase in turnout, and so CV is worthy of special attention (see Lijphart 1997, 8-10). 
However, CV has not been widely used in practice, and researchers have not paid much 
attention to it as a real option until recently (see Hirczy de Mino 2000, 45). Nevertheless, 
against the background of continuous decline in turnout among industrial democracies, 
it is worth seriously considering the usefulness of this ‘hard-power’ measure. There may
11 I appreciate  Professor K en ’ich IK E D A  hav ing  m entioned it in conversation  w ith  the  au thor on  13 Ju ly  2006.
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be some cases in which ‘soft power’ is more useful in achieving the political goal in 
terms of cost and friction than ‘hard power.’ However, controlling human mind is more 
difficult than controlling human behaviour, and so ‘soft power’ is possibly less effective 
in achieving the same goal. Overall, when ‘soft power’ is sensibly combined with ‘hard 
power,’ the goal is likely to be achieved most sufficiently, most effectively and most 
smoothly (see Nye 2004, 147).12
1.4. Conclusion
As the first part of this chapter pointed out, turnout has been declining among the 
industrial democracies. As a result, the discussion of effective and practical solutions to 
remedy the problem has been growing. Measures to improve the differential benefit 
from the electoral outcome (e.g. concentration of power) and measures to improve the 
probability of changing the electoral outcome by a single vote (e.g. division of country 
and adoption of PR) are generally ineffective and/or impractical. However, measures to 
reduce the cost of voting and measures to motivate electors to vote independently of the 
electoral outcome may be effective in improving turnout. More specifically, these 
potentially effective measures are easy-voting devices (e.g. automatic registration, 
absentee voting and weekend voting), civic education and CV. These three measures are 
not opposed to each other either in theory or in practice, and so these measures can be 
used in combination.
Among these three likely solutions, easy-voting devices would diminish the cost 
of voting and so would help electors to overcome the threshold of the cost of voting and 
to turn out. However, the cost of voting is already low in most of the industrial 
democracies, and so the scope for improvement in turnout by the use of these devices 
would be limited. Civic education is an attempt to motivate people to vote by using ‘soft 
power.’ However, civic education deals with psychological orientations towards politics, 
about which we do relatively little. Consequently, its successful exercise would be 
technically difficult. Moreover, civic education is a long-term measure, and it would
12 A part from  effectiveness, it is doubtful w hether soft pow er is m ore hum ane  th an  hard  pow er. W hile hard  pow er tries  to 
contro l hum an  behav iour, so ft pow er tries to  control the ir m ind. I f  soft pow er w ere  e ffec tive ly  exercised , peop le  w ould  n o t be free 
even  in th e ir m ind. S oft pow er cou ld  be regarded  as a  paraphrase  o f  m ind  contro l o r propaganda.
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have little immediate effect on turnout. In contrast, CV is an attempt to motivate people 
to vote by using ‘hard power.’ It would have an immediate, substantial effect in 
improving turnout and this effect would persist so long as CV exists. CV is a promising 
solution to low turnout, and so CV is worth serious consideration to use in combination 
with easy-voting devices and civic education. The next chapter examines the practice of 
CV across the world and reviews previous studies of CV.
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CHAPTER 2 
The Theory and Practice of Compulsory Voting
As Chapter 1 demonstrated, turnout has been declining among the industrial 
democracies, and CV is the most promising solution to low turnout. CV has achieved 
high turnout in several countries (e.g. Australia and Belgium). However, it has been 
mostly neglected elsewhere as a solution to the problem of turnout. CV is a strong 
measure, and so it is understandable that governments hesitate in its introduction. 
Nevertheless, if it becomes clear for industrial democracies that CV is useful to a great 
degree, many industrial democracies will overcome this hesitation and will introduce 
CV. Many academic studies have examined CV (and major works are introduced in this 
chapter), but they have not persuaded many industrial democracies to adopt it. This 
thesis aims at assessing the overall usefulness of CV for industrial democracies. 
However, before starting this assessment, this chapter will overview the practice of CV 
in the world and the previous studies on CV in order to identify the proper course of 
research into the usefulness of CV.
In order to lay the foundations of the research into the usefulness of CV, this 
chapter will first define CV and describe actual CV systems across the world. This 
observation suggests that the practice of CV is enormously diverse, and the reality of 
CV is too unwieldy to make any meaningful assessment of its usefulness. Therefore, 
without formulating an ideal type, it would be impossible to properly assess the 
usefulness of CV. Thus, this chapter will describe the typical CV and will then 
formulate the ideal type of CV for industrial democracies. Second, the chapter will 
evaluate previous studies of CV with an intention of assessing the overall usefulness of 
CV. Finally, the chapter will identify niches in the previous studies in regard to the 
usefulness of CV for industrial democracies.
2.1. Practice of Compulsory Voting
This section will overview the practice of CV in the world in order to identify its main 
features. In order to accomplish this task, this section will first provide a ‘definition of
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CV’ and will determine the scope of CV for observation. Next, the section will describe 
how CV operates across the world. This overview suggests that the practice of CV is 
enormously diverse even within the accepted parameters of CV. Consequently, this 
section will identify the ‘typical CV’ and will finally formulate the ‘ideal type of CV’ 
for industrial democracies.
A Definition of CV
CV is a much disputed concept (but see a definition of CV by Hirczy de Mino 2000, 44). 
For example, social (or political) sanction against abstention, like that of the former 
Soviet-block countries, has occasionally been included in the concept of CV (e.g. 
Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1989, 98-103). Meanwhile, it has been argued that 
compulsory voting is a misnomer, and it is practically compulsory attendance at the 
polling place because of the existence of the secret ballot system (Robson 1923, 576). It 
is also arguable whether a law that requires electors to vote but does not provide any 
penalty against offenders should be considered to be CV. Therefore, CV needs to be 
defined, otherwise it will be difficult to identify actual CVs for examination. For the 
purpose of this thesis, a minimalist approach defines CV as follows:
CV is a legal arrangement to provide that voting/tuming-out is a legal
duty.
However, this definition is not sufficiently inclusive. Therefore, this subsection will try 
to clarify it by providing several examples and more explanations as follows.
Turning out to vote is the minimum requirement to meet this definition, though 
voting rather than turning-out per se is the actual purpose of the introduction of CV. So 
long as a legal regulation meets this condition, it does not matter whether this regulation 
requires tuming-out only (i.e. an attendance at the polling place), the casting of a valid 
or invalid vote, or the casting of a valid vote. Although this is an abstention abatement 
regulation rather than ‘compulsory voting,’ this thesis still regards it as a broad 
definition of CV. Under the secret ballot system, it is technically difficult to check 
whether each elector actually cast a valid vote. Therefore, what can be compulsory is 
attendance at the polling place rather than voting, as Robson (1923, 576) argues.
A legal duty to vote/turn-out is an essential part of this definition. So long as a 
regulation provides that voting/tuming-out is a legal duty, this regulation fits the
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definition of CV. Therefore, any prescription of legal sanctions against offences is not 
essential for the definition of CV. Moreover, even if some sanction against abstention is 
provided, the actual imposition of prescribed sanctions on offenders is not essential, 
either. Furthermore, if a regulation does not explicitly provide that voting/tuming-out is 
a legal duty but prescribes legal sanctions against non-voting/abstention, this regulation 
is regarded as implicitly providing that voting/tuming-out is a legal duty.
A moral duty to vote/tum-out is irrelevant to this definition, while a legal duty to 
vote/tum-out is essential to the definition. As shown in Figure 2.1 below, the moral duty 
overlaps with the legal duty. However, all moral duties are not—and do not need to 
be—legal duties (Wertheimer 1975, 283). So long as a legal regulation provides a legal 
duty (i.e. shaded (b) and (c) in Figure 2.1) of voting/tuming-out, this regulation fits the 
definition of CV and it does not matter whether voting/tuming-out is a moral duty. 
Therefore, a legal regulation that merely declares voting/tuming-out to be a moral duty 
(like that of Portugal) falls into the sub-set (a) in Figure 2.1 below.13 However, if a 
legal regulation provides that voting/tuming-out is a duty without specifying whether it 
is a moral or a legal duty, this duty is regarded as a legal one because rules and 
regulations are supposed to make legal arrangements rather than making moral 
declarations.
Figure 2.1: Relationship between Two Duties
Moral Duty Legal Duty
Legal sanctions against non-voting/abstention may be provided but are not 
essential for this definition of CV. For example, the CV law may provide that voting is a
13 C onstitu tion  o f  the Portuguese R epublic, A rtic le  49, Section 2 provides as follows, T h e  righ t to  vote shall be exercised 
personally  and shall constitu te  a civic du ty .’ < w w w .parlam ento .p t/ingles/cons_leg/crp_ing/index.h tm l>  (18 Sep tem ber 2007). 
H ow ever, there  is no o ther legal arrangem ent in relation to the duty  to  vote.
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duty but it may not stipulate any penalty for illegitimate abstention (see Table 2.1). 
Without any sanctions, it is impossible for the government to legally enforce 
voting/tuming-out and so this legal regulation cannot be ‘compulsory’ 
voting/tuming-out in the literal sense, though there can still be ‘obligatory’ 
voting/tuming-out. However, compulsory voting (CV) is a much more widely-used 
expression than obligatory voting among political students, and so this thesis follows 
the majority and uses this conventional expression of CV.
The actual enforcement of voting/tuming-out is not essential for meeting this 
definition of CV even if the law provides legal sanctions against non-voting/abstention. 
When rules and regulations prescribe legal sanctions against offences, the government is 
supposed to impose these sanctions on offenders. However, in reality, the government 
may not be interested in actually imposing these sanctions on offenders (Gratschew 
2002, 106; Gratschew 2004, 26). In particular, the government may not have sufficient 
resources to investigate cases, identify offenders and impose sanctions on them. Even if 
the government does not impose the prescribed sanctions on non-voters/abstainers, this 
omission does not matter regarding this definition of CV. For example, the sanction 
against abstention is imprisonment in Greece, but this sanction has never been applied, 
according to IPU 2007. However, the case of Greece fits the definition of CV (see Table 
2.1 for cases o f ‘weak’ enforcement).
Social sanction/enforcement of voting/tuming-out does not satisfy this definition 
of CV. This is because social sanction/enforcement implies that voting/tuming-out is a 
social duty but does not imply that it is a legal duty. In many of the former Soviet-block 
countries, voting/tuming-out was legally voluntary but was socially—or politically— 
compulsory (see Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1989, 98-103). However, the definition of 
CV of this thesis does not include such kind of *de facto ' compulsory voting. Even in 
authentic liberal democracies, some peer pressure to vote/tum-out exists. However, 
none of such social sanction/enforcement of voting/tuming-out is relevant to this 
definition of CV.
Function of CV
The subsection above provided a descriptive, legal definition of CV. In order to examine 
its function, it is possible to explain the expected, direct effect of CV and its mechanism 
as follows:
34
The function of CV is to mobilise electors to vote/tum-out by providing 
them with material and non-material disincentives to abstain from 
voting.
This explanation of the function of CV should not be confused with the definition of CV. 
For example, the social sanction/enforcement of voting/tuming-out satisfies this 
explanation of CV above, but it does not satisfy the descriptive, legal definition of CV 
used in the last subsection. However, this thesis does not regard such social 
sanction/enforcement as CV. CV is nothing more than an institutional device and, as is 
so often the case with such devices, CV can have a variety of effects according to its 
usage and environment. However, this variety does not affect the nature of CV as an 
institutional device, and CV in itself is neither useful nor harmful. Therefore, CV might 
eventually be useful for several countries but might not so for others.
Inducement voting (IV), under which the government offers electors some 
material inducement to vote/tum-out (e.g. a monetary reward), can be logically an 
alternative to CV (Hasen 1996, 2135, 2169; Lijphart 1997, 11; Rydon and Goot 1989, 
11). However, its exercise is new and rare (see Balinov 2006; Birch 2007, 19-20; Ellis et 
al. 2006, 23-24; Gratschew 2006; Hasen 1996, 2136; Hasen 2000; Hicks 2002; Keaney 
and Rogers 2006, 24). Its effect and mechanism can be explained as follows:
The function of IV is to mobilise electors to vote/tum-out by providing 
them with material incentives.
The major advantage of IV is that it does not restrict freedom of electors. One of the 
major objections against CV is that it infringes personal liberty (see the next section for 
the major objections against CV). However, IV does not have this disadvantage, and so 
IV is a safer alternative to CV in this regard. Meanwhile, the main shortcoming of IV is 
that it might not be as effective in improving turnout as is CV. IV provides electors with 
material incentives to vote/tum-out but does not provide them with non-material 
incentives, with which CV can provide them by stimulating their law-abiding mentality 
(see Hasen 1996, 2171). Another possible objection to IV is a moral one. It might be 
argued that voting is a civic duty and so voting/tuming-out should not be paid for. 
However, parliamentarians and civil servants are paid for their public service in many 
countries, and this payment is hardly regarded as being shameful. In any case, neither 
IV itself nor such moral argument is the main concern of this thesis, but 3.1 of Chapter 3
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will briefly explain the underlying mechanism of IV.
The Practice of CV in the World
Table 2.1 below lists the countries in the world that use CV, including developing 
countries.14 In this table, CV countries are listed according to the level of turnout of the 
registered electors (i.e. ‘Turnout/Reg’ in Table 2.1 below). The results show that the 
practice of CV is not common, but it is not necessarily rare either. The number of CV 
countries is 28 (16.1%) out of the 174 independent democracies whose data are stored 
in the International IDEA database of elections (Pintor, and Gratschew 2002).15 CV 
countries are therefore a substantial minority among democracies.
14 T ab le  2.1 is com piled  from  G ratschew  2002 and G ratschew  2004, because  h e r im plic it selection  standard  o f  C V  countries 
seem s to  be the  sam e as the  defin ition  o f  C V  by  th is  thesis  and h e r lists o f  C V  coun tries  are m ore in form ative  than  o ther lists: C IA  
2007; D erbysh ire  and D erbyshire 19 8 9 ,9 8 -1 0 3 ; H erm an 1976 ,1 4 6 -4 7 ; L eD uc, N iem i and N orris 2 0 0 2 ,1 3 -1 5 ; N oh len  e t al. 2000, 
355-73. IPU  2007 a lso provides inform ation about electoral system s and vo ting  system s (inclusive  o f  C V ) in each country.
15 Sw itzerland is coun ted  as one o f  C V  countries in this calculation .
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Table 2.1: Practice of CV in the World
Country Turnout/Reg (%) Turnout/VAP (%) Sanctions Enforcement
Australia 95.5 82.1 a, b Strict
Singapore 95.3 35.4 d Strict
Uruguay 91.6 95.4 b, d Strict
Cyprus 91.0 76.8 a, b Strict
Belgium 90.9 83.2 a, b, d, e Strict
Nauru 90.3 50.1 a, b Strict
Chile 89.2 77.5 a, b, c Weak
Luxembourg 87.4 58.7 a, b Strict
Liechtenstein 86.8 54.0 a, b Weak
Turkey 86.2 79.8 b Weak
Italy 82.2 86.1 None Not enforced
Fiji 82.1 65.3 a, b, c Strict
Peru 81.7 78.6 b, d Weak
Brazil 80.4 80.5 b Weak
Argentina 78.4 78.8 a, b, d Weak
Greece 75.7 86.5 Weak
Costa Rica 75.6 79.0 None Not enforced
Paraguay 73.4 52.4 b N/A
Bolivia 71.1 56.2 d N/A
Honduras 68.4 65.8 None Not enforced
Thailand 66.2 70.1 None Not enforced
Dominican Republic 65.8 53.9 None Not enforced
Mexico 57.8 51.3 None/e Weak
Ecuador 57.6 58.2 b Weak
Egypt 46.2 27.7 a, b, c N/A
Guatemala 43.6 32.3 None Not enforced
Gabon N/A N/A N/A N/A
Switzerland (Schaffhausen) - - b Strict
Average 77.3 66.0 - -
Notes:
1. Turnout is the average o f  last two parliamentary (lower-house if  applicable) elections com piled by Pintor and G ratschew 2002. Votes include 
invalid votes when available.
2. Reg: the registered electors, VAP: the voting age population, N/A: not available.
3. Sanctions: a=Explanation, b=Fine, c=Possible Imprisonment, d=Infringem ent o f  Civil Rights or Disenfranchisement, e=Other.
4. In Switzerland, only one o f  26 cantons has CV.
5. The Netherlands abolished CV in 1970. In Austria, several provinces had CV for the N ational Council but this CV was abolished in 1992 
according to the Federal M inistry o f  Interior, Austria (2007). Italy abolished sanctions against abstention but still has a law providing that voting is a 
duty without clarifying whether it is a legal duty or moral duty, according to Gratschew  (2004, 28-29).
Sources: Electoral Commission 2006, 18; Gratschew 2002; Gratschew 2004; Pintor and Gratschew  2002, 125-56.
The first conclusion from Table 2.1 is that the practice of CV is enormously 
diverse. Gratschew (2002, 106; 2004, 26) argues that CV should be understood in a 
spectrum from a purely symbolic law to a government that systematically follows up 
each abstainer and imposes sanctions on offenders. This spectrum model is useful in
37
understanding the practice of CV across the world. However, the reality of the practice 
of CV is, of course, much more complex than this model. First, the regulation of CV 
varies widely; reprimand, fine, imprisonment, disenfranchisement, etc. are prescribed as 
sanctions against non-voting/abstention. While some countries combine several types of 
sanctions (e.g. Belgium) and several use only one of them (e.g. Australia), others do not 
prescribe any sanction though a legal regulation provides that voting/tuming-out is a 
duty. Moreover, there are many other varieties of CV in regard to age, marital status, 
distance from the registered polling place, etc. Therefore, there is no such thing as the 
CV, but CV varies greatly in its provision and practice. However, this complexity is the 
very reason why Gratschew’s spectrum model is useful in simplifying and 
understanding the reality.
The practice of CV involves further complexities. First, the level of turnout in CV 
countries varies considerably.16 While the average turnout of the registered electors is 
95.5% in Australia, it is merely 43.6% in Guatemala. Moreover, the political and 
economic character of CV countries is very diverse; some are liberal democracies (e.g. 
Australia and Belgium), but others are not (e.g. Peru and Mexico). In addition, some are 
industrial countries, while others are economically underdeveloped. Therefore, the 
practice of CV is also diverse in regard to its effect (i.e. turnout) and environment (i.e. 
country features). Moreover, Gratschew’s spectrum model is still unwieldy for assessing 
the usefulness of CV for industrial democracies. Therefore, this thesis will formulate the 
ideal type of CV and will assess its usefulness for industrial democracies. However, 
before formulating the ideal type of CV, this thesis will identify the typical CV from the 
overview of the practice of CV in the world.
The Typical CV System
From the overview of the practice of CV in the world, the typical CV can be defined as 
follows:
For a typical CV system, a law provides that voting is a legal duty and
prescribes a moderate fine for non-voting/abstention without any
16 C V  in itse lf is an institutional device, and C V  can w ork  on ly  on the  registered electors. T herefore, ‘T u rn o u t/R eg ’ can be 
regarded  as the  m ain  index o f  the effectiveness o f  C V . H ow ever, the  purpose o f  the  in troduction  o f  C V  is high  tu rnou t am ong  all 
electors ra ther than all registered electors. T herefore, ‘T u m o u t/V A P ’ is a lso  listed as the  secondary  index in T ab le  2 .1 . T here  is 
usually  som e discrepancy  betw een the  registered  electors and the  vo ting  age population.
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legitimate reason. Although the level of enforcement is weak (and fines 
are rarely imposed on offenders), the turnout of the registered electors 
is 80% and that of the voting age population is slightly lower than 80%.
The country is politically a liberal democracy and is economically a 
developing country.
As CV is practiced across the world, sanctions against non-voting/abstention vary 
widely though a moderate fine is the norm. Among 26 CV countries, seven countries 
(26.9%) do not have any penal code for non-voting/abstention, 16 countries (61.5%) 
impose a fine, four countries (14.8%) even have an imprisonment system, and six
1 7countries (23.1%) have a system of deprivation of civil rights or disenfranchisement.
A fine is therefore the typical sanction against non-voting/abstention, but the amount 
involved is usually small. Among 26 CV countries, the level of enforcement is ‘strict’ in 
eight countries, ‘weak’ in nine countries and relevant information is unavailable about 
four countries. Another six countries do not have any penal code, and so there is no 
enforcement of voting/tuming-out in these six countries. Therefore, the median level of 
enforcement is ‘weak.’ Turnout among registered electors is typically 80%, judging 
from the fact that the median of nine ‘weak’ enforcement countries is 80.4% in Brazil. 
Turnout of the voting age population is typically slightly lower than 80%, judging from 
the fact that the median of nine ‘weak’ enforcement countries is 78.6% in Peru. The 
typical CV country is politically a liberal democracy by definition, and it is 
economically a developing country.
The Ideal Type of CV for Industrial Democracies
The last subsection identified the typical type of CV. However, this typical CV will not 
be useful for the research purpose of this thesis. First, the typical CV country is a 
developing country, while this thesis aims at assessing the usefulness of CV for 
industrial democracies. Second, the typical CV system is unlikely to be the most 
effective one in achieving high turnout, particularly in regard to the level of its 
enforcement. Therefore, this thesis will formulate the ideal type of CV for industrial 
democracies as follows:
For the ideal type of CV system, a law provides that voting is a legal
17 T ab le  2.1 lists 28 countries. H ow ever, in fo rm ation  about sanctions in G abon is no t availab le , and on ly  one o f  26  can tons has 
C V  in Sw itzerland. Therefore, these tw o countries are excluded from  th is calcu lation .
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duty and the law prescribes a moderate fine for abstention without any 
legitimate reason. The government systematically and effectively 
investigates abstainers and then imposes sanctions on offenders.
The administration of CV would be costly in terms of financial and human resources 
(Gratschew 2002, 106; Gratschew 2004, 26; Hughes 1966, 83; Phillips 2001, 21-22). 
However, industrial democracies are prosperous, and so the government will be able to 
allocate the necessary resources to the administration of CV. This thesis will assess the 
usefulness of this ideal type of CV for industrial democracies.
2.2. Previous Studies of Compulsory Voting
CV is not a new research topic. Belgium introduced CV in 1893, the Netherlands in
■I A
1917, and Australia in 1924. The history of the argument over CV is naturally older 
than that of its practice, and many academic works have been published on CV to the 
present. However, despite the scientific development of political science after World 
War II, new scientific methods were rarely applied to CV before the 1980s. Because of 
their methodological limitations, the pre-scientific studies on CV tended to be anecdotal 
about the effectiveness of CV in improving turnout and uncertain how to evaluate the 
system. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the older studies effectively identified the 
advantages and disadvantages of CV and laid the groundwork for the later academic 
study of CV using modem methods in the 1980s and 1990s.
This section will review the previous studies of CV in order to identify what they 
have achieved and what they have not yet achieved in assessing the overall usefulness 
of CV. First, this section will overview major advantages and disadvantages of CV. 
Then, the section will overview the recent scientific development achieved by applying 
new methods. In the 1980s, regression analysis started providing scientific evidence for 
the hypothesis that CV is effective in improving turnout, over which the older studies 
had anecdotally argued. In the 1990s, data analysis was combined with a value standard 
(i.e. democracy) to provide a scientific explanation as to the main advantage of CV (i.e. 
precise representation). As a preparation for assessing the overall usefulness of CV for
18 B elg ium  w as probably  the  first country  tha t in troduced na tionw ide  CV. H ow ever, th is  thesis will n o t pu rsu e  this issue 
because the  h isto ry  o f  C V  is no t its m ain  concern . See R obson (1923, 570-72) for early  exercises o f  CV.
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industrial democracies, this section will then identify gaps in the previous studies.
Advantages and Disadvantages of CV
When Hughes (1966) comprehensively listed up the advantages and disadvantages of 
CV, he effectively accomplished this task though later political students amended his list 
and compiled their own (AEC 2007a; Bennett 2005, 7-10; Electoral Commission 2006, 
12; Gratschew 2002, 105-6; Gratschew 2004, 27-30; Healy and Warden 1995, 19-30; 
Major 1995, 29-42; Phillips 2001, 7-26; Smith 2001).19 This list can be regarded as the 
groundwork for later scientific development in evaluation of CV starting in the 1990s, 
and Lijphart (1997) provided a scientific explanation as to one of them. This thesis will 
list up likely advantages and disadvantages of CV as follows.
Table 2.2: Likely Advantages and Disadvantages of CV
(11 Advantages (2) Disadvantages
a. Correct representation a. Restriction on freedom
b. Democratic legitimacy b. Degeneration of votes
c. Fulfilment of the civic duty c. Political inactivity
d. Reduction in election funds d. Degeneration of election campaign
e. Educational effect e. Difficulty and cost of enforcement
f. Safeguard against extremism f. Danger of extremism
Note: This list is newly compiled mainly based on Hughes 1966.
Likely Advantages of CV. Correct representation is a major argument for CV. If 
the government is to serve the majority of the people, the will of the majority should be 
reflected in politics. This would result in improvement in the well-being of the people 
(or that of the majority at least). The direct effect of CV is high turnout, and high 
turnout should result in more precise representation of the will of the people (Hughes 
1966, 81). Some social groups are more likely to vote than other social groups when
19 H ughes (1966) exam ined  parliam entary  records o f  federal/state  parliam ents in A ustra lia  and lis ted  up likely  advan tages and  
d isadvan tages o f  C V . H ow ever, argum ents over C V  have been m ostly  th e  sam e in B elg ium  (A ckaert and  de W in ter 1996; D e 
C eun ick  e t al. 2007 ; G ra tschew  2 0 0 4 ,2 8 ; P ilet 2007), the  N etherlands (G ratschew  2 0 0 4 ,2 9 ; M inch in  1 9 9 2 ,1 1 ), and G reece  
(G ra tschew  2 0 0 4 ,2 8 ; M alkopoulou  2007).
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voting is voluntary. However, if everybody votes, the electoral outcome will more 
accurately represent the will of the majority. However, if turnout is low, there is a risk 
that the electoral outcome will be different from that of the majority of all electors. 
Therefore, high turnout is desirable (Lijphart 1997).
Democratic legitimacy is occasionally mentioned as an advantage of CV (Hughes 
1966, 82). As Teixeira (1992, 101-2) argues, the fewer people participate in elections, 
the more the extent to which the government truly rests on the consent of the people 
may be called into question. The result of such a deficit of democratic legitimacy could 
range from ineffective government to total failure of government. Democracy is not the 
sole source of legitimacy for the government. However, if the incumbent government is 
suffering a deficit of legitimacy, one way to try to improve its legitimacy will be a 
demonstration that the government is accurately reflecting the will of the people and so 
is genuinely democratic. Nevertheless, established democracies, as Hirczy de Mino 
(2000, 46) argues, seem to enjoy great legitimacy to begin with and so they would not 
have a strong need for visible demonstration of regime support.
Fulfilment of civic duty will be secured by CV. Voting is the right of all citizens in 
a democracy. However, voting is widely regarded as a civic duty, though voting is not 
currently a legal requirement in most democracies. Elections represent a collective 
action to produce the proper representation of the people. Meanwhile, voting represents 
an individual action, but citizens are supposed to exercise their right to vote in order to 
make a proper contribution to the election as collective action. Therefore, it would be 
reasonable to regard voting as a civic duty. If citizens voluntarily fulfil this civic duty, 
voting does not need to be legally enforced but, if they do not, it might be necessary to 
enforce them to fulfil this civic duty. CV would be useful for this purpose. However, 
this does not automatically mean that CV should be introduced unless all electors vote. 
If election as collective action fails to deliver what is required (i.e. proper representation 
of the people), then the introduction of CV will be justifiable though CV is a strong 
measure (Hughes 1966, 81; Phillips 2001, 12-14; Wertheimer 1975, 279-81).21
20 A lso  see  argum ents addressed by  A ustralian  parliam entarians: S enato r L ynch (C om m onw ealth  Parliam en tary  D ebates.
Senate. 25  A u g u st 1915, 6054), Senator O ’K eefe (C om m onw ealth  P arliam entary  D ebates. Senate. 25 A ugust 1915, 6064), Senato r 
B akhap  (C om m onw ealth  P arliam entary  D ebates. Senate. 25 A ugust 1915, 6067), S enato r Payne (C om m onw ealth  P arliam entary  
D ebates. Senate. 17 Ju ly  1924, 2180).
21 A lso  see  a rgum ents addressed  by A ustra lian  parliam entarians: S enato r R ussell (C om m onw ealth  P arliam en tary  D ebates. 
Senate. 13 A u g u st 1915, 5753), C ook M P  (C om m onw ealth  P arliam entary  D ebates. H ouse  o f  R epresentatives. 8 S ep tem ber 1915,
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Reduction in election funds should result from the introduction of CV (Lijphart 
1997, 10). CV would mostly relieve parties and candidates from the burden of 
psychological/physical mobilisation of their supporters to attend polling places (Hughes 
1966, 82), and so the campaign expenses borne by parties and candidates should 
diminish. First, this reduction in election funds would be useful for parties and 
candidates. If parties and candidates do not need to raise a lot of election funds, they 
should be relatively free from minority interests as major donors and so they would be 
less likely to be diverted from the policies that they actually want to pursue. Moreover, 
parties and candidates would not need to mobilise as many election campaigners as they 
do under VV, and this would further release them from the pressure of minority interests. 
Second, the reduction in election funds would be useful for the people. Even if parties 
and candidates are relatively independent from minority interests under CV, they will 
still need to seek votes from electors. Therefore, their relative independence from 
minority interests should result in the improvement in the influence of general electors 
on parties and candidates. This should result in more voter influence on public policy 
(Puplick 1994,22-23).22
An educational effect is also mentioned as an advantage of CV. Habitual 
abstainers may think that politics is irrelevant to them under VV, but they would 
inevitably start thinking about politics once they are forced to vote. CV should therefore 
improve the interest, knowledge and even the sense of responsibility about politics 
among the public (Hughes 1966, 82; Lijphart 1997, 10: also see Mill 1862, chap. 3, para. 
2; Pateman 1970, 42-43).23 However, this argument has been challenged on the basis of 
empirical evidence (McAllister 1998, 12; Minchin 1996a, 244-45; Rydon and Goot 
1989, 7). Indeed, the conventional argument on the educational effect of CV is 
questionable. Electors are more likely to take a shortcut by developing party affiliation 
rather than becoming more informed citizens (see Downs 1957, 98-100). Although they 
might think about politics in the process of the acquisition of party affiliation, they 
would think little about politics once they establish it. Even if CV has some educational
6715), S enato r F ind ley  (C om m onw ealth  Parliam entary  D ebates. Senate. 17 Ju ly  1 9 2 4 ,2 1 8 5 ), M ann M P (C om m onw ealth  
P arliam entary  D ebates. H ouse  o f  R epresentatives. 24  Ju ly  1924 ,2446-47).
22  A lso  see an argum en t addressed  by an A ustra lian  parliam entarian: S enato r F ind ley  (C om m onw ealth  P arliam en tary  D ebates. 
Senate. 17 Ju ly  1 9 2 4 ,2184).
23 A lso  see  argum ents addressed  by A ustra lian  parliam entarians: Senato r Payne (C om m onw ealth  Parliam en tary  D ebates.
Senate. 17 Ju ly  1 9 2 4 ,2 1 8 0 ), M ann  M P (C om m onw ealth  Parliam entary  D ebates. H ouse o f  R epresentatives. 24  Ju ly  1924, 2446-47).
43
effect upon electors, this effect would not be substantial.
Safeguard against extremism might be an advantage of CV. It is time-consuming 
for each elector to collect information about candidates, parties, policies and political 
and social events and make real choices at each election, but acquisition of party 
affiliation would substantially reduce this cost of information (Downs 1957, 98-100). 
Therefore, many electors would establish a party affiliation as a shortcut if CV is 
introduced. If electors establish this party affiliation under stable social/economic 
conditions, most of them would identify with a major party. This party affiliation would 
therefore operate as a safeguard against acute extremism. If the vast majority of electors 
are already aligned with major parties, they would not support extreme parties even if 
social/economic conditions deteriorate (Lijphart 1997, 10). However, the danger of 
extremism is not likely to be a major concern for established democracies.
Likely Disadvantages of CV. The restriction on freedom is one of the two most 
common arguments against CV, according to Hughes (1966, 83). Lijphart (1997, 11) 
also regards it as ‘the most serious objection’ to CV. Opponents to CV argue that CV 
logically contradicts the notion of the right to vote, which should be exercised as each 
elector’s free will in a liberal democracy (Abraham 1955, 33; Jones 1954, 25). They 
continue that this free will can take the form of abstention. Here, opponents to CV claim 
that the right not to vote is an essential part of the right to vote (also see Abraham 1955, 
31; JSCEM 1997, xix-xxi, 23-27; Minchin 1996a, 244-45; Rydon and Goot 1989, 7). 
However, proponents of CV claim that it does not actually infringe ‘the right not to 
vote’ because electors can safely cast an invalid vote at the polling place because of the 
secret ballot system (Hughes 1966, 82). This counter-argument by proponents of CV 
sounds reasonable. However, it is still true that electors have to go to the polling place 
under CV and so CV is surely a restriction on their freedom, though the level of its 
significance is a matter of argument.24
Degeneration of votes is the other of the two most common arguments against CV, 
according to Hughes (1966, 83). All electors are not equally interested in politics and 
are not equally informed about politics. Electors who are more interested and more 
informed about politics are more likely to vote than electors who are less interested and 
less informed. However, CV would bring these less-interested and less-informed
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electors to polling places. Their participation in voting would weaken the quality of the 
electoral decision-making and so would harm the quality of government. Therefore, CV, 
which forcibly achieves high turnout, might not be desirable (Abraham 1955, 31; Rydon 
and Goot 1989, 7-8). When CV was debated in the Australian parliament in 1924, 
Senator Gardiner (Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates. Senate. 17 July 1924, 
2182-83) argued, ‘I hold the view that the opinions of the negligent and apathetic
*yc
section of the electors are not worth obtaining.’
Political inactivity, which results from CV, may degrade the quality of 
government. Parties must make an effort to convert potential supporters to their side and 
to mobilise their existent supporters to polling places when voting is voluntary. 
However, if voting is compulsory, parties do not need to mobilise their supporters to 
polling places though they would still try to convert potential supporters—particularly 
floating voters—to their side. This means that CV would lessen the burden on parties 
and would make parties less active. Furthermore, people would become less active and 
more passive in election campaigns and voting. This would result in less interest in 
politics among the people and would further result in reduced initiative and less 
enterprise in politics. Moreover, if very high turnout is granted, the level of uncertainty 
about the electoral outcome would diminish and the number of marginal (or uncertain) 
seats would decrease. Therefore, parties would be involved in active election campaign 
only in a limited number of marginal (or uncertain) seats and would safely leave aside 
many other seats. As a result, the function of parties as liaison between the people and 
politics would wither. This would, in total, degrade the quality of government (Hughes 
1966, 93-95; Jones 1954, 35; JSCEM 1997, 24; Minchin 1996a, 246).
The degeneration of election campaign/manifesto would result from the adoption 
of CV. If parties are rational and tactical, they will identify target electors and 
concentrate their campaign resources on them in order to make most of their precious 
resources. If voting is compulsory, their target electors would be floating voters in a 
very limited number of marginal (or uncertain) seats. These target electors under CV 
would generally be more volatile in their voting habits than the target electors under VV.
2 4  See argum ents addressed  by  A ustralian  parliam entarians: Senato r G ard iner (C om m onw ealth  P arliam en tary  D ebates. Senate. 
17 Ju ly  1924, 2183), D uncan -H ughes M P (C om m onw ealth  P arliam entary  D ebates. H ouse o f  R epresen tatives. 24  Ju ly  1 9 2 4 ,2 4 4 9 ).
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Even when voting is voluntary, parties have a motivation to make easy promises in 
competition with their rival party. However, when voting is compulsory, parties would 
have a strong motivation to make easier promises in order to appeal to these more 
volatile target electors. This would damage the coherence and effectiveness of their 
policy plan (or their manifesto) (see Minchin 1996a, 247; Rydon and Goot 1989, 8).
The difficulty and cost of enforcement is a disadvantage of CV. A serious 
investigation into abstainers after each election would incur substantial administrative 
resources (Hughes 1966, 83). Although CV is effectively administered in several 
countries (e.g. Australia and Belgium), it is not in other countries (see Table 2.1). If a 
large number of electors did not turn out, it would be almost impossible to seriously 
investigate abstainers and apply sanctions on offenders (Hughes 1966, 83). 
Governmental resources should be allocated so as to maximise the well-being of the 
people, but there is doubt whether CV would have a sufficient, positive effect on the 
well-being of the people to justify its introduction and its expenses. Furthermore, if the 
necessary resources for serious administration of CV are unavailable, CV would 
eventually become lenient. In this case, the effectiveness of CV as a solution to low 
turnout would be limited (Abraham 1955, 16-20).26
The danger of extremism is arguably a disadvantage of CV. There are two types 
of possible danger. First, minor parties (inclusive of extreme parties) might gain more 
votes under CV than they do under VV (Ackaert and de Winter 1996, 8). Extreme 
electors know that their votes to extreme parties are highly likely to be wasted, and so 
they are more likely to abstain under VV. However, if voting is compulsory, many of 
these extreme electors would vote for extreme parties preferable for them. This would 
give extreme parties a better chance to gain seats in parliament and these parties might
77even grow to a ‘relevant party,’ which major parties cannot simply ignore. If so, they 
could have a substantial influence on politics. Second, most abstainers under VV may 
not be extremists, but they might be less interested and less informed about politics. 
These people would be relatively vulnerable to demagogy and extreme ideas. Therefore,
25 T his  com m on argum ent against C V  does no t tu rn  up  in recent w ritings by  A ustra lian  politic ians: M in ch in  1 9 9 2 ,1 9 9 4 ,1996a, 
1996b; N ick  M inch in , “V ote against C om pulsion ,” The Australian Financial Review, 19 D ecem ber 1991; N ick  M inchin , “V olun tary  
Polls Force  Parties to  W ork for V otes,”  The Australian, 10 June 1992; JSC E M  1997, x ix-xx , 23-27.
26  A lso  see an argum ent addressed  by an A ustra lian  parliam entarian: D uncan-H ughes M P (C om m onw ealth  P arliam entary  
D ebates. H ouse  o f  R epresentatives. 24  Ju ly  1924 ,2 4 5 0 ).
27 A bou t the  definition o f  relevant parties, see Sartori 1976, 121-25; Sartori 2000.
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it is risky to bring these electors to polling places; acute extremism could prevail among 
them and could overwhelm normal politics in some circumstances, such as extremely
Oft ♦ • •difficult social/economic situations. However, the danger of extremism is not likely to 
be a major concern for established democracies.
Overall assessment of CV. It is necessary to assess the overall usefulness of CV in 
order to consider whether CV should be introduced. Even if there is an undeniable 
advantage for CV, this does not immediately justify its introduction. Therefore, it is 
unnecessary to deny all possible advantages in order to argue that CV should not be 
introduced. This is vice versa about possible disadvantages of CV. Therefore, the 
introduction of CV should be judged by taking into account all major advantages and 
disadvantages and by making an overall assessment of CV. This is what Robson (1923, 
576) argued to be the appropriate course of research on CV, although he and his 
contemporaries were unable to make this overall assessment because of the then 
methodological limitations.
Normative arguments concerning CV tend to have ended in deadlock between the 
two most highly-evaluated values in liberal democracies: freedom and democracy. 
While opponents of CV argue that CV is anti-liberal and so it should not be introduced, 
proponents of CV claim that CV is pro-democratic and so it should be adopted. Robson 
(1923, 576) even claimed that normative arguments were inappropriate for thinking 
about CV. However, rather than being discarded, normative arguments should be 
integrated into the cost-benefit analysis of CV in order to arrive at an overall assessment. 
Table 2.3 is based on Table 2.2, so that unimportant advantages and disadvantages are 
deleted and similar ones are grouped. This table can be used as a checklist of major 
advantages and disadvantages for overall assessment of CV. New post-war 
methodological developments in political science might have been useful in making an 
overall assessment of CV. However, CV was mostly neglected after World War II, and 
new scientific methods were not applied to CV before the 1980s.
28  L ijphart (1 9 9 7 ,1 0 )  introduces th is argum ent and then addresses his ow n counterargum ent to  it.
Table 2.3: Checklist for Overall Assessment of CV
(1) Advantages (2)  Disadvantages
a. Correct representation
b. Democratic-legitimacy
e—Fulfilment ofthe-eivic-duty
d. Reduction in electoral funds
e. Educational effect
f. Safeguard against extremism
Note: Unimportant items are deleted. Similar items are grouped.
a. Restriction on freedom
b . Degeneration of votes
c. Political inactivity
d. Degeneration of election campaign
e. Difficulty and cost of enforcement
f.-Danger of extremism
Recent Applications of Scientific Methods to CV
After World War II, scientific methods such as data analysis and rational choice theory 
have made major contribution to the advancement of political studies. However, CV 
was mostly a neglected research topic, and these new scientific methods were not 
applied to CV. Meanwhile, industrial democracies have been experiencing a long-term 
decline in turnout and the demand for effective solutions to the problem of turnout has 
become stronger. Against this background, some academic attention was paid to CV, 
resulting in several major findings. First, advanced data analysis verified its outstanding 
effectiveness in improving turnout. Second, scientific methods were, in the 1990s, 
combined with a value standard for the evaluation of the high turnout resulting from CV. 
The major findings from these recent developments are as follows.
In the 1980s, regression analysis started to be performed in order to assess the 
effectiveness of institutional devices (e.g. weekend voting, PR, postal voting and CV) in 
improving turnout. These analyses revealed the effectiveness of CV (i.e. 6-15 
percentage-point increase) compared to other institutional devices (see Blais and Carty 
1990, 176-77; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, 246-47, 250; Franklin 2002, 158-60; R. 
Jackman 1987, 412, 416; R. Jackman and Miller 1995, 474, 476; Powell 1980, 9-10).29 
Previous arguments on CV in this regard were anecdotal; by contrast, regression 
analysis provided scientific empirical evidence for the first time. However, there are still 
two major caveats in relation to the effectiveness of CV in improving turnout. First, any
29  A lso  see  H irczy  1994 fo r a case  study o f  A ustria.
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solid theory about the effectiveness of CV in improving turnout has not yet been 
provided. This missing theory could be provided with rational choice theory. Second, 
the practical application of CV has not been sufficiently considered, and while CV has 
achieved high turnout in some countries (e.g. Australia and Belgium) it has not in others 
(see Table 2.1). This suggests that some conditions and adjustments are necessary for 
CV to effectively improve turnout.
Although regression analysis started providing empirical evidence that CV is 
highly effective in improving turnout, this finding in itself did not provide any 
evaluation about CV. In other words, while CV is an effective solution to low turnout, it 
was still unclear whether its introduction was desirable. However, as the next step, 
Lijphart (1997) evaluated the high turnout resulting from CV as a means to diminish 
unequal turnout between the privileged people and the less-privileged people and he 
evaluated it as a solution to the unequal influence on politics between these two groups. 
The previous studies examining the advantages and disadvantages of CV had been 
assertive or uncertain, but Lijphart (1997) gave a scientific explanation as to one of 
them (i.e. precise representation of the will of the people). His work was a breakthrough 
in this respect and drew great academic attention to CV.
Lijphart (1997) argued that less-privileged people are less likely to vote than 
privileged people. It should be noted that he combined scientific methods with a value 
standard (i.e. ‘democracy’ in this case). Without some value standard, it is impossible to 
evaluate the high turnout resulting from CV.31 Several other scholars have performed 
case studies on CV countries and verified this Lijphart’s theory of CV. Ackaert and de 
Winter (1996) performed data analysis and simulated the abolition of CV in Belgium.32 
Mackerras and McAllister (1999) also simulated the abolition of CV in Australia.33 
Both studies found that the turnout bias against the less-privileged people was 
insignificant in these CV countries but would have been significant if voting had been
30  R ational choice theorists have m ostly  neg lected  C V  so  far. A lthough  several ra tional cho ice  theorists  (C ra in  1995; C rain  and 
L eonard  1993; O ’Toole and  Strobl 1995; Y eret 1995) have pub lished  a  series o f  papers on  the  in fluence o f  C V  over governm en t 
spend ing , th e ir  a rgum ent w as no t abou t the  effectiveness o f  C V  in im proving turnout. Jakee and  Sun (2006) a rgued  the  policy  
im pact o f  the  high tu rnou t resulting  from  C V , bu t the ir w ork  w as not abou t the effectiveness o f  C V  in im prov ing  tu rnou t, either.
31 M cA llister (1986) perform ed regression  analysis and  predicted tha t the abolition  o f  C V  w ould  resu lt in low er tu rnou t and 
w ould benefit the  right-w ing m ajor party  in A ustralia . H is w ork  can  be regarded as a  p receden t fo r L ijphart 1997. H ow ever, 
M cA lliste r did no t evaluate his ow n find ing  w ith  any value standard.
32  In re la tion  to  this paper, see de W inter and A ckaert 1998; H ooghe and Pelleriaux  1998.
33 In relation  to  th is paper, see S. Jackm an  1999a, 1999b.
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voluntary.
However, this Lijphart theory of CV (Lijphart 1997) has not been persuasive 
enough for industrial democracies to introduce CV. Although the Lijphart theory of CV 
is a landmark study, three problems can be identified. First, Lijphart combined science 
with ‘democracy’ as a value standard for evaluating CV. However, democracy is not an 
intrinsic value but is a secondary value. In other words, CV might be democratic but 
this does not automatically guarantee that CV is desirable. Second, Lijphart did not 
consider the applicability of the theory to actual industrial democracies. Third, Lijphart 
provided a scientific explanation for the main advantage of CV (i.e. precise 
representation), but his study effectively left aside all the other advantages and 
disadvantages of CV. Lijphart (1997, 1) argued that the advantages of CV ‘far outweigh 
the normative and practical objections to it.’ However, he did not provide any evidence 
or theory to this remark, and this claim was nothing more than an assertion.
2.3. Conclusion
In order to lay the foundations of this thesis, this chapter first overviewed the practice of 
CV in the world and proposed an ideal type of CV, which is to be used for assessing its 
overall usefulness in the industrial democracies. For this ideal type of CV, a law 
provides that voting is a legal duty and prescribes a moderate fine for illegitimate 
abstention, and the government systematically imposes sanctions on offenders. Second, 
by reviewing the previous studies of CV, this chapter identified its gap in properly 
assessing the overall usefulness of CV. While the older studies were largely anecdotal 
and assertive, new methods began to be applied in the 1980s. First, regression analysis 
provided empirical evidence that CV is substantially effective in improving turnout. In 
the 1990s, scientific methods were combined with a value standard (i.e. democracy) to 
provide a scientific explanation of the main advantage of CV. However, despite recent 
substantial advancements, the previous studies of CV have not yet been persuasive 
enough for industrial democracies to introduce CV.
CV must be effective on two levels for it to be useful. First, CV must increase 
turnout. Second, the high turnout resulting from CV must improve the well-being of the 
people, otherwise CV would not ultimately be useful. Moreover, CV must be effective
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on these two levels not only in theory but also in practice. Judging from these three 
viewpoints, there are five gaps in previous studies. First, the mechanism by which CV 
substantially improves turnout has not yet been revealed. Second, the necessary 
conditions for CV to effectively increase turnout in reality have not been identified. 
Third, the primary value (i.e. some human-oriented value) for assessing the usefulness 
of CV needs to be identified and should be used instead of ‘democracy,’ which has a 
secondary value and which Lijphart 1997 used. Fourth, the applicability of CV to actual 
industrial democracies under globally varying conditions has not been considered. Fifth, 
Lijphart (1997) scientifically evaluated the major advantage of CV but he effectively 
put aside all the other advantages and disadvantages of CV. In the following chapters, 
this thesis assesses the overall usefulness of CV by analysing these five gaps in previous 
studies. As the first step, the next chapter will build a model to explain the mechanism 
by which CV improves turnout.
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PART n 
The Effect on Turnout
CHAPTER 3 
The Impact of Compulsory Voting upon Turnout
The mechanism by which CV improves turnout has not yet been clarified. Since the 
1980s, regression analysis has provided statistical evidence that there is a positive 
relationship between CV and turnout. However, regression analysis in itself does not 
guarantee that this relationship is genuine. Moreover, even if there is a genuine 
relationship between them, regression analysis in itself does not explain why CV 
improves turnout. Nevertheless, so long as this relationship is genuine, it is possible to 
take advantage of CV to improve turnout in practice without knowing its underlying 
mechanism. However, it will still be meaningful to clarify its mechanism. In the real 
world, there would be some obstacles to the realisation of the full potential of CV for 
achieving high turnout. However, if its mechanism is clarified, it will become easier to 
identify these obstacles and will become easier to find ways to remove or control these 
obstacles in order to utilise the potential of CV for improving turnout more effectively.
In order to clarify the mechanism by which CV improves turnout, this chapter 
will formulate a theory of voting under CV by utilising rational choice theory. Rational 
choice theorists have developed the theory of voting under VV. This chapter will review 
this theory of voting and will then introduce CV as an additional condition in order to 
explain the mechanism by which CV improves turnout. This modified theory suggests 
that CV has the potential to achieve almost universal turnout. However, there is a 
significant gap between this theoretical consequence of CV and the empirical evidence 
of turnout improvement of 5-16 percentage points, which several regression analyses 
have attributed to CV since the 1980s (see 2.2 of Chapter 2). Therefore, this chapter will 
then try to identify the major conditions for CV to realise its theoretical potential for 
substantially improving turnout by analysing the practice of CV. This analysis suggests 
that real sanction and serious administration are, as Robson (1923, 571) argued, two 
major conditions for CV to achieve high turnout in practice.
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3.1. The Mechanism of Compulsory Voting
While election is a collective action, voting itself is an individual action. Therefore, 
even if high turnout is desirable for a society, it will not be achieved unless individual 
electors are sufficiently motivated to vote. In other words, unless each individual elector 
estimates that the expected benefits from voting exceed the expected costs of voting, 
they will abstain and high turnout will not be achieved. Rational choice theorists have 
tried to explain voting/abstention from this viewpoint. This section will first review the 
theory of voting advanced by Downs 1957 as a baseline theory. Then, the section will 
review the theory of voting by Riker and Ordeshook 1968, which introduced a new term 
to the baseline theory in order to improve the explanatory power of the Downs theory of 
voting. However, this Riker-Ordeshook theory is about voting under VV. Therefore, this 
section will introduce another new term to this Riker-Ordeshook theory in order to 
formulate a theory of voting under CV. Finally, this section will formulate a theory of 
voting under inducement voting (IV), which can be regarded as a logical alternative to 
CV.
The Downs Theory of Voting under W
Downs (1957) explained voting/abstention as a function of the cost and benefit for each 
individual elector. According to his theory, the cost consists of the cost of information 
and that of voting itself. An individual elector needs to bear some opportunity costs (i.e. 
time, effort and money) in order to collect and examine relevant information before 
deciding for which party or candidate the elector prefers to vote. Furthermore, the 
individual elector needs to pay some personal opportunity costs in order to actually vote 
at a polling place. If and only if the expected individual benefits from the act of voting 
exceed the expected individual costs, the person will vote. Downs’ theory is strictly 
based on the rational actor model, which assumes that individual electors are rational in 
trying to achieve their personal goals, and the emotional and altruistic aspects of human 
behaviour are carefully excluded from the scope of his theory. Although his theory 
successfully explained major aspects of the individual costs of the act of voting, it is 
clear that his theory failed in explaining the major individual benefits from the act of 
voting. As a result of this limitation, the vast majority of individual electors are unlikely 
to vote according to his theory, but this theoretical consequence is contrary to the reality
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that many individual electors actually vote. This gap between his theory and the reality 
is sometimes called the ‘paradox of voting.’
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) formulated the Downs theory above as follows:
R = p B - C  (Model 1)
R: the reward, in utiles, that an individual elector receives from their act of 
voting,
B: the differential benefit, in utiles, that an individual elector receives from 
the success of their more preferred candidate over their less preferred one, 
p: (0 <p < 1) the probability that an individual elector will, by voting, bring 
about the differential benefit (B),
C: the cost to an individual elector of the act of voting.
If and only if the expected individual benefits from the act of voting (pB) surpass the 
expected individual costs of the act of voting (C) (i.e. if pB  > C, and so if R > 0), the 
individual elector will vote. If the expected individual benefits from voting (pB) fall 
below the expected individual costs (C) (i.e. if pB  < C, and so if R < 0), the individual 
elector will abstain. If the expected individual benefits (pB) are the same as the expected 
individual costs (C) (i.e. if pB  = C, and so if R = 0), the individual elector will not find 
any difference between voting and abstention and so they may vote but may abstain.
Judging from this Model 1 above, it is possible to say that an increase in the 
differential benefit (B) or the probability (p) will improve the chance of the reward (R) 
being positive (i.e. R > 0). A decrease in the cost (C) will also improve the chance of the 
reward (R) being positive (i.e. R > 0). However, it is very unlikely to happen that a 
single vote cast by an individual elector changes the outcome of the election, and so the 
probability (p) is infinitesimal. Therefore, the expected benefit (pB) is also infinitesimal. 
Although the cost (Q  may be insubstantial for most individual electors in industrial 
democracies (Aldrich 1993, 261-62; Niemi 1976, 115-16), it would still be more than 
infinitesimal. Therefore, the reward (R) would be negative for most individual electors, 
and so most individual electors would not vote. Nevertheless, in most of the industrial 
democracies, the actual turnout is, in fact, far much more than the expected turnout from 
this Model 1. It is clear that there is a wide gap between the Downs theory of voting (i.e. 
Model 1) and the practice of voting.
The Riker-Ordeshook Theory of Voting under W
In order to fill the gap between the expected turnout from the Downs theory and the
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actual turnout, Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 25-28) introduced the D term to Model 1 
and formulated another model as follows:34
R = p B - C  + D (Model 2)
D : the benefit, in utiles, that an individual elector receives independent of the 
individual contribution to the electoral outcome.35
While the individual benefit ‘Z?’ is almost completely discounted by the infinitesimal 
probability (p) of their single vote having an influence on the electoral outcome, the 
individual benefit ‘£>’ is independent of the electoral outcome and so the individual 
elector can always obtain it without any discount rate. It will be appropriate to 
understand that Riker and Ordeshook (1968) had recognised the limitation of 
conventional rational choice theory in explaining the expected individual benefits from 
the act of voting and so they introduced a new term (D), which is beyond the 
conventional rational choice theory, in order to fill the gap between the Downs theory 
(Model 1) and the reality.
Since Riker and Ordeshook (1968) introduced the D term into the model of voting, 
three major hypotheses have been proposed about the content of the D term (see 
Mueller 2003, 303-32). First, there is ‘a taste for voting’ hypothesis, which argues that 
voters obtain satisfaction from deciding for whom to vote, from going to the polling 
place and from affirming their political efficacy (Riker and Ordeshook 1968, 28). 
Another argument is the expressive voter hypothesis, which regards voting as an 
opportunity to express an opinion about a desirable outcome just like cheering at a 
football match (Brennan and Lomasky 1993; Brennan and Hamlin 1998, 150; Fiorina 
1976). The third is the ethical voter hypothesis, which argues that individual electors 
have ethical preferences in addition to egoistic preferences (Goodin and Roberts 1975, 
927). Although it seems to be difficult to identify the content of the D term, there 
appears to be some individual benefit independent of the electoral outcome and it will 
be reasonable to adopt the D term in the theory of voting.
However, it also seems to be clear that the level of such extra benefit from the act
34  T here  are  tw o  o ther m ajo r explanations for fillin g  this gap. O ne is the  m in im ax  regret hypothesis p roposed by  F erejohn  and 
F io rina  (1 9 7 4 ,1 9 7 5 ). The o th e r is one based on  advanced  gam e theory  (L edyard  1 9 8 1 ,1 9 8 4 ; Palfrey  and R osenthal 1983, 1985). 
H ow ever, th ese  tw o  are no t in the  m ainstream , and th is  thesis puts them  aside.
35 In stead  o f  in troducing  a  new  term , T u llock  (1 9 6 7 ,1 1 0 ) described  the  sam e idea  as a  negative  cost (C ) though  th is descrip tion  
w as very  brief.
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of voting (D) largely varies between individual electors, and individual electors who do 
not have much extra benefit (D) may fail to overcome the threshold of the cost of voting 
(C) and may fail to vote. Judging from actual turnout, the number of such individual 
electors seems to be enormous in several industrial democracies. Moreover, if the value 
level of ‘D * is largely a matter of political culture or political socialisation, it will not be 
easy to artificially improve ‘T>,’ for example, by means of civic education. Therefore, 
academic acquisition of the knowledge about the D term may not be ultimately useful in 
improving turnout. Provision of easy-voting devices may reduce the cost of voting (C). 
However, this cost of voting (Q  is already small for most individual electors in 
industrial democracies (Aldrich 1993, 261-62; Niemi 1976, 115-16), and so the 
government’s flexibility to introduce this measure is limited. Nevertheless, if it is, by 
electoral engineering, possible to give individual electors a substantial selective 
incentive to voting (or a sufficient selective disincentive to abstention), even the 
individual electors with little ‘D’ will overcome the threshold of the cost of voting (C) 
and will vote.
A Theory of Voting under CV
The ideal type of CV, which the last chapter formulated, provides a legal sanction 
against abstention in order to give individual electors a disincentive to abstention. 
Therefore, in order to formulate a theory of voting under CV, the sanction against 
abstention (S) will be introduced as a new term to Model 2 as follows:
R = p B - C  + D - S  (Model 3)
S: the sanction against abstention.
If an individual elector votes, they must bear the cost of voting (C). However, if they 
abstain, they must incur the sanction against abstention (S). In other words, the cost (C) 
and the sanction (S) are alternative to each other, and an individual elector cannot avoid 
both of them. If an individual elector votes, the reward that they receive will be as 
follows:
/^ (v o tin g ) = pB — C + D.
However, if this individual elector abstains, the reward that they receive will be as 
follows:
J^ (absten tion ) ~ — S.
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In the case of Model 2 under VV, the reward for abstention is zero (i.e. ^ (a b s te n t io n )  = 
0) and so the reward for voting must be positive (i.e. (^voting) > 0) for an individual 
elector to vote. However, in this Model 3 under CV, so long as the reward for voting is 
larger than the reward for abstention (i.e. /? (v o tin g ) >  ^ ( a b s te n t io n ) ) ,  the reward for voting 
(/?(v o tin g ))  does not need to be positive. The formula of the reward for voting in Model 3 
( i? (v o t in g )  =  pB -  C + D) is actually the same as that of Model 2 under VV. However, 
some of the electors who do not vote under VV would vote under CV because their 
reward for voting is below zero but is above the reward for abstention in Model 3. They 
are the potential new voters by the introduction of CV.
An individual elector will vote/turn-out when
i? (v o tin g )  >  ./^ (absten tion),
that is, when
pB - C  + D > - S .
This formula can be transformed as follows: 
pB + D + S > C.
Therefore, if the total of the expected benefit dependent on the electoral outcome (pB), 
the benefit independent of the electoral outcome (.D) and the sanction (S) surpasses the 
cost of voting (Q , the individual elector will vote.
So long as ‘S' > 0,’ any level of sanction (S) will improve the chance of *pB + D + 
S’ being larger than ‘C’ to induce an individual elector to vote. Meanwhile, ‘p B ’ is 
known to be infinitesimal. Moreover, the level of ‘ZT would be largely different 
between individual electors, and so \D’ might be very small for some electors. 
Nevertheless, if  the significance of sanction against abstention (S) is larger than the cost 
of voting (C) as follows:
S > C ,
then even individual electors with very small ‘D ’ will vote. Both the sanction against 
abstention (S) and the cost of voting (C) are materialistic, and so the significance of 
these would not vary between individual electors as largely as that of ‘Z).’ Therefore, it 
would not be extremely difficult to ensure that the level of significance of sanction 
against abstention (S) for most individual electors is larger than that of the cost of voting
36  R efer to  the  firs t foo tno te  o f  th is chap ter fo r counter-argum ents. H ow ever, even i f ‘pB ’ w ere no t in fin itesim al, it w ould  no t 
ruin th is exp lanation  as to  C V  o f  th is section because lpB  + D’ is still sm aller than  ‘C ’ for m any electo rs in industrial countries and 
they  actually  absta in  u nder VV.
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(C). The cost of voting (C) is usually assumed to be small for most individual electors in 
industrial democracies (Aldrich 1993, 261-62; Niemi 1976, 115-16), and so the sanction 
against abstention (S) would not need to be very large to make it larger than the cost of
*37 ,
voting (Q . For example, a moderate fine would be appropriate as a sanction against 
illegitimate abstainers.
Therefore, even a minor sanction against abstention (S) would easily surpass the 
cost of voting (C) and would entice even individual electors with very small ‘D ’ to vote. 
This is because each individual elector would accept the cost of voting (C) and would 
avoid the sanction against abstention (S) in order to minimise their individual loss even 
if they cannot obtain a positive reward (R) from the act of voting. Therefore, by the 
adoption of CV, it would be possible to engineer the electoral system to effectively 
entice individual electors to make a contribution to the social benefit (if high turnout is 
actually desirable for the society) while they are pursuing their personal benefit (or 
trying to diminish their personal loss) in their intention. Introduction of CV will nullify 
the difference between election as a collective action and voting as an individual action 
in this respect.
A Logical Alternative to CV: A Theory of Voting under Inducement Voting (IV)
A logical alternative to CV will be inducement voting (IV), under which the government 
offers electors some material inducement to voting/tuming-out (e.g. a monetary 
reward).38 A theory of voting under IV can be formulated as follows:
R = p B - C  + D + I  (Model 5)
<3Q
/: the inducement to voting/tuming-out.
By calculating the above formula, it is possible to reveal that IV is also effective in 
improving turnout. An individual elector will vote/tum-out when
i? (v o tin g )  >  ./^ (absten tion),
that is, when
37  As H asen (1 9 9 6 ,2 1 6 9 -7 2 ) argues, the C V  law  w ould  serve m uch the  sam e function  as a  social norm  o f  v o tin g  fo r 
law -ab id ing  electors. T herefore, an  interaction term  (aD*S) m igh t need  to  be in troduced for better exp lanation  o f  vo tin g  u n d er C V  
as follow s: R = p B - C  + D - S  + aD*S (M odel 4: V  is a  constant). T herefore, the  condition  for vo ting  w ould  be as fo llow s: pB + S 
+ D + aD*S > C. A lso see H irczy  2 0 0 0 ,4 5 .
38 T he defin ition  o f  IV  is g iven  in 2.1 o f  C hap ter 2.
3 9  M odel 4  is given in the  4 th  footnote o f  th is  chapter.
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pB — C + D + 1> 0.
This formula can be transformed as follows: 
pB  + D + /  > C.
Therefore, if  the total of the expected benefit dependent on the electoral outcome (pB), 
the benefit independent of the electoral outcome (D) and the inducement to 
voting/tuming-out (7) surpasses the cost of voting (C), an individual elector will 
vote/tum-out.
The value of ‘D’ will largely vary between individual electors. However, T  is 
materialistic and so its value would not vary as largely as that of ‘Z).’ If ‘C’ is very small 
for most individual electors, even small monetary inducements to voting/tuming-out (I) 
should substantially increase turnout. However, IV might not be as effective in 
improving turnout as CV, which can appeal to the law-abiding mentality of individual 
electors in addition to their material interest (see Model 4 in the 4th footnote of this 
chapter). Nevertheless, IV does not have the problem of the infringement of freedom, 
which is regarded as a major disadvantage of CV (see 2.2 of Chapter 2). Therefore, IV 
could be a useful alternative to CV. IV may look incongruous at first sight, but offers of 
similar inducements are already a part of our daily life. For example, respondents to 
surveys are often provided with some inducement. In Japan, magazines offer prizes in 
order to get feedback from their readers. However, IV has not been largely argued, and 
its implementation for improving turnout has been new and rare in modem democracies 
(see Balinov 2006; Birch 2007, 19-20; Ellis et al. 2006, 23-24; Gratschew 2006; Hasen 
1996, 2136; Hasen 2000; Hicks 2002; Keaney and Rogers 2006, 24).
Moreover, CV and IV do not need to be regarded as alternatives to each other, and 
they can actually be combined. It is technically possible for the government to offer 
electors an inducement to voting/tuming-out and to impose sanctions on illegitimate 
abstainers. In this case, the theory of voting under CV and IV can be formulated as 
follows:
R = p B - C  + D - S  + I  (Model 6).
The combined usage of CV and IV will be more effective in achieving high turnout than 
the sole usage of CV or IV. Some people may think that voting and abstention are two 
sides of the same coin, and so it does not make sense to provide electors with both 
incentives to vote/tum-out and disincentives to abstain. However, actual electors would
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be more complex than the electors that this section has assumed. Therefore, IV could be 
effective on some of the electors on whom CV is not very effective, and vice versa. 
Therefore, the combination of them would be more effective in achieving high turnout 
than the intensification of only CV or IV. However, because the topic of this thesis is 
CV only, this thesis will put aside IV and will concentrate on CV.
3.2. The Effectiveness of Compulsory 
Voting in Practice
With respect to turnout, there is a wide gap between the theoretical consequences of CV 
and the empirical evidence. The theory of voting under CV (Model 3), which the last 
section formulated, suggests that CV will achieve almost universal turnout. Meanwhile, 
the empirical evidence shows modest outcomes as follows. First, regression analysis has 
attributed between 6 and 15 percentage-point turnout improvement to CV controlling 
for other conditions. This figure is much larger than those achieved by other 
institutional devices (see 1.2 of Chapter 1). Second, a comparison of CVs and turnouts 
around the world (Table 2.1) shows that turnout is not very high in all CV countries but 
it varies significantly among them.40 However, this wide gap between the theoretical 
consequence of CV and the empirical evidence does not necessarily mean that the 
theory contradicts the practice. While the CV in this theory is an ideal one operating 
within an ideal environment, the CVs from which the empirical evidence is derived are 
a variety of real ones in a variety of real environments. Therefore, the existence of some 
discrepancy between the theoretical consequence of CV and the empirical evidence is 
simply normal. However, there remains a concern over the reason for this wide gap.
Robson (1923, 571) argued that serious administration is a necessary condition 
for CV to effectively improve turnout. Although he did not mention the type and 
severity of the sanction that should be applied, the legal provision of real sanction can 
be regarded as a precondition of his argument. This Robson hypothesis that real 
sanction and serious administration are necessary for achieving high turnout is useful in 
explaining the wide gap between the theoretical consequence of CV and the empirical
40  A verage= 77 .3% , SD =14.4 , N = 26; M ax= 95.5% , M in=43.6% .
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evidence.41 In the theory of voting under CV (Model 3 in 3.1 of this chapter), each 
individual elector is assumed to estimate that the sanction against abstention (5) is real 
and is unavoidable if they abstain. Meanwhile, the cost of voting (C) is small for the 
vast majority of individual electors. Therefore, almost all of them will find that the 
sanction (5) is more significant than the cost of voting (Q , and so they will turn out to 
vote at the election. As a result, the expected turnout under CV is extremely high in this 
theory. Real sanction and serious administration are implicit preconditions of this theory 
of voting under CV.
However, if real sanction and serious administration are not provided, CV may 
fail to achieve high turnout. If the sanction does not exist or is trivial, the significance of 
sanction (S) may fall short of the cost of voting (Q  for many individual electors and the 
CV system might not substantially increase turnout. Otherwise, if the sanction is real 
but the administration of CV is not serious, the sanction (S) will be discounted by the 
probability of the actual imposition of sanction and the expected sanction may fall short 
of the cost of voting (C) for many individual electors. In this case, turnout will not 
dramatically increase by the adoption of CV. In practice, the type and severity of 
sanction varies considerably among CV countries as does the seriousness of its 
administration (see Table 2.1). Therefore, it is natural that turnout among CV countries 
also varies substantially. Consequently, the Robson hypothesis is theoretically plausible 
as an explanation about the gap between the theoretical consequence of CV and the 
empirical evidence, and this hypothesis is consistent with the theory of voting under CV 
even when several conditions for this theory are modified. As the next step, this section 
will examine whether this Robson hypothesis is also consistent with the practice of CV 
by carrying out two tests as follows.
Test 1: Bar Chart Test42
The strictness of CV should have a positive relationship with turnout. There are two 
types of strictness about CV. One is the strictness of sanction arrangement against 
abstention, and the other is the strictness of the administration of CV. On the one hand, 
it is difficult to compare the strictness of sanction arrangement between different
41 R obson  posed  his argum ent as an observation. H ow ever, th is  section  accepts it as a  hypo thesis  and tests  it on the reality .
42  E xchange rate is based  on Financial Times on 31 A ugust 2007. < http ://w w w .m arke tp rices.ft.com /m arkets/currenc ies/ab>  (1 
Sep tem ber 2007)
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systems (e.g. fine, imprisonment and disenfranchisement). Moreover, several countries 
(e.g. Belgium) combine two or more types of sanctions. As a result, it is difficult to 
make overall comparisons of the level of strictness between such different sanction 
regimes. On the other hand, it is also difficult to properly estimate and compare the 
level of strictness about the administration of CV across the world. However, Gratschew 
(2002) classified CV administrations into three levels of enforcement (i.e. ‘not 
enforced,’ ‘weak,’ and ‘strict’). An overview of Table 2.1 suggests that strictness about 
the administration of CV has a perceptible positive relationship with turnout. While CV 
countries with some sanction and strict administration are around the top of this table, 
CV countries with some sanction and weak administration are in the middle and CV 
countries without any sanction are at the bottom of the table.
In order to observe this tendency more systematically, this subsection will 
calculate the average turnout of each administration level of CV countries and will 
compare them with the average turnout of VV countries (see Figure 3.1 below). Figure
3.1 overall suggests that the Robson hypothesis is plausible in practice. The average 
turnout among countries that strictly administrate CV is 91.3%, which can be regarded 
as being very high by any standards. This figure is higher by 22.0 percentage points 
than the average turnout of 69.3% among VV countries. The average turnout among 
weak CV countries is 76.9%, and the existence of a penal code for abstainers in itself 
seems to be somewhat effective in improving turnout even if sanctions are rarely 
imposed. This might be caused by the fact that many individual electors overestimate 
the probability of the imposition of sanctions on them when they abstain. Otherwise, 
CV with real sanction in itself might stimulate the law-abiding mentality that most 
individual electors possess.43 The average turnout of 63.9% among nominal CV 
countries is even lower than the average among VV countries, and this fact suggests that 
a mere legal declaration of the duty of voting/tuming-out does not have any real, 
positive impact on turnout.
43 This is a  probab le  advantage o f  C V  over IV. For its theoretical descrip tion , see M odel 4  in the  4th  foo tno te  o f  this chapter.
63
Fugure 3.1: Enforcement Level and Turnout
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C om pare of Means (t-test results): p=0.332 (voluntary : nominal), p=0.101 (voluntary : weak), p<0.001 (voluntary : strict), p=0.075 (nominal : 
weak), p<0.001 (nom inal: strict), p=0.017 (weak : strict); Mean=82.8% (weak/strict), p<0.001 (voluntary : weak/strict).
Notes:
1. ‘Nominal Compulsory’ in this figure is equivalent to ‘not enforced’ in the categorisation by Gratschew 2002.
2. Reg: the registered electors.
3. The last available parliamentary (lower-house when applicable) election turnouts in Pintor and Gratschew 2002 are used for calculation o f  the 
mean.
4. Switzerland then with a few CV regions is not included in the calculation for this figure.
5. CV countries where the level o f  enforcement is unavailable are not included. Countries whose turnout o f  the registered electors is not 
available are not included, either.
6. This analysis was largely influenced by Gratschew’s bar chart (Gratschew 2002,110).
Sources: International IDEA (Gratschew 2002; Pintor and Gratschew 2002, 125-56). See Table 2.1.
Moreover, the relationship between the enforcement level and turnout is mostly 
positive in Figure 3.1. However, the average turnout of nominal CV countries is a clear 
exception. It might look unreasonable that the average turnout of VV countries, which 
do not have any legal arrangement about the duty of voting/tuming-out, is higher by 5.4 
percentage points than that of nominal CV countries, which provide that 
voting/tuming-out is a legal duty.44 If individual electors had some law-abiding 
mentality in a country, even nominal CV must have been effective in modestly 
improving turnout. However, if most of the CV countries have introduced CV because 
they used to suffer low turnout but many of the VV countries have not adopted CV 
because they have enjoyed high turnout or have been satisfied with their current turnout,
44 T his relationship is not statistically  s ignificant at the 5%  level (p=0.332).
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this result is not necessarily unreasonable. Therefore, it will be reasonable to understand 
that the overview of this bar-chart is supportive of the Robson hypothesis in regard to 
serious administration.
Statistical analysis of Figure 3.1 supports this interpretation. Figure 3.1 is an 
observation of all democracies in the world, which can be called the ‘population.’ 
However, it is also possible to deal with these democracies as a ‘sample’ and make 
inferences about the underlying process of this ‘population.’ When the two means of the 
five categories in Figure 3.1 are combined and compared (see the t-test results below 
Figure 3.1), the test results indicate that the difference between means is statistically 
significant at the 5% level (or the 10% level in the case of small sample size) in most 
pairs. For example, the difference between the means of VV countries and strict CV 
countries is statistically significant at the 5% level (p<0.001). Therefore, there is 
sufficient evidence to say that strict CV countries are likely to achieve higher turnout 
than VV countries do. The results of these statistical tests provide strong evidence for 
the Robson hypothesis in regard to the strictness of enforcement of voting.
One caveat to this finding is that the bar-chart test does not control for other 
conditions. It is particularly a problem that this test does not control for the severity of 
the sanction arrangement, which is a precondition for the administration of CV to 
effectively improve turnout. As a result, while some of the CV countries with strict 
administration seriously impose a trivial sanction on illegitimate abstainers (e.g. 
Singapore), some CV countries with weak administration hardly ever impose their 
severe sanction on illegitimate abstainers (e.g. Greece).45 Because of this limitation, it 
is difficult to regard this bar-chart test result as conclusive evidence for the Robson 
hypothesis. However, it is still possible to say that this test result has improved its 
plausibility. Moreover, Table 2.1 suggests that the Robson hypothesis is plausible even 
if the severity of sanction is taken into consideration. For further verification of the 
Robson hypothesis, this section will move on to another test that is mostly free from the 
problem of uncontrolled conditions.
Test 2: Graph Test
Several industrial democracies have adopted and abolished CV. Chronological
45 See E lec tions D epartm ent S ingapore  2005 for Singapore, and IPU  2007 for S ingapore  and G reece.
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observation on turnout in each of these countries will be useful in testing the plausibility 
of the Robson hypothesis in practice. If the Robson hypothesis is correct, the 
introduction of virtually ideal CV (i.e. CV with real sanction and serious administration) 
will dramatically increase turnout and this CV will continue achieving high turnout. 
However, its abolition should dramatically decrease turnout. Meanwhile, CVs far 
different from the ideal type would have a limited but positive effect on turnout but may 
fail to achieve high turnout. Because this test compares turnouts before and after the 
adoption and abolition of CV in the context of each country, this test can be regarded as 
being mostly free from the problem of uncontrolled other conditions, which Test 1 
suffered. For this graph test, three industrial democracies (i.e. Australia, Belgium and 
the Netherlands) will be examined as follows.46
Turnout Change in Australia. Australia introduced CV for federal elections (and 
referendums) in 1924. The CV system of Australia is as follows.47 The current sanction 
against illegitimate abstention is an administrative fine of Aus$20 (~US$16). The 
electoral authority investigates all abstainers after each election, and the authority 
requires them to pay a fine or provide a valid and sufficient reason for abstention. If the 
case is not settled in this administrative stage, the abstainer would be prosecuted and 
might be sentenced up to Aus$50 (~US$41) plus court costs. This sanction can be 
regarded as being minor but still real. The administration of CV is exhaustive and 
serious. The government seriously tries to identify illegitimate abstainers and impose 
the penalty on them though such governmental investigation cannot be perfect in 
practice.48 Overall, the practice of CV in Australia is very close to the ideal type of CV. 
As Figure 3.2 below shows, turnout fluctuated between 50% and 80% under VV before 
1924. The adoption of CV in 1924 dramatically improved turnout in Australia (by 
around 30 percentage points), and very high turnout (at around 95% of the registered 
electors) has been continually achieved since then.
46  T he  precise  h isto ry  o f  C V  in G reece and Italy  is d ifficult to  identify , and so these  tw o coun tries are no t exam ined  in this 
subsection . M oreover, A ustria  and Sw itzerland  are no t exam ined because  their C V  w as/is n o t nationw ide. H ow ever, see H irczy  
1994 fo r a  case study  o f  A ustria.
47  C om m onw ealth  Electoral A ct 1918, Section  245. A bout C V  for referendum s, see R eferendum  (M achinery  P rov isions) A ct 
1984, Section  45.
4 8  A fter the  1996 e lection , 29 ,154  electors paid A us$20 adm in istra tive  penalty  and 6 ,027 cases w ere d ealt w ith  by  courts (as o f  
31 Ju ly  2001). A fte r the  1998 election , 40 ,396  electors paid  A us$20 adm inistra tive  penalty  and  6 ,246  cases w ere dealt by  courts (as 
o f  31 Ju ly  2001). T h is  inform ation  w as p rov ided  by an official letter from  the A ustra lian  E lectoral C om m ission  (A E C ) dated  9 
A ugust 2001.
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Figure 3.2: Turnout in Australia
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Notes:
1. CV was adopted in 1924.
2. Reg: the registered electors.
Source: AEC 2007.
Turnout Change in Belgium. In 1893, Belgium adopted CV simultaneously with 
universal male suffrage modified by plural voting. The sanction against illegitimate 
abstention is aggravated by the repetition of offence. The sanction system is as follows 
(Ministry of the Interior, Belgium 2002).49 The first illegitimate abstention may be 
punished with a reprimand or a fine of €25 to 50 (~US$34 to 68). Repetition of the 
offence leads to a fine of €50 to 125 (~US$68 to 171). If the offence occurs at least four 
times in 15 years, the elector can be dropped from the electoral roll for 10 years and, 
during this period, they cannot get an appointment, a promotion or a decoration from 
the authorities. This sanction system can be assessed as a real one.
Meanwhile, the administration of CV is not exhaustive but is still real. The 
government randomly selects several districts after each election, and the investigation 
into abstainers in these districts is serious.50 The CV system is administrated as follows
49  T he reference p rovided the am ount o f  fine  in the  form er national currency o f  B elg ium , and the  am oun t o f  fine in Euro  w as 
p rov ided  by  em ail correspondence w ith  M r Edw in L efebre, M in istry  o f  H om e A ffairs, B elg ium  (2 Ju ly  2002).
50 T his inform ation  about the  random  selection  w as first p rov ided  by  M s M aria  G ratschew , In ternational ID E A , a t the 
in terv iew  w ith her (19  A pril 2002), and it w as la ter confirm ed by em ail correspondence w ith  M r E dw in  L efebre , M in istry  o f  H om e 
A ffairs, B elg ium  (14  O ctober 2002).
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(Ministry of the Interior, Belgium 2002). The public prosecutor makes a list of the 
electors who abstained and whose excuse is not accepted, and then the Prosecution 
Counsel decides which offences will be prosecuted. Abstainers have an opportunity to 
justify their abstention in the Magistrates’ court. However, if the case is once judged in 
court, further appeal is not possible.
The practice of CV in Belgium is some distance from the ideal type of CV, but it 
is still somewhat close to it.51 Figure 3.3 below indicates that the introduction of CV in 
1893 improved turnout, and turnout has been mostly between 90-95% since this 
introduction. However, there are two points that should be noted. First, universal male 
suffrage modified by plural voting simultaneously introduced with CV was also a major 
electoral reform, and so the level of contribution of CV to turnout improvement is not 
clear. Second, in four elections after the adoption of CV in 1893, turnout improved even 
more to around 90-95%. This further improvement in turnout could have resulted from 
the introduction of another major electoral reform (i.e. PR) in 1899. Moreover, turnout 
in Belgium is generally a little lower than that of Australia, and it fluctuates more 
widely than that of Australia. However, taking into consideration the fact that the 
Belgian CV has some more distance from the ideal type of CV compared to the 
Australian one, this difference in turnout between these two CV countries can be 
regarded as another piece of evidence to support the Robson hypothesis.
51 A cco rd ing  to  A ckaert and de W in ter (1 9 9 6 ,2 ) , 153 people w ere dealt w ith  by  courts and 138 peop le  am ong  them  w ere 
convicted  be tw een  1987 and  1990.
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Figure 3.3: Turnout in Belgium
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Notes:
1. CV was adopted in 1893. Until the constitutional reform o f  1920, the usual practice was to have partial (not general) election, that is, voting 
in about half the provinces at one time. Nationwide elections were held only when the parliament was dissolved.
2. Reg: the registered electors.
Sources: Mackie and Rose 1991, 39-65; International IDEA (Pintor and Gratschew 2002,125-56; its online version).
Turnout Change in the Netherlands. In 1917, the Netherlands adopted CV 
simultaneously with universal male suffrage and PR. The sanction against illegitimate 
abstention was minor but real. In regard to the sanction system, an illegitimate abstainer 
might have been fined up to three guilders and, if they had been guilty of the same 
offence within a previous term of two years, the fine might have been raised to up to ten 
guilders, but a reprimand might have been substituted for the fine until 1925 (Tingsten 
1937, 193).52 The administration of CV was as follows (Tingsten 1937, 192-93). The 
electoral law provided that every elector who did not vote at the election was, if 
possible, to be requested by the mayor of their commune within one month after the 
election to provide a written or oral explanation. If the mayor found that a valid excuse 
for abstention had been given, the case was settled. However, if not, the case was to be 
brought to court. This administration of CV was actually exercised to some degree, and
52 A ccord ing  to  the  In ternational Institu te  o f  Social H istory  < w w w .iisg .n l/hpw /calcu late .php>  (25 A u g u st 2007), three  guilders 
in 1937 had  the  sam e purchasing  pow er as €24 .57  (=U S$33) in 2006 and ten guilders in 1937 had the  sam e pu rchasing  pow er as 
€8 1 .9 0  (-U S $ 1 1 2 ) in 2006.
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so the administration of CV can be assumed to have been serious to some extent.53
Therefore, CV in the Netherlands is supposed to have been close to the ideal type 
of CV when it was in operation. However, the Netherlands abolished CV in 1970. 
Figure 3.4 below suggests that CV was effective in achieving high turnout in the 
Netherlands. Turnout surged after CV was introduced in 1917, and it plunged after it 
was abolished in 1970. Turnout was mostly around 95% during CV was in operation. 
However, it should be noted that CV was not the only major electoral reform in 1917, 
and so the level of its contribution to turnout is not necessarily clear. Nevertheless, it is 
still reasonable to argue that the adoption of CV with real sanctions and serious 
administration substantially improved turnout and its abolition substantially decreased 
turnout in the Netherlands.
Figure 3.4: Turnout in the Netherlands
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Notes:
1. CV was adopted in 1917 and was abolished in 1970.
2. Reg: the registered electors.
Sources: IPU 2007 for the 2006 election turnout; Mackie and Rose 1991,322-39; International IDEA (Pintor and Gratschew 2002,125-56; its 
online version).
53 M ore  than  30 years  have passed  since the  abolition  o f  C V  in 1970, and so it is d ifficu lty  to  identify  the  level o f  
adm in istra tion  o f  C V  before  its abolition. H ow ever, accord ing  to  T ingsten  (1 9 3 7 ,1 9 4 ), 1,084 peop le  w ere  p enalised  fo r abstention  
in 1922; the  correspond ing  num ber w as 10,545 in 1925 and th a t w as 6 ,392 in 1927. A cco rd ing  to  Irw in  (1 9 7 4 ,2 9 4 ), 577 abstainers 
w ere  b ro u g h t to  court in 1966.
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Judging from the cases of Australia, Belgium and the Netherlands, it seems that 
CV with real sanctions and serious administration is effective in achieving high turnout. 
This graph test is mostly free from the problems of uncontrolled other conditions 
because of the chronological comparison of turnout in each country. However, these 
three cases do not constitute decisive evidence for the Robson hypothesis. First, there is 
a possibility that several countries with virtually ideal CV failed to achieve high turnout 
in the past, and then they might have abandoned strict administration or abolished CV 
altogether in order to stop consuming resources on an unworkable CV system. In other 
words, it might be as a result of natural selection that all the industrial democracies with 
virtually ideal CV appear to have achieved high turnout.54 Second, the sample size of 
this graph test is merely three (i.e. Australia, Belgium and the Netherlands), and so this 
test has the problem of small sample size. Therefore, its generalisation to other 
industrial democracies is problematic.55 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that this 
graph-test has further improved the plausibility of the Robson hypothesis.
3.3. Conclusion
In theory, CV is expected to achieve almost universal turnout. However, the empirical 
evidence indicates moderate outcomes, and there is a wide gap between the theoretical 
consequences of CV and the empirical evidence. First, regression analyses have 
attributed a 6-15 percentage-point turnout improvement to CV, controlling for other 
conditions. Second, a comparison of CVs and turnouts across the world (see Table 2.1) 
suggests that turnout is not necessarily high in all CV countries and turnout largely 
varies among them. However, the Robson hypothesis (Robson 1923, 571) is useful in 
explaining this gap between the theoretical consequence of CV and the empirical 
evidence. This Robson hypothesis argues that real sanction and serous administration 
are necessary conditions for CV to effectively improve turnout. International 
comparisons of CVs across the world (Figure 3.1) and chronological comparisons of
54 In o rder to  deny this possib ility , ex tensive  research  on  past/p resen t C V  countries is necessary . H ow ever, its conduct w ill be 
technically  d ifficu lt and w ill be ex trem ely  costly.
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turnouts in several CV countries (Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4) support the Robson 
hypothesis though these tests have several limitations. Therefore, it will be reasonable to 
understand that CV will achieve high turnout upon the condition that real sanction and 
serous administration are put in place.
The theory of voting under CV is free from a concern over the ‘paradox of voting’ 
posed by Downs 1957. In order to resolve this ‘paradox’ in the theory of voting under 
VV, scholars have tried to identify the content of the D term (i.e. the benefit that an 
individual elector receives independent of the individual contribution to the electoral 
outcome), which Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 25-28) added to the Downs theory of 
voting. The content of this D term is still unclear, and its clarification remains a 
challenge. However, upon the condition that CV with real sanction is adopted and the 
government seriously administrates CV, almost all electors will vote and high turnout 
will be achieved. If high turnout resulting from CV is ensured, political students will 
cease to worry about abstention. As a result, they will stop trying to clarify the content 
of the D term and will stop trying to utilise their knowledge of the D term to improve 
turnout. Therefore, the prevalence of CV with real sanction and serious administration 
in the world will make high turnout common and will eliminate this research topic in 
political studies.
Moreover, CV will diminish the significance of the ‘dilemma of collective action’ 
addressed by Olson [1965] 1971. Interest groups (i.e. organised interests) are privileged 
in influencing politics to protect and advance their minority interests. Under VV, one of 
their major advantages is the mobilisation of their group members to attend polling 
places. Interest groups can increase the turnout of their group members by decreasing 
the value of the cost of voting (C) and by improving the value of the D term (e.g. by 
means of providing information about affiliated candidates and parties). This 
mobilisation power is particularly advantageous for interest groups when general 
turnout is low. However, high turnout resulting from CV will deprive them of this 
advantage, though they will retain the other advantages, such as guidance of their group 
members to vote to affiliated parties and candidates, mobilisation of election 
campaigners, and donation of election funds.
55 It shou ld  be  no ted  tha t the num ber o f  industrial dem ocracies in its e lf  is lim ited , and the  num ber o f  C V  coun tries am ong  them  
is even  m ore lim ited. Therefore, from  the beginning, it is d ifficu lt to  ob tain  decisive  em pirical ev idence fo r the  theory  o f  vo ting  
under C V  and the  R obson  hypothesis.
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However, CV will surely achieve high turnout only when the necessary 
conditions are satisfied, and so it is important to meet these conditions to utilise the full 
potential of CV for achieving high turnout. Real sanctions and serious administration 
are two major conditions for CV to effectively improve turnout according to the Robson 
hypothesis, and this chapter found the Robson hypothesis plausible. The next chapter 
will consider the necessary conditions for CV to realise its potential for improving 
turnout more comprehensively, and it will propose the necessary adjustments to meet 
these conditions.
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CHAPTER 4
Necessary Conditions and Adjustments
This chapter aims at identifying the conditions and necessary adjustments for CV to be 
effective in substantially improving turnout. CV with real sanction and serious 
administration will be effective in this regard, as Robson (1923, 571) argued and the last 
chapter tested the proposition by using several methods. CV with real sanction and 
serious administration has achieved very high turnout in several countries, most notably 
Australia and Belgium. However, the legal provision of real sanction against abstention 
has not necessarily been the norm among the countries that operate the system (see 
Table 2.1). Moreover, some countries have failed to seriously administrate their CV 
with real sanction (e.g. Greece). Furthermore, several countries have even abolished 
their CV with real sanction and serious administration in the past (e.g. the Netherlands 
in 1970). This suggests that CV with real sanction and serious administration requires 
some conditions in order to function effectively and continuously. This chapter will 
identify some of these conditions and will discuss the necessary political adjustments 
for satisfying these conditions.
This chapter will examine ‘adoption,’ ‘administration’ and ‘persistence’ of CV 
with real sanction. This chapter regards these as necessary conditions for CV to work 
effectively for three reasons as follows. First, unless CV with real sanction is adopted, it 
cannot be effective in achieving high turnout. Second, unless this CV is rigorously 
administered, high turnout is not likely to be achieved. Third, unless CV with real 
sanction and serous administration is sustainable, CV will not continue being effective 
in achieving high turnout. This chapter finds that it is difficult to meet the first condition, 
but most industrial democracies have the capability to satisfy the other two conditions.
4.1. Adoption of Compulsory Voting
CV with real sanction must first get adopted in order for the system to be effective in 
improving turnout. If it is verified that CV is ultimately useful for the people in a 
democracy, CV will get adopted in this country. However, the adoption of CV would be
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difficult for industrial democracies in practice. This is because, in addition to the 
technical difficulty in clarifying the usefulness of CV, there are three major 
psychological barriers to the adoption of CV, namely (1) popular commitment to 
freedom, (2) path dependence of parliamentarians, and (3) that of electors. First, 
freedom is highly respected in industrial democracies. CV is surely a restriction on the 
freedom (or the choice) not to vote. Therefore, popular commitment to freedom is a 
barrier to the adoption of CV. Second, once a system is adopted, it will not be replaced 
by another system unless the alternative has a clear and significant advantage over the 
current one. This is because the switching cost is usually high, and it results in path 
dependence as a barrier to the adoption of new systems like CV. Third, people are not 
substantially interested in politics. Moreover, CV is an imposition of the legal duty to 
vote on electors. People do not like duties, and they tend to show negative reaction 
against new duties so this too represents a barrier to the adoption of CV. This section 
will consider these three psychological barriers to the adoption of CV and will try to 
find out necessary adjustments to lower each barrier.
Popular Commitment to Freedom
Although utility is a common value for human-beings, freedom and democracy are 
highly evaluated in industrial democracies. Therefore, even if people recognise that CV 
is useful from the viewpoint of utility, they may still think that the freedom not to vote 
should be preserved. Electors have to go to polling places under CV, and so CV 
represents a restriction on their physical freedom. Moreover, some people may regard 
the freedom not to vote as a derivative from the freedom of voting like that the freedom 
not to express is derived from the freedom of expression (JSCEM 1997, xix, 26; 
Minchin 1996a, 245; Rydon and Goot 1989, 7). In this context, CV is contrary to 
liberalism though the type and level of this contradiction is a matter of argument (see
2.2 of Chapter 2 for more arguments and references). Furthermore, if the freedom not to 
vote is an inalienable right of citizens, CV will clash with this inalienable right and so 
the cost-benefit analysis of CV will be simply unacceptable. If it is allowed to restrict 
the freedom not to vote but this freedom is highly valued, the cost-benefit analysis of 
CV will be acceptable but the total expected benefits from CV will have little chance to 
exceed the total expected costs of CV. Accordingly, the popular commitment to liberal 
values has critical influence on the adoption of CV.
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The level of popular commitment to freedom would vary widely across the 
industrial democracies. Industrial democracies with fundamental faith in freedom will 
be more reluctant to adopt CV than ones with moderate ideas about freedom. In reverse, 
liberal democracies with moderate ideas about freedom should be relatively flexible 
about controlling the level of freedom for practical purposes. Some scholars have 
regarded utilitarianism as the leading political principle of Australia, and they have used 
it to explain why Australia has been flexible enough to restrict the freedom not to vote 
and to employ CV while the USA has not, despite the fact that both countries share a 
British colonial heritage (Collins 1985, 150-52; Hancock 1930, 61; Hartz 1964, chap. 1; 
Mackerras and McAllister 1999, 231). According to a survey of the 2001 Australian 
election (Bean, Gow and McAllister 2002), people who respect freedom are more likely 
to support CV at the 5% significance level in Australia (Table 4.1 below).56 
Accordingly, it can be argued that Australian people generally do not perceive CV 
seriously undermining liberal values. However, this tendency is not likely to be shared 
by all the other industrial democracies. For example, CV might be strongly opposed in 
the USA because of their strong commitment to freedom (Colantuono 1987, 1503; 
Hasen 1996,2176-78).
Table 4.1: Respect for Freedom and Support for CV (Australia 2001)
Respect for Individual Freedom
Much (%) Some (%) Not much (%) No respect (%) Total (%)
Strongly Favour CV 52 46 46 38 47
Favour CV 23 24 21 8 23
Favour VV 15 18 17 12 17
Strongly Favour VV 10 12 16 42 13
Total 100 100 100 100 100
(n) (446) (1,057) (383) (60) (1,946)
a=0.05, p<0.001, G =0.113
Source: 2001 Australian Election Study (Bean, Gow and McAllister 2002).
All industrial democracies share some respect for freedom, thereby representing a 
barrier to the adoption of CV in any industrial democracy. We would expect this barrier 
to be relatively high in some industrial democracies, but relatively low in others.
56 T he au thor v isited  the  A ustra lian  N ational U niversity  (A N U ) and gained access to  opin ion  su rvey  d a ta  useful fo r th is thesis 
because o f  h is official status at the  A N U . H ow ever, he has not had  access to  the  2004 A ustra lian  E lection  S tudy  and  the  2004 
A ustra lian  C andidate  S tudy  because these w ere  no t yet availab le  w hen he left the  A N U . T his  m eans th a t th ese  la test su rvey  d a ta  are 
no t used  fo r this thesis.
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Nevertheless, utility is a common value for human beings, and so utility should be 
consciously or unconsciously evaluated in any country. Therefore, if CV is useful for 
the people from the viewpoint of utility and this is clarified, it will become easier for 
industrial democracies to overcome this barrier. However, it is difficult to verify the 
usefulness of CV and so it is difficult to overcome this barrier.
Path Dependence of Parliamentarians
Industrial democracies under VV are unlikely to adopt CV because they do not have CV 
at present. Several industrial democracies introduced CV with real sanction in the early 
years of mass democracy (e.g. Belgium in 1893 and Australia in 1924), and these 
countries have achieved very high turnouts since then. Meanwhile, most of the other 
industrial democracies did not adopt CV at that critical juncture, and they already have a 
long experience in mass democracy under VV (e.g. the USA, the UK and France). This 
fact in itself seems to make it difficult for these countries to adopt CV. In other words, 
the switch from VV to CV is costly for parliamentarians and electors, and so this switch 
is unlikely to occur. This is because all the political stakeholders are already committed 
to VV. Since the end of World War II, many of these countries have experienced a 
long-term decline in turnout, but CV as the most straightforward and potentially most 
effective solution to low turnout has been ignored until recently (but see Chapter 2 for 
new academic development in the 1980s and 1990s).
This path dependence (or lock-in) rests on parliamentarians and electors. First, the 
people who are in a position to reform the electoral system are usually those who 
benefit from the current system, and so any major reform is unlikely to occur (Reynolds 
2000, 62). In a representative democracy, parliamentarians have the legislative power to 
initiate the electoral system reform, but they are ones who have been successful under 
the current electoral system (i.e. the current set of electoral rules) inclusive of VV. 
However, under CV (or a new set of electoral rules inclusive of CV), they may be 
replaced by other people who have been less successful under the current system but are 
possibly more successful under the new system. As such, the status quo of the electoral 
system is the safest and best choice for incumbent parliamentarians (Dunleavy and 
Margetts 1995, 20; Margetts and Dunleavy 2002, 7).
However, if one of the two major parties under a two-party system is likely to 
out-manoeuvre the other major party by switching from VV to CV, this party would
77
have a collective motivation to seek the introduction of CV. On the other hand, the other 
major party will try to block its adoption. However, the reality would be more complex 
than this simple proposition implies. Although CV might be desirable for the collective 
benefit of one of the two major parties, its parliamentary organisation consists of 
individual parliamentarians and each parliamentarian should have substantial concern 
for their own individual electoral benefit. Some of the parliamentarians may still press 
their case for CV for the collective benefit of their party. However, their proposal for 
CV is not likely to be popular among their party colleagues in parliament. Even if CV is 
raised as an issue, this major party will be divided over this issue. Meanwhile, the other 
major party will be able to achieve unanimous opposition to CV because their party 
benefit and their individual benefit has the same orientation.
Parliamentarians are also human, and it is understandable that they have much 
concern on their own interests. However, it would be difficult for them to distinguish 
their egoistic interests from their moral interests in their mind. In general, individual 
parliamentarians would be reluctant to seriously consider any major electoral reform. 
When they have to consider any major electoral reform, parliamentarians would feel 
comfortable about identifying its disadvantages and would tend to overestimate them. 
On the contrary, they would feel uncomfortable about finding its advantages, and they 
would tend to overlook or underestimate them. As a result, they would tend to conclude 
that its total expected costs exceed its total expected benefits and so the major electoral 
reform should not be implemented in the best interests of the people. This avoidance of 
electoral reform may, in reality, meet the best interests of their own rather than those of 
the people, and this tendency among parliamentarians will also be the case with the 
introduction of CV.
Path Dependence of Electors
Negligence and idleness among electors should be another cause of path dependence (or 
lock-in). Because of the search and information cost, it is not cost-effective for 
individuals to try to understand everything related to their life. Therefore, they would 
not pay much attention to most political issues unless they are strongly dissatisfied with 
them or they have strong necessity for them. This energy-saving attitude is rational. 
Moreover, this inactive and subject mentality has an advantage of giving stability to 
political systems inclusive of electoral systems (Almond and Verba [1963] 1989, 30,
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339-41). However, this inactive mental tendency is surely an obstacle to any major 
system reform in a democracy.
Furthermore, people tend to dislike duties and burdens—particularly new 
ones—and so the introduction of new duties is likely to provoke an initial reaction 
against them. CV is an imposition of the legal duty to vote on electors, and so electors 
may resist its introduction. Although parliamentarians are in a position to reform the 
electoral system, they have to seek votes from electors at the election and, as a result, 
parliamentarians tend to avoid provoking electors (Schumpeter [1976] 1996, 269; 
Almond and Verba [1963] 1989, 342). Therefore, parliamentarians in the position to 
reform the electoral system would tend to refrain from introducing CV in this regard, 
too.
Necessary Adjustments for the Adoption of CV
As Irwin and van Holsteyn (2007, 1) argue, CV will not be introduced unless it is
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supported, or is at last tolerated, by electors. However, there are three major barriers 
to the introduction of CV: popular commitment to freedom, path dependence of 
parliamentarians and that of electors. These barriers are formidable, and the prospect of 
adopting CV seems to be slim in industrial democracies under VV at present.
Several attempts could be useful in lowering the barriers and in making the 
introduction relatively easier. First, if the usefulness of CV is recognised to be 
substantial, CV will have a better chance to get accepted by electors despite their 
commitment to liberal values and their inactive mentality. This is because utility is a 
common value no matter what other values the people embrace. Second, despite the 
path dependence of parliamentarians on VV, some parliamentarians may still try to raise 
CV as an issue for their party benefit. Their drive for the introduction of CV may 
provoke debate, and it may provide an opportunity for CV to gain wider recognition. 
Most of parliamentarians are likely to hesitate in implementing any major electoral 
reform in order to preserve their own best interests. However, if electors admire the 
usefulness of CV and eagerly seek it, parliamentarians will have a stronger motivation 
to respond to the preferences of electors and deliver CV in order to remain/become 
popular among electors and get re-elected (Schumpeter [1976] 1996, 269; Almond and
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Verba [1963] 1989, 342; Farrell 2001, 181, 183-84). Third, although some negative 
reaction is expected for any new duty imposed on electors, popular understanding of the 
usefulness of CV would control the risk and level of their negative reaction.
4.2. Effective Administration
It is too optimistic to think that the adoption of CV with real sanction will automatically 
secure very high turnout. As Robson (1923, 571) argued and several analyses of the last 
chapter demonstrated, serious administration is a necessary condition for CV to assure 
high turnout. However, this serious administration should not be limited to the 
systematic investigation into abstainers and the rigorous imposition of sanctions on 
offenders. The goal of the administration of CV is the popular compliance with CV 
rather than the imposition of sanctions on offenders. In order to effectively achieve this 
goal, the government should provide facilities for easy voting, should exercise ‘soft 
power’ (i.e. public relations and civic education) and should only sparingly wield ‘hard 
power’ (i.e. imposition of sanctions). These three measures should be combined for the 
most effective achievement of popular compliance with CV (S. Jackman 2001, 16317). 
This section will consider these three administrative measures in more details as 
follows.
Easy-Voting Facilities
Somebody may think that CV transfers the burden of effort for turnout from the 
government to electors, and so CV would release the government from the need to 
provide substantial easy-voting facilities. Although this prediction looks plausible at 
first sight, further consideration will suggest otherwise (S. Jackman 2001, 16317). The 
easy-voting facilities that the government provides will include easy registration, easy 
access to polling places, easy voting methods and information campaigns for the 
purpose of reducing the cost of voting itself and the cost of information for each elector. 
The importance of the provision of easy-voting facilities was extensively argued in the 
Australian parliament when CV was adopted for a referendum scheduled in 1915, which
57 Irwin and van  H olsteyn 2007 is a  draft version  and is no t fo r citation. H ow ever, a  special perm ission  w as g iven for th is
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was later cancelled.
The provision of easy-voting facilities will be more important for CV countries 
than for VV countries because of four reasons as follows.59 First, if voting is difficult 
and abstainers are sanctioned, CV will look to electors like a trap. Therefore, the 
government will need to reduce the burden imposed on electors. Second, the 
government of CV countries will have a practical necessity to ensure the ease of voting 
in order to contain the number of abstainers, whom the government has to deal with 
after each election, within a manageable size (Abraham 1955, 16-17; Hughes 1966, 83). 
Third, the government in CV countries has to make voting easy even for the least 
privileged electors in terms of electoral participation resources. Under VV, the 
government will set the target of their mobilisation effort at the electors who may vote 
by improving their voting environment, but the government may strategically neglect 
the electors who are very unlikely to vote for better allocation of precious administrative 
resources. Meanwhile, all electors must vote under CV and so voting must be easy for 
all electors inclusive of the least privileged. Fourth, even serious enforcement of CV 
with real sanction and serious administration will be unable to achieve 100% turnout, 
and so the provision of easy-voting facilities will be useful in further improving turnout, 
which is the original purpose of the introduction of CV.
‘Soft Power’
If electors do not think that CV is legitimate, the system would not work effectively no 
matter how many easy-voting facilities the government provides and how 
systematically and enthusiastically the government wields ‘hard power.’ It is important 
therefore that CV is accepted in the minds of electors. In order to achieve this goal, the 
government should exercise ‘soft power.’60 More specifically, the government should 
inform the people about the necessity and usefulness of CV for the collective benefit of 
the people and should try to persuade them to comply with CV. This ‘soft power’ will be 
exercised in the form of public relations and civic education. Most of the industrial
p articu lar c ita tion  on  27  A ugust 2007.
58 C om pulsory  V o ting  A ct 1915 (No. 36 o f  1915). R efer to  the  debates m ade by S enato r M illen (C om m onw ealth  Parliam entary  
D ebates. Senate. 25 A ugust 1915, 6049) and C harlton  M P (C om m onw ealth  P arliam entary  D ebates. H ouse  o f  R ep resen tatives. 9 
S ep tem ber 1915, 6842).
59 The second  and th ird  reasons are briefly  expressed in A E C  2001.
60  For m ore exp lanation  about ‘so ft pow er’ and  ‘hard  p o w er,’ see 1.3 o f  C hap ter 1.
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democracies should be privileged in exercising ‘soft power.’ Law and order is already 
established in these countries, and most electors are law-abiding, at least, to some 
degree. Therefore, if CV is introduced as a legal system, then most will comply with it 
simply because it is a law (Hasen 1996, 2168, 2171).61
Australia represents a good example of this. The electoral authorities have made 
substantial efforts in fields of public relations and civic education (AEC 2005, 37-44; 
AEC 2006, 56-61, 77-96), and CV has been recognised to be legitimate by the vast 
majority of electors. According to a survey of the 2001 Australian election (Bean, Gow 
and McAllister 2002), 47% of the valid answers strongly supported CV, 23% supported 
it, 17% opposed it, and 13% strongly opposed it. If the two support levels and the two 
opposition levels are combined respectively, 70% of the valid cases supported CV and 
30% of them opposed it (n=l,987). It will be possible to say that the vast majority of 
Australian people support CV. Moreover, considering the fact that 47% of valid answers 
strongly supported CV but only 13% of them strongly opposed it, it will be reasonable 
to say that the support for CV is not just vast but is also strong in Australia (also see 
Figure 4.1 in the next section for the long-term popular view towards CV in Australia).
‘Hard Power*
Although ‘hard power’ is not the sole measure of achieving the popular compliance with 
CV, it is an essential one. Moreover, the exercise of ‘hard power’ is the face of CV as a 
legal system. Even if ‘hard power’ is rarely wielded, it will still be important to show 
that the government is serious about identifying illegitimate abstainers and is ready to 
impose sanctions on them. Exercise of ‘hard power’ should be regarded as the last resort 
in the whole process of administration of CV.
For effective achievement of popular compliance with CV, sanction needs to be 
systematically and seriously imposed on offenders, as Robson (1923, 571) argues. 
However, the serious exercise of ‘hard power’ for the administration of CV could be 
extremely costly in some countries (Hughes 1966, 83; Phillips 2001, 21-22; Gratschew 
2002, 106; Gratschew 2004, 26), and it could exceed the resource capacity of the 
government. However, industrial democracies are privileged in two ways for achieving 
popular compliance with CV. First, law and order already exists and people are
61 For cond itions o f  leg itim acy  for the  e lectoral system  and dem ocratic  institu tions in general, see R eynolds 2 0 0 0 ,5 9 ; R eynolds,
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generally law-abiding in most industrial democracies, and so it will be possible for the 
government to achieve the popular compliance with CV without consuming enormous 
resources. Second, industrial democracies are prosperous, and so the government has 
somewhat sufficient resources to implement the necessary administrative measures. In 
fact, empirical evidence suggests that high income OECD members with CV are more 
likely to strictly impose sanctions on offenders than other CV countries, and this 
relationship is statistically significant at the 10% level though the sample size is small 
(see Table 4.2 below).62
Table 4.2: Industrial Democracies and Enforcement of CV
High Income OECD Other Total
Strict Enforcement (n) 80% (4) 31% (4) 44% (8)
Weak Enforcement (n) 20% (1 ) 69% ( 9) 56% (10)
Total (n) 100% (5) 100% (13) 100% (18)
a=0.10, p=0.060, G=0.800 
Notes:
1. High income OECD: (Strict Enforcement) Australia, Belgium, Switzerland, Luxemburg; (Weak Enforcement) Greece. Others: (Strict
Enforcement) Cyprus, Nauru, Singapore, Uruguay; (Weak Enforcement) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Fiji, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Peru, 
Turkey.
2. Although the sample size is small, column percentages are presented for reference.
Sources: Table 2.1; World Bank 2001, back cover.
Australia is a typical case of strict enforcement of CV. For achieving the popular 
compliance with CV, the level of sanction is also important in addition to serious 
administration of CV. As 3.1 of Chapter 3 argued, a moderate fine is appropriate as a 
sanction against abstention. In the case of Australia, the electoral authority, after each 
election, investigates all abstainers and tries to impose sanctions on all offenders. 
Moreover, in a leading court case of Australia, the judgement declared that the electoral 
law requires electors to actually vote and, if they do not have any idea whom to vote for, 
they should cast a randomly marked vote or an invalid vote.64 In effect, the judgement 
clarified the legal requirements of CV in Australia. Overall, the administration of CV in 
Australia is systematic and serious in regard to the use of ‘hard power.’ Turnout is 
consistently around 95% of the registered electors, and the electoral authority has 
effectively controlled the number of abstainers (see Figure 3.2).
R eilly  and  E llis 2 0 0 5 ,1 1 -1 2 .
62 For th is  test, a = 0 .10  is used  because the  sam ple  size is sm all.
63 See 3 .2  o f  C hap ter 3 for m ore deta ils o f  en forcem ent procedure and the  num ber o f  e lecto rs w ho  paid  the  fine.
64 O ’B rien  v  W arden (1981) 37 A C T R  13.
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On the other hand, Greece represents a typical case of weak enforcement of CV. 
The sanction against abstention is imprisonment (and imprisonment only), but this 
sanction has never been imposed on any abstainer.65 Turnout has recently been 
decreasing from 84.5% of the registered electors in 1989 to 75.0% of them in 2000 (see 
Pintor and Gratschew 2002, 136-37).66 Although the turnout is still high by 
international standards, it will be reasonable to argue that CV has not been very 
effective in sustaining high turnout in Greece. The major problem is that imprisonment 
appears to be an excessive sanction, and this makes it psychologically and politically 
difficult to impose any sanctions on offenders. Moreover, the Greek government would 
not have sufficient resources to systematically sanction offenders; the administrative 
cost of enforcement would be enormous for this serious sanction. Although the 
existence of CV in itself could pressure electors to vote, minor but real sanctions (e.g. a 
moderate fine) would be more useful to actually impose them and achieve high turnout 
than major and unwieldy sanctions (e.g. imprisonment).
Necessary Adjustments for Effective Administration
The goal of CV administration is to achieve public compliance with CV. In order to 
successfully achieve the goal, it will still be necessary for the government to sensibly 
combine three measures: the provision of easy-voting facilities, the exercise of ‘soft 
power’ and the use of ‘hard power.’ Although the second measure— ‘soft power’—may 
sound peaceful and reasonable, the importance of the third measure— ‘hard 
power’—should not be undervalued. The application of ‘hard power’ is the face of CV 
as a legal system, and the government would fail to achieve public compliance if it were 
disregarded by electors. It will also be important to allocate substantial administrative 
resources to the three administrative measures.
For serious application of CV, the sanction should be real but minor. The sanction 
should be systematically applied on offenders in order to avoid letting electors 
disregarding CV. Although the full administration of CV—as occurs in 
Australia—might be financially difficult for many countries, more economical versions 
like that of Belgium might be affordable. In Belgium, all abstainers are not investigated
65 A ccord ing  to  IPU  2007 , vo ting  is com pulsory  in G reece until the age o f  70 and failure to  vo te  m ay  resu lt in a  p rison  sentence 
o f  one m onth  to  one year, and a  loss o f  the  o ffender's post (how ever, no one has ever been p rosecuted).
66 T urnout w as 76 .6%  o f  the registered  e lectors at the 2004 election  (P in to r and G ratschew  2002  [updated  on line  version]).
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after each election but only abstainers in randomly selected districts are prosecuted for 
the best allocation of governmental resources. By this method, it would be possible to 
substantially reduce the cost of using ‘hard power’ for the administration of CV. Despite 
this cost-conscious exercise of ‘hard power,’ turnout has been at around the 90-95%
( \ 7under CV in Belgium (see Figure 3.3). The sanction should also be minor m order to 
avoid being unwieldy.
4.3. Persistence of Compulsory Voting
Unless CV is sustained, it will not be continuously effective in achieving high turnout. 
However, it will not be difficult to sustain CV for industrial democracies once it is 
introduced. The reasons that make it difficult for CV to get adopted (see 4.1 of this 
chapter) are, in reverse, the very reasons that make it difficult to get abolished. First, 
popular commitment to democracy will work as a protector of CV. Liberalism and 
democracy are core principles in industrial democracies. CV is anti-liberal, but CV is 
pro-democratic in its nature (see 2.2 of Chapter 2 for arguments and references). 
Arguments over the abolition of CV tend to reach a deadlock between liberalism and 
democracy, so the normative arguments are not likely to reach a clear-cut conclusion 
that CV should be abolished.
Second, the path dependence on CV will start to develop once it is introduced. 
Parliamentarians are in a position to reform the electoral system in a parliamentary 
democracy, but they are the very people who benefit from the current arrangements so 
most parliamentarians will not want to implement any major electoral reform like the 
abolition of CV (Reynolds 2000, 62). Because of the party disadvantage of CV, one of 
the two major parties will have a motivation to abolish CV in a two-party system. 
However, this party consists of individual parliamentarians who have a motivation to 
keep CV for their individual benefit. Some members of this party might still pursue the 
abolition of CV for their collective party benefit, but this party is likely to be divided 
over its abolition while the parliamentarians in the other major party will unanimously 
seek to keep it because their collective party benefit and individual benefit have the
67 For m ore  deta ils o f  the exercise o f  enforcem ent o f  vo ting  in B elg ium , see 3.2 o f  C hap ter 3.
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same orientation. Third, the prevalence of negligence and idleness among electors will 
give stability to CV once it is adopted and the initial confusion and reaction dissipate.
Australia has maintained CV since its introduction in 1924 despite persistent 
arguments against it and several attempts at abolition (Farrell and McAllister 2006, 
138-40). Belgium has also sustained CV since its introduction in 1893 despite a 
substantial argument over its abolition during the 1990s (Pilet 2007, 6-12). However, it 
is also true that several industrial democracies have abolished CV. The Netherlands, 
which adopted CV in 1917, abolished it in 1970 (for the reasons of this abolition, see 
Gratshew 2004, 29). Italy abolished all sanctions against abstention in 1993 though the 
law still provides that voting is a duty (Gratschew 2004, 28). Several Swiss cantons 
used to have CV for national-level parliamentary elections, but there remains only one 
CV canton (i.e. Schaffhausen) at present (Gratschew 2004, 29). In Austria, provinces 
were entitled to make voting compulsory for national-level parliamentary elections and 
several provinces had utilised this system, but this CV system was abolished altogether 
in 1992 (Federal Ministry of Interior, Austria 2007). These facts suggest that some 
maintenance will be necessary for CV to continue existing. This section will examine 
the case of Australia in order to learn lessons from it. Then, this section will try to 
identify necessary adjustments to sustain CV.
Argument over the Abolition of CV in Australia during the 1990s
As already noted, Australia has retained CV since its introduction in 1924 but persistent 
arguments against CV have existed. Several academics (e.g. Rydon 1968; Rydon 1997; 
Rydon and Goot 1989)69 and commentators (e.g. McGuiness 1994, 1998)70 have 
expressed their objection to CV in journals and newspapers. However, they have not 
generated any substantial argument over CV. Nevertheless, bitter argument over the 
abolition of CV arose among parliamentarians during the 1990s though it declined in 
some time.
The argument for the abolition of CV was raised by several conservative coalition
68 F o r presidential e lections, nationw ide C V  existed  until 1982 but then C V  w as up  to  provinces. Several p rov inces retained 
C V , but the  last C V  prov ince (i.e. Tyrol) abolished  it in 2004 (Federal M in istry  o f  In terior, A ustria  2007).
69 A lso see G eoffrey  B lainey, “ The Q uiet C ustom  o f  C om pulsory  V o ting ,” The Australian, 21 F eb ruary  1990.
70 A lso see  Pad ra ic  P. M cG uiness, “D o n ’t Force the  V ote on Those W ho D o n ’t C are,”  Sydney Morning Herald, 19 A pril 2001; 
F rank D evine, “ W hy E ndure a  Law  T h a t B enefit O nly  Politicians?: C om pulsory  V o ting  D o esn ’t Pu t People  in the  B ooths,” The 
Australian, 18 June  2001.
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parliamentarians. Australia has a de facto two-party system consisting of the Australian 
Labor Party (hereafter the Labor Party) and the conservative coalition of the Liberal 
Party o f Australia and the National Party of Australia. In addition to these two major 
parties, there are also a few minor parties mainly in the upper-house (i.e. the Senate). 
The conservative coalition lost the 1983 election to the Labor Party lead by Robert 
Hawke, and the coalition fell from power. Moreover, the conservative coalition lost the 
1984, 1987, 1990 elections to the Labor Party under Hawke. Then, the Labor Party 
experienced an intra-party conflict and its leadership was taken by John Keating. 
However, the coalition lost the 1993 election to the Labor Party under Keating. In total, 
the coalition was in opposition for 13 years from 1983 to 1996. During this period, the 
coalition struggled to return to power. The coalition formulated public policies (e.g. a 
radical economic policy package ‘Fightback!’ launched in 1991) and they changed their 
leader several times (Andrew Peacock, John Howard, Andrew Peacock, John Hewson, 
Alexander Downer, and then John Howard) during this period. In this process, the 
abolition of CV was raised as an issue among the coalition members (e.g. Minchin 
1994).
The most prominent figure among the anti-CV coalition parliamentarians was 
Senator Nick Minchin (Liberal Party).71 From 1985 to 1993, he was the State Director 
of the South Australian Liberal Party (i.e. the secretary-general of the 
extra-parliamentary organisation of the South Australian Liberal Party). During this 
period, he already made a commitment to the case for the abolition of CV (see Minchin 
1992). In 1993, he was elected to the federal parliament as a Senator for South Australia. 
In the federal parliament, Senator Minchin became a member of the Joint Standing 
Committee on Electoral Matters (hereafter the JSCEM) in 1993 and he continued being 
a member of the committee until 1997. This committee is to inquire into and report on 
matters relating to electoral laws and practices and their administration as may be 
referred to it by either the parliament or a minister. This is a joint committee and so it 
consisted of Senators and MPs. The committee reflects the partisan constitution of the 
parliament, and so the coalition were then in a minority in this committee. However, 
Senator Minchin and his coalition colleagues addressed their case for the abolition of
71 For h is b iography , see a  w ebpage o f  the  P arliam ent o f  A ustra lia  < h ttp ://parIin fow eb .aph .gov .au /p iw eb/v iew _docum ent. 
aspx?ID = 12558& T A B L E = B IO G S>  and a  w ebpage o f  Senator M in ch in ’s m inisteria l hom epage <w w w .financem in is ter.gov .au / 
b iography .h tm l>  (19 A ugust 2007).
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CV in this committee.
In 16 November 1994, the JSCEM submitted a report about the conduct of the 
1993 federal election to the parliament (JSCEM 1994). Although the majority report did 
not mention CV, a dissent report compiled by four coalition members recommended the 
abolition of CV. The committee then consisted of 12 members: seven Labor members, 
four coalition members (three Liberals and one National), and one Democrats member. 
This dissent report argued that CV was contrary to the ‘fundamental democratic right to 
choose not to vote’ (JSCEM 1994, 157). However, the coalition was in opposition and 
so this recommendation for the abolition of CV did not have any real impact on politics. 
Nevertheless, they, at least, registered their case for the abolition of CV in this stage. 
This fact suggests that the abolition of CV could grow into a real topic when the 
conservative coalition wins the election and assumes power in the future.
The conservative coalition under John Howard finally won the 1996 election and 
assumed power. The coalition was in the majority in the lower house, but they were not 
in the majority in the upper house (i.e. the Senate). Therefore, it was still technically 
difficult for the coalition to abolish CV. However, by this electoral victory, the abolition 
of CV gained more attention. As a result of the 1996 election, the committee consisted 
of five coalition members (four Liberals and one National), three Labor members, and 
one Democrats member. The committee, which was chaired by a coalition member, 
argued over the abolition of CV. The committee submitted a report on the conduct of the 
1996 federal election on 16 June 1997, and this report recommended the abolition of 
CV (JSCEM 1997, xix-xx, 23-27). However, this report was accompanied by two 
minority reports: one by three Labor members, and the other by one Democrats member, 
and both minority reports criticised the attempt to abolish CV made by coalition 
members (JSCEM 1997, 119, 124-130, 135, 138-146). Judging from the fact that 
several pages were dedicated to the argument over the abolition of CV in the majority 
report and the minority reports, CV seems to have been substantially argued in this 
committee.
The major reasons for recommending the abolition of CV were (1) democracy 
was sustainable without CV in Australia, (2) CV was contrary to the notion of the right 
of voting, and (3) the abolition of CV would encourage party membership and party 
activities (JSCEM 1997, xix-xx, 23-27). Meanwhile, the main counter-argument was 
that the conservative coalition members pursued the abolition of CV only for their
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partisan interest, but the democratic fairness and other reasons for CV were also listed 
up (JSCEM 1997, 119, 124-130, 135, 138-146). Overall, the arguments for and against 
CV were mostly reproductions of past arguments over CV (for these past arguments, see
2.2 of Chapter 2).
However, the abolition of CV had not been shared even among the coalition 
parliamentarians. Petro Georgiou MP (Liberal Party) addressed his case for CV at a
77meeting of some Liberal parliamentarians on 29 October 1996 (Georgiou 1996), and 
the division in the party over this issue was revealed. It would be possible to say that his 
speech gave a shape to a growing concern over the abolition of CV among Liberal 
parliamentarians. The Liberal Party is the major coalition partner, and this revealed 
division among them would have been a considerable damage to the anti-CV drive.
However, the anti-CV drive in the parliament still had another chance. Senator 
Minchin became the Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister in charge of the 
Constitutional Convention after the 1996 federal election. The Constitutional 
Convention was an ad hoc assembly for discussing whether Australia should become a 
republic, which republic model should be put to the electorate to consider against the 
status quo (i.e. the constitutional monarchy), etc. Later, the government introduced the 
Constitutional Convention (Election) Bill 1997 on 26 March 1997, which provided that 
VV and postal vote would be used for the election of half of the convention delegates. 
Amendments to the Constitutional Convention (Election) Bill 1997 were affirmed on 28 
August 1997, and the usage of VV and postal vote for the Constitutional Convention 
election was confirmed. Although one of the amendments provided that this usage of 
VV for this special election would not be a precedent for any parliamentary election or 
referendum,74 this usage of VV could still have been regarded as a test case for 
parliamentary elections and referendums in the future. If the usage of VV for this 
special election had been regarded as being successful, the anti-CV drive could have 
gained a new momentum.
Polling by mail for the Constitutional Convention election was closed on 9
72 This w as the  inaugural m eeting  o f  the John  S tuart M ill Society. T h is  society w as a  non-m em bersh ip  assoc iation  o f  L iberal 
parliam entarians that offers an opportun ity  o f  hav ing  d inner and o f  hearing  a speech w ith o ther L iberal parliam entarians. T herefore, 
th is w as a k ind o f  a  friendship  association  and a  study group  in th is  party. H ow ever, th is  association  w as a de facto loose fac tion  o f  
cen tre -righ t L iberal parliam entarians.
73 The o ther h a lf  o f  the  convention  delegates w ere appo in ted  by  the  governm ent.
74 C onstitu tional C onvention  (E lection) A ct 1997(No. 1 2 8 ,1 9 9 7 ), Section 12.
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December 1997, and the voting rate was 45.30% of the registered electors. This turnout 
was far much lower than ordinary parliamentary election turnout of around 95%. The 
Constitutional Convention election was a special one and its result was not a 
scientifically meaningful sample to be referred to ordinary parliamentary elections and 
referendums. However, this low turnout of 45.30% must have been an anecdote 
surprising enough for many parliamentarians to doubt whether Australia could achieve 
decent turnouts without CV. When anti-CV parliamentarians argued ‘if Australia is to 
consider itself a mature democracy compulsory voting should now be abolished’ 
(JSCEM 1997, xix), this statement should have suggested that turnout would not 
become very low in Australia even if CV were abolished. However, the turnout of this 
special election indicated contrary to this prediction.
On 8 April 1998, the conservative coalition government, to the parliament, 
submitted a government response to the JSCEM report. This official response stated that 
the Howard coalition government did not support the recommendation of the abolition 
of CV. Furthermore, the extra-parliamentary organisation of the Liberal Party expressed 
its opposition to the abolition of CV in a submission to the JSCEM after the 1998 
election, which the coalition won (Liberal Party of Australia 1999).75 The JSCEM, in 
which the coalition was in the majority, submitted a report about the 1998 federal 
election on 26 June 2000. The majority report mentioned CV but did not recommend its 
abolition (JSCEM 2000,106-7). Although the coalition members were in the majority in 
the JSCEM, the reports about the 2001 federal election and the 2004 federal election 
mentioned CV as a topic but did not recommend its abolition, either (JSCEM 2003, 
247-251; JSCEM 2005, 183-204). These facts suggest that the drive for the abolition of 
CV had effectively broken down by 1998.
The anti-CV drive started after the 1993 election and it mounted after the 1996 
election, at which the conservative coalition won the election and came into power. 
However, when the drive had a real chance to abolish CV and gained publicity, it was 
countered by their party colleagues and it broke down before the 1998 election. 
Argument against CV still exists. However, since its breakdown in 1998, the case for 
the abolition of CV has not gained any real momentum.
75 Som ebody m ay attribute th is  statem ent to  Linton C rosby, the  Federal D irec to r o f  the  F ederal S ecre ta ria t o f  the  L iberal Party  
o f  A ustralia . H ow ever, th is  w as an official subm ission  m ade by the  ex tra -parliam entary  o rgan isation  under the  nam e o f  th e  Liberal 
Party  o f  A ustralia .
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Analysing the Case of Australia
This subsection analyses the argument over the abolition of CV in Australian during the 
1990s, which the last subsection described. This subsection will first try to identify the 
reasons why the argument mounted during the 1990s and then will pursue the reasons 
why it broke down in several years.
There seems to have been four major reasons for the rise in argument over the 
abolition of CV. First, substantial minority of Australian people had persistently been 
against CV. Although opinion surveys before 1943 are not available, the obtainable 
surveys indicate that CV has been continuously supported by the vast majority of the 
electorate (see Figure 4.1 below). Since 1943, the support rate for CV has been 
persistently around 70% and the opposition rate has been around 30%. Nevertheless, it 
should also be noted that a substantial minority of around 30% have opposed CV in 
Australia. Moreover, several libertarians have defied the electoral authorities in relation
7 fkto CV and have attracted the attention of the mass media. Judging from the fact that 
CV is a strong legal measure, it will be natural that there is some objections and 
resistance to it in a liberal society. Furthermore, this anti-CV sentiment among the 
substantial minority of the electorate would be worth being represented in the 
parliament in a democracy.
76 “C om pulsory  V o ting  B ack  on A genda,”  The Canberra Times, 17 M ay 2001; B ill Sm ith ies, “ L etters to  the  Editor: O bjection  
to  C om pulsory  V o ting  a  M atter o f  P rincip le,” The Canberra Times, 26  M ay 2001; F rank  D evine, “ Scourge o f  L aw  E nforcers Faces 
F resh Poll T est,” The Australian, 29 O ctober 2001.
Figure 4.1: Public Views towards CV in Australia
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N ote: DNK stands for ‘do not know .’ Because o f  the question design, there are no DNK answers in 1993 and after.
Sources: Australian Public Opinion Polls 1943, 1955, 1963,1965; Aitkin 1982a; M cAllister and M ughan 1987; Jones, M cAllister, Denemark and 
Gow 1993; Jones, McAllister and Gow 1996; Bean, Gow and McAllister 1999; Bean, Gow and M cAllister 2002 (These sources have been traced 
back from Aitkin 1982b, 31; M cAllister, M ackerras and Boldiston 1997,291.). Aitkin (1982b, 355-91) for 1967 and 1969 (Two sets o f  original 
survey data are stored in the Australian Social Science Data Archive, Australian National University. However, the author has not gained access 
to them ).
The second reason was that the conservative coalition had a partisan interest in 
abolishing CV. An academic paper (McAllister 1986) had provided empirical evidence 
that high turnout resulting from CV was advantageous for the conservative coalition and 
was disadvantageous for the Labor Party in Australia.77 Parties are assumed to play a 
game of election within the framework of a set of rules, and this is a zero-sum (or a 
fixed-sum) game because the number of seats is fixed. However, parties might also play 
another game of manipulating the rules in order to win the game of election and assume 
political power. Judging from an opinion survey about the 2001 Senate election (Table
4.3 below), high turnout resulting from CV is a disadvantage for the conservative 
coalition (Coalition) and is an advantage for the Labor Party (ALP). This finding is in
77 Mackerras and McAllister 1999 provides more substantial empirical evidence, but this paper was not available yet.
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line with the analyses of other elections in Australia (McAllister 1986; Mackerras and 
McAllister 1999; Tables 5.3 and 5.4 of this thesis). If voting had been voluntary rather 
than compulsory and turnout had been 62% at the 2001 Senate election, the
• 78conservative coalition would have increased its vote share by three percentage points. 
On the other hand, the vote for the Labor Party would have been lower by two 
percentage points. Meanwhile, it is not clear whether CV has any implications for the 
vote share of the minor parties (i.e. Democrats, the Greens and One Nation). Under this 
condition, the conservative coalition will have a collective motivation to seek the 
abolition of CV for their electoral benefit. On the other hand, the Labor Party will have 
a collective motivation to protect CV.
Table 4.3: Five-Party Preference at Different Turnout Levels (Cumulative Percentages)
(2001 Senate Election, Australia)
Coalition ALP Dems Greens OneNation Total (n)
Expected
Turnout
(%)
Definitely would have voted (%) 47 32 9 8 5 100 (1,166) 62
(+) Probably would (%) 46 33 9 8 4 100 (1,479) 82
(+) Might, might not (%) 46 33 9 8 4 100 (1,613) 90
(+) Probably not (%) 45 34 9 8 5 100 (1,730) 96
(+) Definitely not (%) 44 34 10 8 5 100 (1,796) 100
a=0.05, p<0.001, V =0.080 (xJ-test results for the column-percentage table)
Notes:
1. The ‘Coalition’ consists o f  the Liberal Party o f  Australia (Liberal) and the National Party o f  Australia (The Nationals). The other parties are the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP), Australian Democrats (Democrats), Australian Greens (The Greens) and Pauline Hansen’s One Nation (One 
Nation).
2. This table has been remodelled from one in Mackerras and McAllister (1999,228). The first row represents the expected vote share o f  five parties 
and expected turnout when only the 'definitely would have voted' vote. The second row represents the expected vote share o f  their expected turnout 
when the 'probably would have been voted' also vote. The following rows are calculated in the same manner.
Source: 2001 Australian Election Study (Bean, Gow and McAllister 2002).
As the third reason, the sadness and disappointment with their successive 
electoral defeats at the 1983, 1984, 1987, 1990 and 1993 elections might have 
stimulated their latent partisan interest in the abolition of CV among coalition members. 
Fourth, there was Nick Minchin, who personally had a strong commitment to the 
abolition of CV and played a leading role in the anti-CV drive after he became a Senator 
in 1993 and became a member of the JSCEM. Without a political entrepreneur like
78 F rom  a  su rvey  o f  the  1996 A ustralian  federal election  (Jones, M cA lliste r and  G ow  1996), S. Jackm an  1999a estim ates that 
tu rnou t w ou ld  have b een  in the  55-65%  range i f  vo ting  had  been voluntary. T h is is a  com panion  paper o f  S. Jackm an  1999b in the 
sam e vo lum e o f  a  jo u rn a l. S. Jackm an  took  non-response and m easurem ent errors in to  accoun t in these  papers and estim ated  the 
tu rnou t under sim u la tive  V V  in A ustralia.
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Senator Minchin, the anti-CV drive would not have substantially mounted like that of 
the 1990s.
Meanwhile, there seems to have been five major reasons for the breakdown of the 
anti-CV drive. First, the coalition parliamentarians were divided over the abolition of 
CV whereas the Labor parliamentarians and minor party parliamentarians were, at least 
mostly, unanimous in supporting CV. Judging from the 1993, 1996 and 2001 Australian 
Candidate Studies (see Figure 4.2 below), newly-elected coalition parliamentarians 
were always divided over the issue during the rise and decline of the argument for the 
abolition of CV though the support rate for VV experienced rise and fall. Therefore, it 
would have been difficult for the coalition to achieve a party consensus. Meanwhile, 
newly-elected parliamentarians from other parties (i.e. the Labor Party, Democrats, and 
the Greens) were not divided, and a consensus that CV should be retained existed 
among them.
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F ig u r e  4 .2 :  S u p p o r t  f o r  W  a m o n g  N e w ly  E l e c t e d  P a r l i a m e n ta r in a s  ( A u s t r a l i a )
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Notes:
1. The ‘Coalition’ consists o f  the Liberal Party o f Australia (Liberal) and the National Party o f  Australia (The Nationals).
2. The Australian Labor Party (ALP), Australian Democrats (Democrats) and Australian Greens (The Greens) are independent from each 
other in practice, but they are consolidated in this figure.
Sources: 1993 Australian Candidate Study (McAllister, Jones, Denemark and Gow 1994), 1996 Australian Candidate Study (Jones, McAllister 
and Gow 1996), 2001 Australian Candidate Study (Gibson, Gow, Bean and M cAllister 2002). For access to the elected-candidate data, the 
author obtained a special permission from the Australian Social Science Data Archive, Australian National University.
Second, the anti-CV drive in the 1990s did not develop into a perceptible public 
discontent with CV and did not threaten the predominance of popular support for it, 
judging from the past surveys illustrated in Figure 4.1. The support for CV even seems 
to have increased during the 1990s. CV is not provided for by the constitution but is 
provided by the electoral law in Australia, and so it is technically possible for the 
parliament to abolish CV without a consensus of the Australian people through a 
referendum. However, the substantial popular support for CV should discourage 
parliamentarians from seeking its abolition. This is because most of them have to seek 
re-election and the two major parties want to win the next election and take or retain 
power, and so they cannot simply ignore the preferences of the people (Almond and 
Verba [1963] 1989, 342; Farrell 2001, 181, 183-84; Schumpeter [1976] 1996, 269). This 
would have been a concern for many coalition parliamentarians in relation to the drive
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for the abolition of CV.
Third, the coalition parliamentarians might have realised that they could win 
elections even under CV, which was likely to be disadvantageous for them. When they 
could not win elections, they might have thought that the abolition of CV would be 
useful for them and could give them an electoral victory. However, once they win an 
election, they would not feel a strong desire to abolish CV any more. In other words, 
this is a catch-22 situation. When they are in opposition, they have a motivation to 
abolish CV but they do not have power to achieve it. When they are in power, they may 
be able to abolish CV but they do not have a substantial motivation for it. In either case, 
the abolition of CV is not likely to be delivered. If the anti-CV coalition 
parliamentarians could gain a real chance to abolish CV in the future, it would be the 
time when the coalition is still in power but is likely to lose the next election. In this 
particular situation, their party colleagues might get upset and might try to do anything, 
inclusive of the abolition of CV, useful in winning the next election. For example, 
according to a research paper published by the Australian Electoral Commission (Evans 
2006, 5), the conservative government of Queensland introduced CV for the state 
lower-house election in 1915 in the expectation of the partisan advantage for them, but 
the conservative government lost the 1915 election in the end.79
Fourth, any major electoral reform is not the benefit of incumbent 
parliamentarians inclusive of coalition parliamentarians (Reynolds 2000, 62), and 
another entrepreneur for CV gave a shape to a growing concern among coalition 
parliamentarians over the abolition of CV. The incumbent parliamentarians are the most 
successful people in their own party under the present electoral system. If this system is 
largely reformed, they may not be as successful as they are at present and they may be 
even replaced by other people in their own party. Therefore, the more the anti-CV drive 
mounted, the greater concern the incumbent parliamentarians would have about the 
abolition of CV for their individual benefit. While several anti-CV coalition members 
were pressing the case for the abolition of CV mainly in the JSCEM, a concern on this 
issue should have grown among other Liberal parliamentarians. In this situation, Petro 
Georgiou MP (Liberal Party) gave a speech in which he expressed his support for CV 
(Georgiou 1996) and played a leading role in giving a shape to the concern among his
79 Q ueensland was the  first state tha t in troduced C V  fo r s tate  e lections in A ustralia .
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Liberal colleagues.
Fifth, the test case of VV in 1997 was regarded as a failure. The turnout of a 
special election under the VV system was 45.30%, which was much lower than the 
turnout of around 95% for parliamentary elections and referendums under CV. This low 
turnout suggested that Australia was unable to achieve decent turnouts under VV though 
this election was a special one and its turnout was not a proper indicator of the turnout 
of federal elections and referendums in a strict sense. It would be reasonable to 
understand that the outcome of the test case caused a great concern over the abolition of 
CV from the viewpoint of democracy in addition to their individual electoral interest.
The breakdown of the anti-CV drive among the conservative coalition 
parliamentarians can be traced in past opinion surveys (see Figure 4.2). While the 
anti-CV drive mounted then broke down, the support rate for VV among newly-elected 
coalition parliamentarians also experienced rise and fall. Although the conservative 
coalition was in opposition after the 1993 election, several coalition parliamentarians 
addressed the case for VV and gained some support from their party colleagues. The 
support rate for VV among the newly-elected conservative coalition parliamentarians at 
the 1993 election was 48%. However, the support rate for VV increased to 62% among 
the newly-elected coalition parliamentarians at the 1996 election, at which the 
conservative coalition finally won the election and came into power. Then, anti-CV 
coalition parliamentarians started strongly pressing their case for VV in parliament. 
However, they encountered a backlash from their party colleagues, and the test case of 
VV was regarded as a total failure. The Australian Candidate Study was not conducted 
at the 1998 election, but the support rate for VV declined to 42% among the 
newly-elected coalition parliamentarians at the 2001 election. The rise and fall of the 
anti-CV drive during the 1990s suggests that CV is locked in Australian politics and that 
it is difficult to unlock it.
Necessary Adjustments for Persistence of CV
Judging from the case of Australia, it will not be difficult to maintain CV once it is 
adopted and is properly administered for some time. There would remain some 
opposition to CV among parliamentarians and the people, but the opposition does not 
seem to be viable. However, it is also true that the practice of CV has been declining 
among industrial democracies as Hirczy de Mino (2000, 45) argues, and several
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industrial democracies have abolished their CV (e.g. the Netherlands and Austria). For 
persistence of CV, three administrative measures (i.e. the provision of easy voting 
facilities, the exercise of ‘soft power,’ and the use of ‘hard power’) should be sensibly 
combined in order to achieve popular voluntary compliance with CV. Moreover, the 
imposition of sanctions on illegitimate abstainers should be regarded as the last resort 
and should be applied sensibly, reasonably and sparingly in order to avoid provoking 
electors though sanctions should also be applied systematically in order to effectively 
achieve popular compliance with CV. Civic education would also be useful in achieving 
and maintaining the popular support for CV. So long as popular support for CV is 
overwhelming, it will be difficult for popularly-elected parliamentarians to abolish CV 
because they do not like to take a risk of loosing their popularity even if they have some 
partisan or normative motivation to abolish CV.
4.4. Conclusion
Adoption, serious administration and persistence are three major conditions for CV to 
be effective in continuously achieving high turnout. Of these three conditions, adoption 
is the most difficult one to satisfy for industrial democracies because of (1) popular 
commitment to freedom, (2) the path dependence of parliamentarians, and (3) that of 
electors. However, if the usefulness of CV is widely recognised, it will become easier 
for CV to get adopted. Industrial democracies are prosperous, and so they will be able to 
allocate necessary resources to the administration of CV. However, for effective and 
efficient administration, it is necessary to sensibly combine three administrative 
measures: the provision of easy-voting facilities, the exercise of ‘soft power,’ and the 
use of ‘hard power.’ The actual usage of ‘hard power’ should be regarded as the last 
resort in the whole process, but it should not be disregarded either. Once CV is adopted, 
it will not be difficult for industrial democracies to sustain it because of popular 
commitment to democracy, and path dependence of parliamentarians and electors on CV. 
However, some effort for maintenance will still be necessary, and proper administration 
of CV should be continuously provided to retain popular voluntary compliance with CV. 
Civic education might also be useful in achieving/retaining popular support for CV.
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CHAPTER 5
The Consequences for Voters
This chapter assesses whether the high turnout resulting from CV is effective in 
improving the well-being of the people. This is because, even if CV is highly effective 
in improving turnout, CV cannot ultimately be useful unless the high turnout resulting 
from CV is also effective in improving the well-being of the people. This well-being of 
the people could be most easily measured by some value standard. Although scientific 
political studies do not usually deal with values, Lijphart (1997) combined scientific 
methods with the value standard of democracy (or precise representation of the will of 
the people) and he admired the high turnout resulting from CV. This attempt was a 
breakthrough for the research on CV, but his choice of value standard is questionable. 
This chapter will, therefore, with another value standard, remodel and develop his 
hypothesis in order to assess the effectiveness of the high turnout resulting from CV in 
improving the well-being of the people.
In order to achieve the goal of this chapter, this chapter will first identify a value 
standard appropriate to measure the well-being of the people. Second, this chapter will 
remodel the Lijphart hypothesis by applying his argument on the left-right dimension 
and by replacing his value standard with the one that is selected here. Third, this chapter 
will carry out a case study of Australia and evaluate the simulative abolition of CV in 
Australia by using the remodelled hypothesis and the chosen value standard. Finally, 
based on the findings of this chapter, the concluding section will consider whether the 
introduction of CV and its resulting high turnout would improve the well-being of the 
people in industrial democracies under VV at present.
5.1. Value Standard for Assessment
Although it is a matter of argument what the well-being of the people is, this thesis 
regards it as the total utility of individuals. However, non-electors (e.g. children) among 
the people cannot participate in election and so it is difficult to take the utility of 
non-electors into consideration in relation to the effect of CV. Therefore, this thesis
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further narrows it down to the total utility of electors, and this thesis uses it as a working 
value standard. The reason for this choice among several conceivable value standards is 
outlined as follows.
The advantages and disadvantages of CV have been identified based on a variety 
of value standards, such as liberalism and democracy (see the discussion in 2.2 of 
Chapter 2). For example, Lijphart (1997) argued that the turnout of privileged people is 
higher than that of less privileged people and public policy would be distorted for the 
benefit o f the high turnout group. Then, he evaluated CV as a useful measure to 
substantially improve turnout and to solve this democratic deficit. He appreciated the 
usefulness of CV from the viewpoint of democracy (more specifically ‘precise 
representation of the will of the people’). However, this choice of value standard is 
questionable. Both liberalism and democracy are highly valued in industrial 
democracies as goals in their own right. Nevertheless, people do not exist for liberalism 
or democracy, but liberalism and democracy exist for people. Therefore, the values that 
liberalism and democracy have are secondary, and the intrinsic value resides only in 
human beings. Although it is difficult to identify this intrinsic value, it must be some
finhuman-oriented one.
Both the utilitarian efficiency and the Pareto efficiency are human-oriented value 
standards.81 On the one hand, the utilitarian efficiency finds the intrinsic value in the 
utility that each individual receives and appreciates the maximisation of the total utility 
of individuals (i.e. the aggregation of individual utilities in the population). So long as a 
system reform improves the total utility of individuals, this reform should, from the 
viewpoint of the utilitarian efficiency, be implemented even if this reform makes some 
individuals worse off (Mill 1879, chap. 2, paras. 10, 21; Mueller 2003, 151-52; Suzuki 
1994, 156-57). On the other hand, the Pareto efficiency accepts a system reform if and 
only if this reform makes some individuals better off and does not make any individual 
worse off. In other words, the Pareto efficiency does not accept any system reform that 
makes some individuals worse off even if this reform makes many individuals better off 
substantially (Suzuki 1994, 154-55). It will be possible to say that the Pareto efficiency
80 It shou ld  be noted  tha t this hum anistic  s tatem ent in itse lf  is a  value standard  chosen by  the  author. In the  fo llow ing  
paragraphs, the  au tho r exam ines several hum an-orien ted  value s tandards and chooses one o f  them . T h is is a lso  h is cho ice  and  is a 
p rovisional choice.
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is, in a sense, more humane than the utilitarian efficiency, which does not hesitate in
» 09making some individuals worse off in order to improve the total utility of individuals. 
However, many interests conflict with each other in the real society, and the Pareto 
efficiency is ineffective in reforming the current regime tangled with vested interests 
and in improving the well-being of the people. Therefore, this thesis disregards the 
Pareto efficiency but adopts the utilitarian efficiency (i.e. the maximisation of the total 
utility of individuals) as the value standard for assessing the usefulness of CV for the 
people. However, because of technical limitations, this thesis actually uses the total 
utility of electors instead of that of all individuals.
The Nash efficiency (Nash 1950; Suzuki 1994, 157-67), for which individual 
utilities are multiplied together rather than being summed up, can be regarded as being 
fairer than the utilitarian efficiency (i.e. the total utility of individuals). The Nash 
solution was originally addressed as a bargaining solution between two players, but the 
same idea can be used as a normative criterion for authoritative distribution of utilities. 
This thesis will hereafter call it the ‘Nash efficiency’ for this purpose. For example, the 
distribution of 100 utility-units between two individuals as [90, 10] is equal to another 
distribution as [50, 50] from the viewpoint of the utilitarian efficiency because the total 
utility of these two individuals is 100 in either case. Meanwhile, from the viewpoint of 
the Nash efficiency, the latter set of utility-unit distribution is more desirable than the 
former set because the product (or the Nash product) of the former set is 900 (=90*10) 
but that of the latter one is 2,500 (=50*50). Moreover, between two sets of [90, 10] and 
[50, 40], the first set is more desirable than the second set from the viewpoint of the 
utilitarian efficiency (90+10 > 50+40), but the first one is less desirable than the second 
one from the viewpoint of the Nash efficiency (90*10 < 50*40).
Although the Nash efficiency is a credible idea, this chapter will not use the Nash 
efficiency but will instead use the utilitarian efficiency for three reasons. First, the Nash 
efficiency and the utilitarian efficiency are the same in a simple model used in the 
following sections of this chapter. Second, the calculation of the Nash efficiency is 
much more complex than that of the utilitarian efficiency. Third, while it is possible to
81 V ilfredo Pareto  (1848-1923) w as a  socio logist, econom ist and philosopher. T he Pareto  e ffic iency  is a lso called  the  Pareto 
optim ality .
82 It should be noted  tha t the Pareto  e ffic iency  could fail to  be hum ane. E ven i f  the  status quo is ex trem ely  u n fa ir and  inhum ane, 
the  Pareto  effic iency does n o t accept any  reform  i f  th is reform  m akes som e indiv iduals (e.g. a despo t) w orse off.
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engineer a set of rules to achieve the utilitarian efficiency (see 7.2 of Chapter 7), it is 
technically difficult to engineer a set of rules to achieve the Nash efficiency. To
04
summarise, the Nash efficiency is not manageable.
5.2. Distance between Two Medians
The median voter position and the median elector position in the left-right dimension 
could be the same but could also be different from each other. If turnout is not 100%, 
the distribution of electors (i.e. all eligible voters) along the left-right dimension could 
be different from the distribution of voters (i.e. all actual voters) along this dimension. 
Therefore, the median voter position could be different from the median elector position, 
which can be regarded as the estimate of the will of the people. If voters are normally 
distributed along the left-right dimension and there are two established major parties, 
the policy positions of these major parties will, as Downs (1957, 117-18) argues, 
converge around the median voter as a result that the two major parties compete for 
more votes in order to win the election and ultimately to come into power. In other 
words, the median voter position is the focal policy position for two major parties. If all 
the other conditions are the same for these two major parties, these parties would take 
the same distance from the median voter position, one on the left and the other on the 
right.
Although misrepresentation of the will of the people is more likely to happen 
when voting is voluntary and turnout is low, low turnout does not automatically result in 
disproportional influence of minority interests upon public policy in theory. The 
left-right dimension model is useful in demonstrating this possibility of precise 
representation of the will of the people under conditions of low turnout. In Figure 5.1 
below, the policy preferences of all electors in a country are hypothesised to be 
normally distributed along the left-right dimension. If turnout is 100% and all electors 
are voters, then the median elector position will be the same as the median voter 
position. Even if turnout is much lower than 100% (e.g. 50%), then the median voter
83 John  Forbes N ash , Jr. (1 9 2 8 - )  is a  m athem atician . In gam e theory , he is a lso fam ous for the N ash  equilibrium .
84 This paragraph argued the N ash  effic iency  because it is a  typical attem pt to  seek  a  p roper balance betw een  e ffec tiveness and 
fairness.
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position will still be the same as the median elector position so long as the constitution 
of all voters along the left-right dimension is exactly proportional to that of all electors. 
Therefore, under this hypothetical condition, the focal policy-position for the two major 
parties (i.e. the median voter) under some low turnout (e.g. 50%) will be the same as 
that of 100% turnout. Furthermore, this is also the case even if turnout is extremely low 
(e.g. 10%). Therefore, low turnout under VV will not automatically result in a distortion 
of the will of the people upon public policy.
Figure 5.1: Proportional Decrease in Turnout to 50%
Electors
Voters
Median Elector RightLeft
Median Voter
Note: In this figure, ‘electors’ are all potential voters, and ‘voters’ are all actual voters.
Although low turnout in itself is not a problem and it does not automatically 
result in a distortion of the will of the people in theory, low turnout under VV is likely to 
result in a distortion of the will of the people because personal resources for voting 
participation are not evenly distributed among electors. Lijphart (1997, 1) argues that, 
‘... the inequality of representation and influence are not randomly distributed but 
systematically biased in favor of more privileged citizens—those with higher incomes, 
greater wealth, and better education—and against less advantaged citizens.’ If the 
turnout under VV is much lower than 100% and less-privileged electors are more likely 
to support the left-wing major party rather than the right-wing major party but are less
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likely to choose to vote than privileged electors, the median voter position will be to the 
right of the median elector position, as presented in Figure 5.2 below. This distance 
between the median elector and the median voter can be regarded as a distortion of the 
will of the people. Moreover, the less the turnout is, the wider this distance is likely to 
be.85
Figure 5.2: Disproportional Decrease in Turnout to 50%
Electors
Voters
RightLeft Median Elector Median Voter
Note: In this figure, ‘electors’ are all potential voters, and ‘voters’ are all actual voters.
However, it is still a matter of argument whether the existence of the distance 
between the median elector and the median voter is a problem. Some people like 
Lijphart (1997) may regard it as a democratic deficit. However, some people (e.g. new 
liberalists) may argue that the governmental policy-position should be to the right 
because a welfare-based society will diminish people’s spirit of self-help and will 
discourage people’s effort for self-development and so the government should be small 
and should deliberately leave people alone. On the contrary, some others (e.g. social 
democrats) may claim that the governmental policy-position should be to the left 
because less-privileged people have greater needs and, by offering them a better chance
85 T ingsten  (1 9 3 7 ,2 3 0 ) argued from  em pirical da ta  that, i f  the  general tu rnou t is high in a certain  e lection , the  d ifference in 
vo tin g  partic ipa tion  betw een  d ifferen t categorises o f  electors is com paratively  low  and  he called this tendency  ‘the  law  o f  
d isp ersio n .’
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of education, better health services, etc., the well-being of the whole society will benefit. 
It is difficult to dismiss either position. If there is some reason that the governmental 
policy-position should be at the median elector, this reason must be explained.
To demonstrate these arguments, a country of 100 electors is assumed in Figure
5.3 blow. These 100 electors are unimodally and symmetrically (i.e. roughly normally) 
distributed along the left-right dimension and they fall into 19 groups. There is a group 
of 10 electors in the centre of the left-right dimension (i.e. the tallest bar in the centre of 
Figure 5.3), and the number of electors in each group decreases one by one as the policy 
position goes away from this centre. If the whole population of 100 electors vote under 
CV, the median voter will be exactly the same as the median elector and so the focal 
policy-position for the two major parties will be at the policy position of the 10-elector 
group in the centre.
Figure 5.3: 0-Unit Policy Shift from the Median Elector
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Note: FPP: the focal policy position. (Utility Units per Elector)
It is also assumed in Figure 5.3 that each elector obtains a certain number of 
utility-units according to the distance from the focal policy-position (see numbers in 
brackets in Figure 5.3). For example, each of 10 electors in the centre obtains 10 
utility-units. Therefore, the sum of utility-units of these 10 electors in the centre is as 
follows:
10(units/elector) * lO(electors) = 100(units).
Each elector of the other groups obtains a diminished number of utility-units according 
to the distance from the focal policy-position. In Figure 5.3, each elector of the 9-elector
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group that is on the right to the 10-elector group obtains 9 utility-units and so the sum of 
utility-units that these electors obtain is as follows:
9(units/elector) * 9(electors) = 81 (units).
By continuing this calculation and then summing them up, it is possible to obtain the 
total utility of the population of 100 electors when the focal policy-position is at the 
median elector as follows:
(Total utility of 100 electors)
= 1*1+ 2*2 + 3*3 + 4*4 + 5*5 + 6*6 + 7*7 + 8*8 + 9*9 + 10*10 + 9*9 + 8*8 
+ 7*7 + 6*6 + 5*5 + 4*4 + 3*3 + 2*2 + 1*1 
= 670.
If turnout decreases as a result of the introduction of VV and the focal 
policy-position for the two major parties shifts from the median elector to the 9-elector 
group on the right to the 10-elector group in the centre, the quantity of utility unit that 
each elector obtains will change according to the change in the distance from the focal 
policy-position, as presented in Figure 5.4 below.
F igure 5.4: 1-U nit Policy Shift from the M edian E lector to  the R ight
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Note: FPP: the focal policy position. (Utility Units per Elector)
Each elector in the 10-elector group (i.e. the tallest bar) in the centre will obtain 
only 9 utility-units in Figure 5.4 because of this focal policy-position shift to the right. 
Therefore, the total utility of these 10 electors will be as follows:
9(units/elector) * 10(electors) = 90(units).
Each elector to the left of this 10-elector group will also lose one utility-unit. For 
example, each of the 9-elector group to the left of the 10-elector group in the centre
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obtains 8 utility units upon this condition, instead of 9 utility units upon the former 
condition. On the other hand, each elector of the 9-elector group to the right of the 
10-elector group in the centre obtains 10 utility-units upon this condition instead of 9 
units upon the former condition because the focal policy-position is now exactly at their 
policy position. Therefore, the total utility of these 9 electors is as follows: 
10(units/elector) * 9(electors) = 90(units).
Each elector to the right of this 9-elector group also obtains one additional utility-unit 
because of the focal policy-position shift to the right. It should be noted here that the 
number of electors who obtain one additional utility-unit by this shift (the diagonal in 
Figure 5.4) is less than the number of electors who lose one utility-unit by this shift (the 
shadowed in Figure 5.4).
By continuing this calculation, it is possible to obtain the total utility of 100 
electors when the focal policy-position shifts rightwards by one unit of policy position 
from the 10-elector group as follows:
(Total utility of 100 electors)
= 0*1 + 1*2 + 2*3 + 3*4 + 4*5 + 5*6 + 6*7 + 7*8 + 8*9 + 9*10 + 10*9 + 9*8 
+ 8*7 + 7*6 + 6*5 + 5*4 + 4*3 + 3*2 + 2*1 
= 660.
Therefore, the total utility of 100 electors decreases by 10 units from 670 units to 660 
units, as a result of one-unit rightward policy-position shift from the 10-elector group in 
the centre. As turnout decreases farther under VV and the focal policy-position shifts 
rightwards farther, the number of electors who obtain one additional utility-unit 
decreases and the number of electors who lose one utility-unit increases. Therefore, as 
the focal policy-position shifts rightwards, the total utility of 100 electors 
accumulatively decreases. This change is summarised in Table 5.1 below.
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Table 5.1: Policy Shift and U tility Loss
Policy Distance from the Total Utility Additional Utility Cumulative Utility 
Median Elector (units) (units) Loss (units) Loss (units)
660
588
460 210
570100
632
530 140
100 670
670
380
292
290
378
198 472
This table above indicates that, as turnout decreases under VV and the focal 
policy-position moves away from the median elector, the additional utility loss 
gradually increases and so the total utility loss of electors cumulatively increases. Figure 
5.5 below graphically presents the change of the additional utility loss of 100 electors.
Figure 5 .5: Policy D istance and A dditional U tility L oss
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Policy Distance from the Median Elector
Figure 5.6 below graphically presents the change of the cumulative utility loss of 
100 electors, on the condition that the additional utility loss of electors increases as 
Figure 5.5 above. Judging from Figure 5.6 below, it would be reasonable to argue that, 
as turnout decreases under VV and the focal policy-position shifts away from the 
median elector, the loss of the total utility of electors increases cumulatively rather than 
proportionally. Therefore, the focal policy-position (i.e. the median voter position) 
should be as close as possible to the median elector in order to maximise the total utility 
of electors. If personal resources for voting participation are not evenly distributed 
among individual electors and so the level of voting participation is systematically 
biased, turnout should be maximised in order to maximise the total utility of electors.
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The high turnout resulting from CV will be useful in achieving this goal.
F igu re 5 .6 : P o licy  D is ta n c e  and C um ulative U tility L oss
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Policy Distance from the Median Elector
The two major parties will converge around the median voter. However, if all the 
other conditions are the same for both major parties, the two major parties will take the 
same distance from this median voter—one on the left and the other on the 
right—because each major party is under the influence of centripetal power (i.e. vote 
power) and centrifugal power (i.e. lobby power) (McLean 1982, 124-29; McLean 1987, 
70-71). If these two parties come into power alternately, the governmental 
policy-position will stay at either of these party positions rather than at the median voter 
position. Nevertheless, the approximation of the median voter position to the median 
elector position will still be useful in improving the total utility of electors. If two major 
parties always take the same distance from the focal policy position (i.e. the median 
voter position), the average of the total utility of electors achieved by the governmental 
policy position at one major party and that at the other major party will be maximised 
when the focal policy position is at the median elector position. As the focal policy 
position goes away from the median elector position, this average of the total utility of
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electors will decrease. Upon the condition that the two major parties take a distance of 
one utility unit from the focal policy position, Table 5.2 below demonstrates that the 
expected (i.e. the average) total utility of electors will decline as the distance of the 
focal policy position (i.e. the median voter position) from the median elector position 
increases. Based on Table 5.1, the numbers of utility units are allocated to two major 
parties in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Distance of FPP from the Median Elector and the Average Total Utility of 
Electors
Distance of the FPP 
from the median elector 
(units)
Total utility of electors 
at the policy position of 
Party 1 (units)
Total utility o f electors 
at the policy position of 
Party 2 (units)
Total
(units)
Average
(units)
0 660 660 1320 660
1 670 632 1302 651
IHHHHHHHi 660 588 1248 624
3 632 530 1162 581
4 588 460 1048 524
5 530 380 910 455
6 460 292 752 376
7 380 198 578 289
8 292 100 392 196
9 198 0 198 99
Note: FPP: the focal policy position for the two major parties.
This is a simple model to demonstrate that the total utility of electors is 
maximised when the focal policy position for the two major parties is at the median 
elector and so the median voter should approximate to the median elector (see the 
appendix at the end of this chapter for more mathematical description about the utility 
function of each elector). To achieve this goal, the high turnout resulting form CV will 
be useful in theory. However, this thesis has not yet tested this hypothesis on the reality. 
The next section will simulate the abolition of CV in Australia in order to see whether 
this abolition would decrease turnout and would shift the median voter position away 
from the median elector position in practice. If this is the case in Australia, it will, in 
reverse, suggest that the adoption of CV in industrial democracies under VV at present 
would improve turnout and would approximate the median voter position to the median 
elector position. Consequently, the introduction of CV would result in an increase in the 
total utility of electors in these industrial democracies.
I l l
5.3. Simulating the Abolition of 
Compulsory Voting in Australia
Australia has a fully enforced form of CV, and turnout is persistently high at around 
95% of the registered electors. If the model outlined in the last section is valid, the 
distance between the median voter and the median elector in Australia must be short. 
However, if CV were abolished, this distance would become longer. Mackerras and 
McAllister (1999) found that the abolition of CV would advantage the conservative 
coalition but would disadvantage the Labor Party in Australia by analysing a survey of 
the 1996 Australian election (Jones, McAllister and Gow 1996). This section applies 
their research procedure on the left-right dimension and analyses a survey of the 2001 
election in Australia (Bean, Gow and McAllister 2002) in order to confirm that their 
finding is also the case in the left-right dimension framework.
Distance between Two Medians
Table 5.3 below shows that, under the present CV system in Australia, the relationship 
between the left-right position of electors and their voting participation is not 
statistically significant at the 5% level (p=0.106). The turnout of electors on the left is 
almost the same as that of electors on the right. The turnout of electors in the centre is 
slightly less than that of electors on the left and on the right. However, this relationship 
would be very weak even if it existed in the parent group (i.e. the all electors). While 
99% of respondents of the 2001 Australian election survey (Bean, Gow and McAllister 
2002) answered that they had cast a valid vote, the actual turnout at the 2001 House of 
Representatives election was 94.9% of the registered electors. This means that there is a 
discrepancy between these two figures. However, it would still be reasonable to predict 
that the relationship of the left-right position with voting participation does not exist or 
exists only in a strictly limited degree under the present CV system in Australia.
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Table 5.3: Policy Position and Voting
2001 House o f Representatives Election, Australia
Left (%) Centre (%) Right (%) Total (%)
Vote 99 98 99 99
Informal/Did not vote 1 2 1 1
Total 100 100 100 100
(n) (384) (628) (517) (1,529)
a=0.05, p=0.106 
Notes:
1. Each respondent’s self-claimed left-right position was surveyed on a scale from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right). However, in this table, ‘0-4’ are 
aggregated under the label o f ‘Left,’ ‘5 ’ is labelled as ‘Centre’ and ‘6-10’ are aggregated under the label o f ‘Right.’
2. The actual turnout at the 2001 House o f  Representatives election was 94.9% o f  the registered electors.
Source: 2001 Australian Election Study (Bean, Gow and McAllister 2002).
Based on precedent (i.e. Lijphart 1997), the last section argued that electors on the 
right are more likely to vote under VV than electors on the left and so the median voter 
position will be on the right to the median elector position when turnout is low. This 
argument is supported by a survey of the 2001 Australian election (Bean, Gow and 
McAllister 2002) as follows. Table 5.4 is a cross-tabulation of the left-right position of 
respondents and the level of willingness for voting under the hypothetical VV system. 
Figures in this table are column percentages. The relationship between the left-right 
position of respondents and the level of willingness to vote under hypothetical VV is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (p<0.001) and is negative (G=-0.122). 
Consequently, there is sufficient evidence to say that electors on the left would be less 
likely to vote than electors on the right if CV were abolished in Australia. Therefore, the 
median voter position would shift away from the median elector position to the right in 
the left-right dimension.
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T able 5.4: W illingness for V oting under H ypothetical W  (C olum n P ercentages)
Australia 2001
Left (%) Centre (%) Right (%) Total (%)
Definitely would have voted 68 53 74 64
Probably would have voted 16 21 16 18
Might, might not 8 11 4 8
Probably not 5 8 4 6
Definitely not 4 6 2 4
Total 100 100 100 100
(n) (386) (657) (530) (1,573)
a=0.05, p<0.001, G = -0.122 
Note:
1. Each respondent’s self-claimed left-right policy position was surveyed on a scale from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right). However, in this table, ‘0-4’ are 
aggregated under the label o f ‘Left,’ ‘5 ’ is labelled as ‘Centre’ and ‘6-10’ are aggregated under the label o f ‘Right.’
2. The row question was as follows: Would you have voted in the election if  voting had not been compulsory?
Source: 2001 Australian Election Study (Bean, Gow and McAllister 2002).
Table 5.5 below is compiled from Table 5.4 above in order to present the 
predicted turnout of three column groups (i.e. left, centre and right) at several turnout 
levels under the hypothetical VV system. It should be noted that figures in Table 5.5 
below are cumulative percentages rather than column percentages.
Table 5.5: Expected Turnout under Hypothetical VV (Cumulative Percentages)
Australia 2001 
Left (%) Centre (%) Right (%) Total (%)
Definitely would have voted 68 53 74 64 p<0.001, G=-0.125
+ Probably would have voted 84 75 90 82 p<0.001, G=-0.178
+ Might, might not 91 86 94 90 p<0.001, G=-0.134
+ Probably not 96 94 98 96 p=0.001, G=-0.174
+ Definitely not 100 100 100 100
Total 100 100 100 100
(n) (386) (657) (530) (1,573)
Notes:
1. Each respondent’s self-claimed left-right policy position was surveyed on a scale from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right). However, in this table, ‘0-4’ are 
aggregated under the label o f ‘Left,’ ‘5 ’ is labelled as ‘Centre’ and ‘6-10’ are aggregated under the label o f ‘Right.’
2. The row question was as follows: Would you have voted in the election if  voting had not been compulsory?
3. This table is compiled from Table 5.4. Each row o f  this table is the sum o f column percentages from the top row to the equivalent row in Table 
5.4. Therefore, figures in this table are cumulative percentages, p-value and Gamma to the right o f  each row are calculated from a table o f  the sum 
o f  column percentages from the top row to the equivalent row in Table 5.4 and the sum o f the other rows.
Source: 2001 Australian Election Study (Bean, Gow and McAllister 2002).
The relationship between two variables at the hypothetical turnout of 64%, 82%, 
90% and 96% is statistically significant at the 5% level, and this relationship is negative 
(G<0). Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude that electors on the left are less 
likely to vote than electors on the right under the hypothetical VV system in Australia.
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Judging from Table 5.5 above, it would also be reasonable to understand that, as turnout 
decreases, the level of imbalance in turnout between electors on the left and those on the 
right increases. Although it is difficult to predict the turnout level under VV in Australia, 
S. Jackman (1999a) estimated from a survey of the 1996 Australian election (Jones, 
McAllister, and Gow 1996) that it would be in the 55-65% range.86 If this prediction is 
correct, the hypothetical turnout of 64% (the first row in Table 5.5) will be useful for the 
prediction of turnout imbalance under the hypothetical VV system in the left-right 
dimension. At the 64% turnout level, the turnout of electors on the left (68%) would be 
lower by 6 percentage points than that of electors on the right (74%). Meanwhile, this 
imbalance is not detectable under the present CV system (see Table 5.3). Therefore, it 
would be reasonable to conclude that the turnout imbalance in the left-right dimension 
is mostly suppressed under the present CV system in Australia.87 However, this 
imbalance would become clearer and stronger if CV were abolished. The turnout of 
electors on the left would become lower than that of electors on the right and so the 
median voter position would shift away from the median elector position to the right.
Turnout among Centre Electors
Table 5.5 also suggests that turnout of centre electors would decrease more substantially 
than that of electors on the left and on the right if CV were abolished in Australia. This 
would result in reducing the electoral attractiveness of the centre policy position, and so 
the policy positions of the two major parties would move away from the median voter 
position. If the overall turnout were 64% under VV, the turnout of electors in the centre 
(53%) would be lower by 15 percentage points than that of electors on the left (68%) 
and by 21 percentage points than that of electors on the right (74%). This potential 
result under VV is consistent with the conventional wisdom that the two major parties 
are ambiguous for electors around the median voter and so centre electors tend to 
abstain. This argument can be extended by using Figure 5.7 below.
86 This is a  com panion  paper o f  S. Jackm an  1999b in the sam e vo lum e o f  a  jou rna l. H e took  non -response  and m easurem ent 
erro rs  in to  account in these  papers and estim ated  the  tu rnou t under hypothetical V V  in A ustralia .
87 M cA llister (1986) found  that, even in A ustra lia  under C V , there  is a  system atic  re la tionsh ip  betw een tu rnou t and electoral 
pa rty  advantage, though  tu rnou t is persisten tly  very  high in A ustra lia  and this party  advan tage  is m inor.
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Figure 5.7: Relationship between Two Major Parties and Electors
Pi M P2
\N i t f  >
Left 1 Right
Xl X2 X3
Notes:
1. Pi: major party; i =  1 ,2 .
2. X j : elector;y = 1 ,2 ,3 .
3. M: the median voter position.
4. Values from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right) can be hypothetically allocated and can be expressed by small letters. For example, the value o f
the policy position o f  PI can be described as ‘p i . ’
The two major parties (Pi and Pi) and three electors (A7, X 2 and Xi) are in the 
left-right dimension in Figure 5.7, and the two major parties are at the same distance 
from the median voter position (M). For elector Xi at the median voter position, the two 
major parties are at the same distance from Xi. Therefore, Xi cannot expect any 
differential benefit from the electoral outcome. In other words, the policy positions of 
these two major parties are indifferent to Xi. However, X 3 is to the right of Pi and P2 but 
is closer to P2 than Pi. Therefore, X 3 can expect differential benefit from the electoral 
success of P2 over Pi and the level of this differential benefit can be measured by the 
policy distance between Pi and P2 (i.e. \p i-p \\). Meanwhile, e le c to r^  is between the 
two major parties and is closer to P2 than Pi, and so X 2 can also expect differential 
benefit from the electoral success of P2 over Pi. The level of this benefit can be 
measured as ‘I(x2 - p\) - (p i-x i)V  and this is not as much as that of X 3 (i.e. \pi - pi I).88 
To summarise, although policy positions of the two major parties are totally indifferent 
only to electors at the exact middle of the two major party positions (e.g. elector Xi in 
Figure 5.7), other electors between the two major party positions (e.g. e lec to r^ ) have a 
diminished level of differential benefit from the electoral success of the party closer to 
them over the other party compared to electors at either of the two major party policy
88 Judg ing  from  Figure 5.7, it is c lear that Ip 2 -p , I is la rger than I(x2-p,)  - (p2 - x j \ . H ow ever, th is can  be m athem atically  
proven  as follows: (p2- p ) 2 - {(x2- p j  - (p2 - x j } 2 =  (p, - p j 2 - (2x2- p , - p j 2 =  ( p , - p j } 2- { 2 x 2 ~ ( p ,+  p j } 2 =  (p,2 - 2 p p 2 + p /J  -  
{4x 22 - 4 (p, + p j  x2+ ( p ^ p j 3}  = p 23 - 2 p p 2 + p , 2 - 4 x 2 + 4ppc2 + 4 p?2- p 2 -2p,p2- p 2 =  - 4 x 2 +  4ppc2 +  4p2x2 - 4pj?2 =  -4 (x2 - 
Ptx 2 ~P? 2  + p W  =  -4(x2 -Pi)(x2 ~ p J  =  4(x2 ~Pi)(P2 - x j > 0 .  T herefore, (p2- p j 2> {(x2- p j  - (p2 - x j } 2. C onsequen tly , Ip 2- p ,  1 
> \(x2-Pi)~ (P2-xJ' ■
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positions or exterior to them (e.g. elector X 3). The level of differential benefit from the 
electoral success of the party closer to them over the other party is visualised in Figure 
5.8 below.
Figure 5.8: Elector’s Policy Position and Their Differential Benefit
Differential Benefit
Left Right
Xi X2 X3
Elector’s Policy Position
N otes:
1. Pi: major party; / = 1,2.
2. Xj: elector;_/ = 1 , 2 , 3 .
3. M: the median voter position.
4. Values from 0 (Left) tolO (Right) can be hypothetically allocated and can be expressed by small letters. For 
example, the value o f  the policy position o f  PI can be described as ‘p i . ’
Although party positions and voter positions in the left-right dimension are clear 
in Figure 5.7 and the differential benefit from the electoral outcome is measurable as 
demonstrated in Figure 5.8, the reality would be largely different from these two figures 
(Downs 1957, 45-47). There would be many policy dimensions in reality and so an 
elector might be closer to one of the two major parties on several policies but might be 
closer to the other major party on other policies. Therefore, it is not necessarily clear for 
electors around the centre which major party is closer to them taking all of their policy 
preferences as a whole. Therefore, although the policy positions of the two major parties 
are indifferent only to electors at the exact middle between the two major parties, the 
identity of the closer party would be ambiguous to more electors around the centre. This 
ambiguity could damage their motivation for voting in relation to the electoral outcome 
(Downs 1957, 78). On the other hand, although it is also difficult for extreme electors to
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specify the exact policy positions of themselves and the two major parties in the 
left-right dimension, the level of differential benefit from the electoral outcome will still 
be high and clear to them so long as it is clear which major party is closer to them. 
Therefore, extreme electors on the left or the right would have a stronger and clearer 
motivation for turning out to vote compared to centre electors. Therefore, extreme 
electors are more likely to vote than centre electors under the VV system.
If the CV system were abolished in Australia, the turnout of centre electors would 
decrease more substantially than that of extreme electors on the left or the right and so 
the electoral attractiveness of the centre policy position would diminish for the two 
major parties. As a result, the policy positions of the two major parties would move 
farther away from the median voter position. If the governmental policy position stays 
alternately at the two party positions, this shift of the two major party positions would 
diminish the total utility of electors in the end.
5.4. Conclusion
This chapter assessed whether the high turnout resulting from CV is effective in 
improving the well-being of the people in industrial democracies. Previous works on 
CV have assessed CV and its effects by a variety of value standards, such as liberalism 
and democracy. For example, Lijphart (1997) used ‘democracy’ as the value standard to 
evaluate the high turnout resulting from CV. However, this chapter chose to regard the 
total utility of electors as the well-being of the people and to assess the usefulness of the 
high turnout resulting from CV by using this value standard, because of two reasons as 
follows. First, this chapter decided to choose some human-oriented value standard as a 
primary one rather than some secondary one like liberalism and democracy. Second, 
rather than other conceivable human-oriented value standards (i.e. the Pareto efficiency 
and the Nash efficiency), this chapter chose the total utility of electors (i.e. the 
utilitarian efficiency) because it is likely to be useful for improving the well-being of the 
people and also be manageable. On the left-right dimension model, this chapter applied 
the Lijphart theory that the turnout of privileged people is higher than that of less 
privileged people and public policy would be distorted for the benefit of the high 
turnout group but the high turnout resulting from CV will solve this democratic deficit.
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The new model demonstrates that lower turnout is likely to widen the distance between 
the median voter (i.e. the median of all actual voters), around which the two major party 
policy positions converge, and the median elector (i.e. the median of all potential voters), 
at which the total utility of electors is maximised, in the left-right dimension. In reverse, 
the high turnout resulting from CV will be useful in approximating the median voter to 
the median elector and improving the total utility of electors.
This chapter simulated the consequences of the abolition of CV in Australia by 
using a survey of the 2001 Australia election (Bean, Gow and McAllister 2002). Under 
CV, the overall turnout is at around 95% of the registered electors and the turnout 
imbalance between electors on the left and those on the right is negligible—even if  it 
exists. Therefore, the distance between the median elector position and the median voter 
position must be narrow. However, if CV were abolished in Australia and the overall 
turnout decreased to 64% for example, the turnout imbalance between the left and the 
right would become substantial. This finding is in line with Mackerras and McAllister 
1999, which analysed a survey of the 1996 Australian election (Jones, McAllister and 
Gow 1996). This turnout imbalance would result in shifting the median voter position 
away from the median elector position to the right in the left-right dimension. 
Consequently, this shift would result in a decrease in the total utility of electors.
By analysing a survey of the 2001 Australia election (Bean, Gow and McAllister 
2002), this chapter also found that turnout among electors in the centre would decrease 
more substantially than turnout of electors on the left and that on the right if CV were 
abolished in Australia. Consequently, the electoral attractiveness of the centre policy 
position would decrease, and so the two major parties would shift their policy positions 
farther away from the median voter position. When a two-party system is in operation, 
the policy positions of the two major parties will converge around the median voter 
position but will take the same distance from it—one on the left and one on the right—if 
all the other conditions are the same because each major party is under the influence of 
centripetal vector (i.e. vote power) and centrifugal vector (i.e. lobby power) (McLean 
1982, 124-29; McLean 1987, 70-71; also see Downs 1957, 115-17). If the two major 
parties alternate in power, the governmental policy position will stay at either of these 
parties and will not stay at the median voter position. Therefore, the total utility of 
electors will not actually be maximised even if the median voter position is identical to 
the median elector position. However, the median voter position will still be important
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as the focal policy position around which the two major parties converge. The farther 
departure of the two major parties from the median voter position would result in a 
further decrease in the total utility of electors.
Therefore, if CV were abolished in Australia, the overall turnout would decrease 
and the total utility of electors would diminish in two folds. This result of the simulation 
of the abolition of CV in Australia, in reverse, implies twofold positive impact of the 
introduction of CV on the total utility of electors in industrial democracies under VV at 
present. Although the two major party policy positions are under the influence of the 
electoral attractiveness of the centre policy position, they are also assumed to be under 
the influence of some power that draws them back from the centre position. The next 
chapter will consider this outward power over the two major parties and the influence of 
CV upon it.
Appendix: Utility Function o f Each Elector
This appendix is an extended explanation to Figure 5.3. In this figure, each elector is 
assumed to have a linear utility function as follows:
Ui = Mi -  Cli\d -  Xi\
Ur. the zth elector’s utility function
Mr. the maximum utility for the zth elector, which they get at their ideal policy 
position
ar. the zth elector’s characteristic constant 
6: the focal policy position for two major parties 
xr. the ideal policy position for the zth elector.
This function means that the zth elector obtains the maximum utility for them (Mi) at 
their ideal policy position (xi) but the utility that they obtain (Ui) will decrease in 
proportion (ai) to the distance between their ideal policy position (xi) and the focal 
policy position (&). Furthermore, neither Mi nor ai is likely to be identical among all 
electors in reality, but these are set identical (i.e. Mi -  10 and ai -  1) for all electors in 
the hypothetical population of 100 individual electors in Figure 5.3. So long as these 
coiditions are met, the total utility of electors is maximised when the focal policy
poution stays at the median of the distribution of ideal policy positions of electors
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because the median is the least absolute estimate. Ideal policy positions for the 
individual electors are unimodally and symmetrically distributed along the left-right 
policy dimension in Figure 5.3. However, even if the shape of the distribution is largely 
different from it, the median elector will still be the ideal policy position for the society 
from the viewpoint of the total utility of electors. For example, even if the distribution 
of the ideal positions is bimodal and/or asymmetrical, the total utility of electors is still 
maximised at the median elector.
Although the utility function of each elector is linear in the hypothetical 
population of 100 individual electors of Figure 5.3, Hinich and Munger (1994, 44-52) 
presented another model of a quadratic utility function for each elector as follows:
Ui = M i-  Cli(Q -  xi)2.
In this model, the zth elector obtains the maximum utility for them (Mi) at their ideal 
policy position (xi) but the utility that they obtain (Ui) quadratically decreases as the 
distance between their ideal policy position (xi) and the focal policy position (6) 
increases. In their model, Mi and at are set identical for all electors and the total utility 
of electors is maximised when the focal policy position is at the mean of the ideal policy 
positions of electors rather than the median of them because the mean is the least 
squares estimate.90 If the distribution of the ideal policy positions of electors is 
symmetrical, the mean position and the median position are identical. However, if it is 
asymmetrical, the mean position and the median position will mostly be different from 
each other. Nevertheless, Hinich and Munger (1994, 50-51) still admired the median 
position rather than the mean position because the median is insensitive to a variety of 
preference shifts by the other electors. If the electoral system is engineered to allow 
each elector to register the intensity of their preference, some electors might tactically
89 5.2 o f  this chap ter dem onstra tes  tha t th e  total utility  o f  electors is m axim ised  a t the m edian , bu t it is hard  to  m athem atically  
prove it because it is d ifficu lt to  deal w ith absolu te  values.
90  It is possib le  to  m a them atica lly  prove th a t the to ta l utility  o f  electors is m ax im ised  a t the m ean  as follow s.
U , = M  -  a(0 -  x , ) 2
U  =  ' £ u i =  '£t [ M  -  a(0 -  *,)’ ] = £  [M -  a0  2 + 2 a  0x, -  ax,2] = nM -  na 0 2+ 2 a 0 £  x, -  x,2
/ = l  i *I  I <*l  / - I
= -2 /io  0 + 2a  V  x. = 0 
d0  ff,
/= I
s*.
0 = — = x
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exaggerate it in order to draw the mean position in their direction. However, the median 
position is not influenced by this kind of tactical manipulation of the intensity of 
preference.
Although it looks reasonable to think that each elector obtains the maximum 
utility at their ideal policy position and the utility that they obtain decreases as the focal 
policy position shifts away from it, the actual shape of the utility function of each 
elector is unknown. Even if each elector had a linear utility function, it is still unknown 
what Mi and at each elector has. Nevertheless, it would still be reasonable to assume that 
the total utility of electors is maximised at around the median elector position if each 
elector has a linear utility function and the difference of Mi and at among these electors 
is entirely random. Meanwhile, even if each elector had a quadratic utility function, it is 
still unknown what Mi and at each elector has. However, it would be reasonable to 
assume that the total utility of electors is maximised at around the mean position if each 
elector has a quadratic utility function and the difference of Mi and at among these 
electors is perfectly random. Moreover, the distribution of ideal policy positions of 
electors is not likely to be extremely skewed in the middle-class society that would be 
the case in most of the industrial democracies, and so the mean is not likely to be 
extremely far from the median. The mean is vulnerable to tactical manipulation of the 
intensity of preference but the median is not, and so it would be wise to be satisfied by 
the median. Taking all conditions above into consideration, although exact shape of the 
utility function that each elector has is unknown, it will be useful for practical purposes 
to hypothetically regard the median as the policy position at which the total utility of 
electors is maximised.
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CHAPTER 6 
The Implications for Political Parties
This chapter aims at extending the argument of the last chapter, by examining the 
implications of CV for political parties. If the two major parties come into power 
alternately, the government will stay at one of these two major party policy positions in 
the left-right dimension. The two major parties will not stay at the median voter position, 
but they will take the same distance from the median voter position—one to the left and 
the other to the right—if all the other conditions are the same. Upon this condition, the 
policy distance of the two major parties from the median voter position should have a 
relationship with the total utility of electors. When the major parties have a long 
distance from the median voter, the total utility of electors will be limited. However, if 
their policy positions are close to the median voter, the total utility of electors will be 
more substantial.
The policy position of each major party can be regarded as an equilibrium 
between one vector to the left and another to the right in the left-right dimension. On the 
one hand, each major party has a motivation to approximate their policy position to the 
median voter position in order to gain more votes and win the election (the centripetal 
vector). On the other hand, each major party has a motivation to appeal to the providers 
of electoral resources (i.e. election funds and campaigners) to run the election campaign 
and win the election. Consequently, each major party is drawn away from the median 
. voter position by minority interests (i.e. interest groups and party activists) that provide 
electoral resources with the party (the centrifugal vector). The policy position of each 
major party would stay at the point where the centripetal vector and the centrifugal 
vector are in balance (McLean 1982, 124-29; McLean 1987, 70-71; also see Downs 
1957, 115-17).
The last chapter argued that the median voter position and the centripetal vector 
influence the policy positions of the two major parties, and so this chapter will research 
the remaining centrifugal vector in order to complete the entire hypothesis about the 
relationship of CV with the total utility of electors. For this purpose, the chapter will 
first build a hypothesis that CV controls the demand of the two major parties for 
electoral resources, which draws them away from the median voter position in the
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left-right dimension, by utilising rational choice theory. Second, the chapter will provide 
empirical evidence for this hypothesis by making statistical, international comparisons 
between the major industrial democracies.
6.1. The Distance between the Party 
and the Median Voter
This section considers whether the high turnout resulting from CV has the effect of 
controlling the size of the centrifugal vector that influences the policy position of the 
two major parties. The first subsection posits a hypothesis that the policy positions of 
the two major parties are in balance between the centripetal vector and the centrifugal 
vector. The second subsection provides a hypothesis that CV will release the two major 
parties from the requirement to mobilise their supporters to attend polling places and so 
the amount of electoral resources that the parties spend will diminish. The third 
subsection advances a hypothesis that CV will diminish the level of uncertainty about 
the electoral outcome in each constituency and will decrease the number of marginal 
seats, into which the two major parties concentrate their electoral resources. This 
decrease in the number of marginal seats will further limit the amount of electoral 
resources that the two major parties spend. As a result, minority interests (i.e. interest 
groups and party activists) will have less power to draw away the two major parties 
from the median voter position. This will result in a shift of the two major party 
positions in the direction of the median voter position and will further increase the total 
utility of electors.
Party Policy Positions as Equilibria
When the governmental policy position is at the median elector position in the left-right 
dimension, the total utility of electors will be maximised. However, the two major 
parties will converge around the median voter position rather than the median elector 
position, and so the median voter position will be the preferred policy position for the 
two major parties rather than the median elector position. Although CV is useful in 
approximating the median voter position to the median elector position, this does not 
mean that the introduction of CV will surely maximise the total utility of electors. The
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two major parties will converge around the median voter position but will still position 
themselves some distance from it (McLean 1982, 124-29; McLean 1987, 70-71; also 
see Downs 1957, 115-17). If these two major parties come into power alternately, the 
governmental policy position will not remain at the median voter position but will 
alternately stay at the two major party policy positions. Therefore, even if  the median 
voter position coincides with the median elector position, the level of the total utility of 
electors will depend on the distance of the two major party positions from the median 
voter position.
Upon the hypothetical condition that the median voter position coincides with the 
median elector position, the approximation of the two the major party policy positions 
to the median voter position will improve the total utility of electors. However, each of 
the two major party policy positions is in equilibrium between the centripetal vector and 
the centrifugal vector (see Figure 6.1 below). On the one hand, each major party has a 
motivation to approach the median voter position to gain more votes and win the 
election. Therefore, each major party policy position is under the influence of this 
centripetal vector, which the last chapter considered in detail. On the other hand, each 
major party needs electoral resources (i.e. election funds and campaigners) to conduct 
an election campaign and to win votes and the election. Therefore, each major party has 
to appeal to their potential donors and campaigners (i.e. interest groups and party 
activists), most of whom are not at around the median voter position. This means that 
each major party also has a motivation to move away from the median voter position 
and is under the influence of this centrifugal vector (Aldrich 1983, 985).91 As a result, 
each of the two major parties is under the influence of both the centripetal vector and 
the centrifugal vector, and each of them stays at the policy position where these two 
conflicting vectors are in equilibrium.
91 A lso see D ow ns (1 9 5 7 ,1 0 0 -2 ) for ano ther explanation  abou t the  reason the  tw o m ajo r parties do  no t stay a t th e  m edian  
voter.
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Figure 6.1: Two Major Party Policy Positions as Equilibria
Voters
Left Median Voter Right
Note: P,: major party; /= !, 2.
If the size of the centrifugal vector of the two major parties is controlled and all 
the other conditions remain the same, the two major party policy positions will cease to 
be in equilibrium and will shift in the direction of the median voter position until they 
restore their equilibrium (see Figure 6.2 below). This shift of the two major party policy 
positions will improve the total utility of electors.
Figure 6.2: Shift of Two Major Party Policy Positions
Pi' P2'
Voters
Left Median Voter Right
Note: P,: major party; /= !, 2.
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A Party’s Election Tasks
If electoral registration is voluntary, encouraging their supporters to register and 
offering them a help for registration will be one of the most important tasks for 
extra-parliamentary party organisations. For example, many states of the USA have a 
voluntary registration system and electoral registration is a major political concern 
(Brians 2000). However, the majority of industrial democracies have some form of 
compulsory or automatic registration system at present (ACE Project 2006), and so 
registration is not a major concern for parties any more in these countries. Nevertheless, 
most of the industrial democracies have VV and so mobilisation of their supporters to 
polling places is an important task for parties in these countries though conversion of 
electors might have increased its relative importance compared to their mobilisation as a 
result of decline in party identification (Katz and Mair 1995, 8). Meanwhile, several 
industrial democracies that have proper CV (i.e. Australia and Belgium) have achieved 
very high turnout, and so parties in these countries are mostly released from the task of 
mobilisation. In CV counties, then, parties can concentrate on the acquisition, 
conversion and reinforcement of party support among the electorate. In other words, 
parties in CV countries have fewer tasks compared to their counterparts in VV counties. 
This means that parties have relatively limited space for manipulation by election 
campaign in CV countries compared to those in VV countries.
The effectiveness of election funds measured by vote share can be expected to 
follow an S-shape curve like Vi in Figure 6.3 below (Mueller 2003, 481-86). At the 
beginning of a campaign, election spending is highly productive because a candidate 
reaches electors who will vote for him/her once they learn something about the 
candidate. As more and more electors learn his/her name and his/her policy position on 
the issues, the number of new votes gained by a unit of election-fund spending will 
decline, probably reaching zero (the saturation) at the election-fund quantity of S  in 
Figure 6.3 (see also Abramowitz 1988; Coates 1998; Jacobson 1978; Jacobson 1985; 
Lott 1991).92
92  B eyond the saturation  po in t (S), spend ing  m igh t even have a  n egative  e ffec t on the vo te  share  (C oates 1998). H ow ever, this 
is not a  concern o f  this thesis.
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Figure 6.3: Effectiveness and Cost of Election-Fund Raising/Spending
Effectiveness (vote share) 
and cost C
E l/
Vl
V2
^  Quantity
Notes:
1. V(: vote share as effectiveness o f  election-fund spending; /= !, 2 ,3 .
2. C: cost o f  election-fund raising.
3. Ef. equilibrium between effectiveness and cost;y=l, 2 ,3 .
4. Q*: quantity o f  election funds; k =  1 ,2 ,3 .
Meanwhile, election-fund raising is not cost-free, and fund-raisers incur the 
opportunity costs (i.e. time, effort and money) for it. Moreover, the cost per unit of 
election funds is not the same. At the beginning, a fund-raiser may be able to collect 
donations relatively easily. However, most people are not generous, and so fund-raising 
will gradually prove its difficulty and it will take more time and effort to earn one unit 
of election funds. In other words, the cost of fund-raising will accumulatively increase 
as the total spending of election funds increases. Line C in Figure 6.3 represents the cost 
of election-fund raising. Line Vi and Line C cross at El Beyond Ei, the total cost of 
fund-raising exceeds the total effectiveness of fund-spending. Therefore, a fund-raiser 
cannot afford to continue raising election funds any more. In other words, this point is
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the equilibrium for fund-raising.
If Vi is the line of effectiveness of election spending in a VV country, the line of a 
CV country will conform to V2 because the space for manipulation by the election 
campaign is relatively limited under CV and so election funds should be less effective in 
gaining additional votes. However, the total cost of fund-raising under CV will be the 
same as that of VV, and so Line V2 crosses Line C at E2 . Beyond this point of E2, the 
total cost of fund-raising exceeds the total effectiveness of fund spending and so a 
fund-raiser cannot afford to continue his/her activity. In other words, this point of E2 is 
the equilibrium for fund-raising in a CV country. In Figure 6.3, the quantity of election 
funds in equilibrium between effectiveness and cost under CV (Q2) is less than that of 
VV (Qi). Consequently, the election will be less costly under CV compared to that of 
VV. This argument is only about election funding, but electoral resources in general (i.e. 
election funds and campaigners) would take similar lines. Therefore, by releasing 
parties from having to mobilise their supporters to attend polling places, CV will 
decrease the electoral resources that the parties spend.
Electoral Fluidity and Marginal Seats
A CV country will tend to have more safe seats and fewer marginal seats than a VV 
country if all the other conditions are the same, because almost all electors vote under 
CV and so electoral uncertainty is limited compared to that of a VV country in which 
even electors with party identification may vote but may not. It is not cost-effective to 
spend a lot of electoral resources on safe seats, and so the number of constituencies for 
which parties work hard will be relatively limited in a CV country. Although parties 
could spend the same amount of electoral resources on a reduced number of marginal 
seats, this is not likely to happen from the viewpoint of cost effectiveness. For thinking 
about the level of electoral uncertainty in detail, this thesis will hereafter call it 
‘electoral fluidity (EF).’ This electoral fluidity can be divided into three sub-concepts
93 I f  these tw o lines w ere gain and loss for a  private  com pany, th is  com pany w ould  stop  the ir business activ ity  w hen  the 
m arginal loss catches up w ith the m arginal gain (E quilibrium : AC=AV) because they  are a  p ro fit m axim iser. H ow ever, an election  
candidate is a  p roduction m axim iser (i.e. a  vo te  share  m axim iser) and so they will con tinue the ir e lection  cam paign activ ity  as m uch 
as they can afford (Equilibrium : C=V).
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presented in Table 6.1 below.94
Table 6.1: Electoral Fluidity (EF)
1. Turnout Fluidity (EFa).
which comes from the difference between persistent voters, occasional voters and persistent 
abstainers.
2. Partv-Support Fluidity (EFb).
which comes from the difference between party supporters and floating electors.
3. Seat Fluidity (EFc).
which is a result of EFa and EFb.
Turnout fluidity (EFa) is the first type of electoral fluidity. Under VV, electors 
may vote but may not vote. However, with closer observation, it will become clear that 
some electors almost always vote, some occasionally vote and others rarely vote. This 
type of fluidity mostly resides in occasional voters who may vote but may not vote (see 
Table 6.2), and they are the target for election campaign. Moreover, persistent abstainers 
are largely irrelevant to the electoral outcome under VV. If the rate of occasional voters 
• is high among all electors except for persistent abstainers, the level of turnout fluidity 
(EFa) will be high and so the overall electoral fluidity (EF) will probably be high either. 
On the other hand, under the proper CV system, the vast majority of electors vote and so 
turnout is very high. Therefore, turnout fluidity (EFa) is small (see Table 6.3). Turnout 
is always very high in Australia and Belgium because of their proper CV system, and so 
turnout fluidity (EFa) should be little in these CV countries.
94 ‘E lectoral flu id ity  (E F )’ shou ld  be d istingu ished  from  ‘electo ral v o la tility ’ addressed  on the  dynam ics o f  party  system s by 
Pedersen 1979 (also  see  M air 2 0 0 0 ,3 3 1 ).
Table 6.2: Turnout F luidity (EFa) and Party-Support F lu id ity  (E Fb) in a V V  C ountry
Left Centre Right
(Almost) always vote Left-wing
(solid)
Floating
(EFb)
Right-wing
(solid)
May vote but may not Left-wing
(EFa)
Floating 
(EFa, EFb)
Right-wing
(EFa)
[Rarely/never vote] [b e ft^ in g ]
^ (h felevarrt)^
Notes:
1. The description in each cell indicates the party for which each cohort voters (may) vote. The description in parentheses is the level and type o f  
electoral fluidity.
2. Electoral fluidity (EF) resides in the shadowed cells.
3. The description in square brackets are irrelevant to the electoral outcome and so these cells are also irrelevant to the level o f  electoral fluidity 
(EF). These sells are crossed in the table.
Table 6.3: Turnout Fluidity (EFa) and Party-Support Fluidity (EFb) in a CV Country
Left Centre Right
(Almost) always vote 
under hypothetical VV
Left-wing
(solid)
Floating
(EFb)
Right-wing
(solid)
May vote but may not 
under hypothetical VV
Left-wing
(solid)
Floating
(EFb)
Right-wing
(solid)
Rarely/never vote under 
hypothetical VV
Left-wing
(solid)
Floating
|  t i x F h f
Right-wing
(solid)
Notes:
1. The description in each cell indicates the party for which each cohort voters (may) vote. The description in parentheses is the level and type o f  
electoral fluidity.
2. Electoral fluidity (EF) resides in the shadowed cells.
3. Turnout fluidity (EFa) is negligible in a CV country.
Party-support fluidity (EFb) is the second type of electoral fluidity. Some electors 
have party identification but others do not. Electors without party identification can be 
regarded as floating electors, and they are a source of electoral uncertainty and are the 
targeted electors of electoral campaign for acquisition and conversion (Katz and Mair 
1995, 8; Kavanagh 2000, 29). This type of electoral fluidity can be measured by the rate 
of electors without party identification, who can be regarded as floating electors. If the 
rate of floating electors is high, the level of party-support fluidity (EFb) will also be 
high. According to Downs (1957, 273), the cost in relation to voting consists of the cost 
of information and the cost of voting itself. It takes considerable time and effort to 
collect, examine and assess information about each candidate or party in regard to their 
policies and track record. However, by developing a party identification, electors can 
bypass this process and can significantly reduce the cost of information (Downs 1957, 
96-113).
Because of the cost of information for voting, electors who are mobilised by CV
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but otherwise do not vote are likely to be a type of people who are less interested in 
politics or people who are less privileged in regard to electoral information (Downs 
1957, 214-16; Putnam [2000] 2001, 35; Table 8.1). However, the development of party 
identification will make voting easier for them (Downs 1957, 85, 96-113). Therefore, 
the introduction of CV will encourage these electors to acquire a party identification 
(Mackerras and McAllister 1999, 229-30), and this will result in decreasing the level of 
party-support fluidity (EFb). International comparisons of the level of the party-support 
fluidity (EFb) are possible by using survey data (Table 6.4 below). Only Australia and 
Belgium have a proper CV system among the 19 industrial democracies in Table 6.4. 
Australia has the highest party-identification rate of 84%, and party-support fluidity 
(EFb) is relatively low in Australia (16%). This finding is supportive of the Downs 
‘shortcut’ hypothesis of party identification (Downs 1957, 96-113). Meanwhile, the 
party identification rate of Belgium is 36% and this is the third from the bottom in this 
table. Therefore, party-support fluidity (EFb) is relatively high in Belgium (64%). This 
means that the Downs ‘shortcut’ hypothesis of party identification does not fit well with 
the case of Belgium.95
95 Lundell applied ordinal logistic regression on E uropean Social Survey 2 -2004 , and h is analysis ind icates th a t the re la tionsh ip  
o f  C V  with party  identification is m arginal though it is statistically  s ign ifican t (L undell 2007). T h is  result a lso  suggests  th a t the  
D ow ns ‘sho rtcu t’ hypothesis is questionable in term s o f  em pirical evidence. H ow ever, the  num ber o f  C V  coun tries  in his sam ple  is 
m erely  three, and his analysis has a lim itation in this regard.
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T able 6.4: P arty Identification Rate in Industrial D em ocracies
Party identification
Total (%) (n)Yes (%) No (%)
Australia (2004) 84 16 100 (1,719)
Spain (2004) 61 39 100 (1,168)
Japan (2004)* 58 42 100 (1,712)
France(2002) 56 44 100 (990)
New Zealand (2002)* 56 44 100 (1,682)
USA (2004)* 56 44 100 (1,061)
Denmark (2001) 50 50 100 (1,894)
Germany (2002 Mail-back)* 50 50 100 (992)
Sweden (2002) 49 51 100 (1,047)
Finland (2003) 47 53 100 (1,174)
Portugal (2005) 45 55 100 (2,721)
Italy (2006)* 43 57 100 (1,169)
Switzerland (2003)* 42 58 100 (1,403)
Norway (2001) 41 59 100 (2,021)
Netherlands (2002) 39 61 100 (1,564)
Canada (2004)* 38 62 100 (1.622)
Belgium (2003) 36 64 100 (2,149)
Great Britain (2005)* 35 65 100 (853)
Ireland (2002)* 28 72 100 (2,313)
Average 48 52 100 -
N otes:
1. CV countries are underlined and bold.
2. Invalid answers are excluded from the total.
3. Original sample weight is applied for countries with an asterisk (*), but the unmodified sample size is presented.
4. Data are not available for Austria and Greece.
Source: CSES Module 2— Full Release (Comparative Study o f Electoral Systems 2007).
Seat fluidity (EFc) is the third type of electoral fluidity. While turnout fluidity 
(EFa) and party-support fluidity (EFb) are about voting behaviour of electors, seat 
fluidity (EFc) is the result of these two types of electoral fluidity (i.e. EFa and EFb) in 
the framework of the single-seat constituency system and is more directly related to the 
electoral outcome. Seat fluidity (EFc) in a CV country is demonstrated in Figure 6.4 
below. Turnout fluidity (EFa) is negligible in a CV country (e.g. Australia and Belgium) 
and so it is controlled for in this model. By controlling for turnout fluidity (EFa), it is 
also possible to make this model simpler and more intelligible.
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Figure 6.4: Seat Fluidity (EFc) in a CV Country
Constituency A
Seat fluidity (EFc) is low.
Left
Party-Support 
Fluidity (EFb)
M Right
Constituency B Party-Support
Seat fluidity (EFc) is fairly high. Fluidity (EFb)
h ------------------------ H< ------------------------------- i ------------- >
Left M Right
Constituency C
Seat fluidity (EFc) is very high.
Party-Support 
Fluidity (EFb)
Left
Notes:
1. Turnout fluidity (EFa) is controlled for in this model.
2. M: the median voter position.
M Right
The following example demonstrates this phenomenon. In Constituency A, the 
range of party-support fluidity (EFb) is narrow (i.e. EFb is low.), and this range does not 
stretch past the median voter position. This means that the electoral outcome of this 
constituency is certain and this is a safe, left-wing party seat. Therefore, seat fluidity 
(EFc) is low in this constituency. Meanwhile, in Constituency B, the range of 
party-support fluidity (EFb) is wide (i.e. EFb is high.) and it stretches past the median 
voter position. Therefore, the electoral outcome of this constituency is uncertain. 
However, the centre of this range is clearly to the right, and so the left-wing major party 
is more likely to win this seat than the right-wing major party. Overall, seat fluidity 
(EFc) is fairly high in this constituency. In general, seat fluidity (EFc) is likely to be low 
if the rage of party-support fluidity (EFb) is short (i.e. EFb is low.). However, this will 
not always be the case, and Constituency C shows an exceptional case. In this 
constituency, the range of party-support fluidity (EFb) is narrow. However, this range 
covers the median voter position and the centre of this rage is at around this median 
voter position. Therefore, the constituency fluidity (EFc) is very high and the electoral
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outcome is extremely uncertain.
In Australia, turnout is persistently high and so turnout fluidity (EFa) is negligible. 
Moreover, the rate of party identification is high possibly because of its proper CV 
system, and so party support fluidity (EFb) is low. Although data for testing seat fluidity 
(EFc) is not available, it would be reasonable to think that seat fluidity (EFc) is low in 
Australia because both turnout fluidity (EFa) and party-support fluidity (EFb) are low. 
Therefore, the number of marginal seats is likely to be controlled by CV in Australia. 
Meanwhile, turnout is high in Belgium too, and so turnout fluidity (EFa) is limited. 
However, the party identification rate is low and so party-support fluidity (EFb) is high 
despite the existence of proper CV. Nevertheless, the low tumout-fluidity (EFa) 
resulting from CV is expected to be controlling the level of seat fluidity (EFc) at least, 
and so it should have operated to control the number of marginal seats. Belgium does 
not have a single-seat constituency system but has a PR system. However, the key point 
of this argument about electoral fluidity (EF) would still be relevant to Belgium.
The allocation of electoral resources will be influenced by the decrease in the 
number of marginal seats. If there are two constituencies in a country that are equally 
fluid in all of the three types of electoral fluidity and the two major parties procure the 
same amount of electoral resources from each constituency, each major party will not 
transfer any electoral resources between the constituencies and will spend all resources 
they procure in each constituency (see the two-marginal-seat situation in Figure 6.5 
below). On the other hand, if one constituency is safe and the other is marginal, each 
major party will regard this safe seat as a ‘resource cow’ and will transfer the electoral 
resources they can milk from this safe seat to the marginal seat for better allocation of 
their electoral resources (see the one-safe, one-marginal seat situation in Figure 6.5 
below). Although these two major parties will need to spend some keep-up cost on the 
safe seat in reality, these parties are here assumed to spend all electoral resources only 
on the marginal seat in this model for the purposes of simplicity. Furthermore, the 
allocation of electoral resources between constituencies is presumed to be centralised 
and smooth in this model.
135
Figure 6.5: Tactical Allocation of Electoral Resources
Two-Marginal Seat Situation
Marginal Seat Marginal Seat
Electoral Electoral
Resources Resources
One-Safe. One-Marginal Seat Situation
Safe Seat Marginal Seat
ElectoralElectoral
ResourcesResources
(Resource Cow)
If the number of marginal seats decreases, the scope for electoral manipulation 
will also diminish and the amount of electoral resources that two major parties spend 
will also decrease. For example, if the number of marginal seats becomes half in a 
country, the space for electoral manipulation will also become half. As a result, the 
effectiveness of election funds will also become half. This example is illustrated by the 
effectiveness line of V3 in Figure 6.3.96 This effectiveness line of Vs crosses the cost 
line of C at Es. The quantity of election funds Qs is more than the half of Q2 in this 
figure. Therefore, even if the number of marginal seats becomes half, the election funds 
that the two major parties spend will not become half in total. This means that the 
election funds spent per marginal seat will even increase though it will not become
96 Figure 6.3 w as orig inally  p resented  for a  constituency. H ow ever, th is  figure is here  used for a hypo thetical coun try  in w hich 
the  num ber o f  m arginal seats becom es half.
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double. However, the value of Q3 is, at least, smaller than that of Q2. Therefore, the total 
quantity of election funds that the two major parties spend in a country will decrease. If 
Q3 is compared with Qi, it will be clearer that CV has an effect of decreasing the 
quantity of election funds that parties spend.97
CV’s Control over Minority Interests
The introduction of CV will diminish the influence of minority interests over the two 
major parties, and this will result in increasing the total utility of electors. First, the 
introduction of CV will release the two major parties from the task of mobilisation of 
their supporters to polling places. Second, it will reduce the number of marginal seats. 
These two effects of CV will decrease the electoral resources (e.g. election funds and 
campaigners) that the two major parties spend. The electoral resources are provided by 
minority interests (e.g. interest groups and party activists), which draw the policy 
positions of the two major parties away from the median voter position (McLean 1982, 
124-29; McLean 1987, 70-71). As a result of the decrease in electoral resources, the two 
major parties will become relatively free from the influence of minority interests, and 
these parties will shift their policy positions in the direction of the median voter position 
(see Figure 6.2). Upon the condition that the two major parties alternately come into 
power, this centripetal shift of the two major party positions will result in a further 
increase in the total utility of electors. The next section will examine whether the 
demand for electoral resources is actually weaker in industrial democracies with proper 
CV than in those with VV.
6.2. Demand for Electoral Resources under 
Compulsory Voting (International Comparisons)
By making international comparisons, this section provides empirical evidence that CV 
controls the demand for electoral resources (i.e. election funds and campaigners). 
Taking into consideration the fact that the nature of election campaigns is changing 
from the human resource-oriented one to the centralised, finance-oriented one (Katz, 
and Mair 1995, 18, 20; Kavanagh 2000, 29; Scarrow 2000), international comparison of
97  See 2 .2  o f  C hapter 2 for argum ents that C V  will control the  quan tity  o f  electo ral funds.
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election funds is particularly important. However, any meaningful comparison of 
election funds is difficult for two reasons. First, it is difficult to obtain data about 
election funds since all industrial democracies do not have a legal disclosure system of 
election funds.98 Without a legal disclosure system, some parties publish data about 
their funds but others do not. Second, even if data of party funds for comparison is 
available, any international comparison of the funds is not likely to make much sense. 
Some available data may be about the election campaign only, but others may be about 
continuous party activity. Moreover, the main fund-raisers may be parties in some 
countries but may be candidates in others, but data about funds raised by candidates 
may not be available or may be difficult to obtain. Furthermore, some countries have a 
system of party subsidy but others do not. Therefore, this section will concentrate on 
comparing election campaigners.99
Party activists may tend to be very different from electors around the median 
elector position (Aldrich 1983; McLean 1982, 124-29; McLean 1987, 70-71). Making a 
substantial contribution to a political party is costly in time, effort and money; as a 
result, the majority of the people would not bother to do it but people with clear, strong, 
political beliefs may. At the time of election, they would work as election campaigners. 
Survey data indicates that extreme electors are more likely to be actively involved in 
election campaign activity than centre electors in industrial democracies (see Table 6.5 
below). In 15 industrial democracies out of 19, the relationship between the 
centre-extreme policy position of respondents and campaign activity participation is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. All gammas of these 15 countries are negative, 
and extreme electors on the left or on the right are more likely to participate in election 
campaign activity. Moreover, even in the other four countries, a similar pattern is 
observable.
98 K atz  and M air (1992) p rov ided  cam paign expend itu re  data  in 12 industrial dem ocracies until 1990. M eanw hile , fund ing  and 
d isclosure  schem e has been in operation  in A ustra lia  since the 1984 election . T here  is an overlap  from  1984 to  1990, and so 
international com parison  is possible. H ow ever, the  m eaningfulness o f  th is com parison  is questionable.
99  T his m eans th a t an overall, em pirical assessm ent o f  the  dem and fo r e lectoral resources is g iven  up.
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T able 6.5: E xtrem ism  and E lection C am paign A ctivity Participation  R ate
Self-assessed centre-extrem e policy 
position___________________________
O(Centre) 1 2 3 4/5(Extreme) Total
Country (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (n) p-value Gamma
Canada (2004)* 29 32 40 43 56 36 (1,493) <0.001 -0.229
USA (2004)* 20 31 32 47 39 32 ( 917) <0.001 -0.266
A ustralia  (2004) 11 12 20 25 21 12 (1 ,415) <0.001 -0 .255
Great Britain (2005)* 8 13 19 28 25 16 (610) <0.001 -0.354
Germany (2002)* 8 14 16 16 15 14 (9 2 8 ) 0.119 -
Finland (2003) 10 12 12 15 17 12 (1,075) 0.271 -
Italy (2006)* 7 8 14 13 17 12 (891) 0.019 -0.239
Ireland (2002)* 6 9 9 18 11 9 (1,836) <0.001 -0.275
Denmark (2001) 9 7 6 7 14 8 (1,950) 0.002 -0.034
Portugal (2002) 5 8 7 10 14 8 (1,105) 0.020 -0.242
B elsium  (2003) 5 7 8 12 12 7 (2 ,006) <0.001 -0 .276
France (2002) 4 4 9 7 14 7 (9 6 4 ) 0.001 -0.330
Norway (2001) 5 4 7 10 14 7 (1,948) <0.001 -0.305
Netherlands (2002) 5 6 6 9 15 7 (1,546) 0.002 -0.225
New Zealand (2002)* 5 6 5 7 9 6 (1,262) 0.334 -
Switzerland (2003)* 4 5 6 10 9 6 (1,345) 0.007 -0.285
Spain (2004) 3 4 7 9 12 6 (1,060) 0.001 -0.371
Japan(2004)* 3 4 4 6 10 4 (1,801) 0.009 -0.204
Sweden (2002) 3 2 3 4 5 3 (1,017) 0.532 -
A verage 8 10 12 16 17 11
a=0.05
Notes:
1. CV countries are underlined and bold.
2. ‘Self-assessed centre-extreme policy position’ was originally measured on a scale from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right). However, for this table, ‘5 ’ in this 
original scale is relabelled as ‘0 (Centre),’ and ‘0 (Left)’ and ‘ 10 (Right)’ in the original scale are combined and relabelled as ‘5 (Extreme).’ The others 
in the original scale are combined and relabelled in accordance.
3. In the case o f Japan, the original scale was ‘0 (Progressive)—10 (Conservative).’ For this table, this Japanese scale is dealt with like the scale used for 
other countries.
4. Data are not available for Austria and Greece.
5. Portugal (2002) is used because Portugal (2005) does not include necessary data for this table.
6. Germany (2002) is a mail-back survey.
7. Sample weight is used for countries with an asterisk (*), but the unmodified sample size is presented.
8. Invalid answers are excluded from the total.
Source: CSES Module 2— Full Release (Comparative Study o f Electoral Systems 2007).
If parties need election campaigners, they will need to pay some ‘price’ to party 
activists (e.g. the adoption of policies that party activists want) in order to give them 
incentives (Clark and Wilson 1961; Downs 1957, 92). By paying this price, the parties 
will get drawn away from the median voter position. Interest groups might also provide 
election campaigners to the parties, and these election campaigners may not be
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extremists. However, the parties will still need to pay some ‘price’ to these groups. If 
the parties pay a high price to minority interests (i.e. interest groups and party activists) 
for election campaigners, the parties will be strongly drawn away from the median voter 
position.
If CV controls the demand for electoral resources (i.e. election funds and 
campaigners), the election campaign participation rate in Australia and Belgium is 
likely to be limited compared to that of other industrial democracies. However, the 
campaign activity participation rate of the total is 17% in Australia and 7% in Belgium 
in Table 6.5. These rates are not particularly low among 19 industrial democracies in 
this table. An international comparison of party membership indicates a similar 
tendency (see Table 6.6 below). The party membership rate of Australia is 10% and that 
of Belgium is 7%. These figures are not particularly low among 22 industrial 
democracies in this table. These findings are contrary to the hypothesis that CV controls 
the demand for electoral resources. However, these findings are not necessarily solid 
evidence against this hypothesis, and there may be another way of assessing the demand 
for election campaigners.
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T able 6.6; C haritable O rganisation  M em bership and P olitical P arty M em bership
Country
Charitable Org 
M embership (%)
Political Party 
Membership (%)
Sample Size 
(n)
p-value Gamm a
New Zealand (1998) 32 13 (1,033) <0.001 0.605
Australia (1995) 30 10 (2,040) <0.001 0.513
Norway (1996) 28 15 (1,126) <0.001 0.339
Switzerland (1996) 22 17 (1,191) <0.001 0.503
Netherlands (1999) 22 9 (1,003) <0.001 0.499
Sweden (1999) 21 10 (1,015) <0.001 0.445
USA (1999) 17 19 (1,200) 0.014 0.219
C an ad a(2000) 13 6 (1,931) 0.013 0.284
Belgium (1999) ! i 7 (1,912) <0.001 0.531
Finland (2000) 10 6 (1,038) 0.002 0.453
Japan (2000) 9 3 (1,362) <0.001 0.744
Austria (1999) 7 12 (1,522) 0.001 0.389
Denmark (1999) 7 7 (1,023) 0.196 -
Ireland (1999) 7 4 (1,012) 0.957 -
Great Britain (1999) 7 3 (1,000) <0.001 0.783
Greece (1999) 6 8 (1,142) 0.001 0.466
Italy (1999) 6 4 (2,000) 0.001 0.464
France (1999) 6 2 (1,615) <0.001 0.638
N Ireland (1999) 5 2 (1,000) 0.972 -
Germany (1999) 4 3 (2,036) 0.873 -
Portugal (1999) 4 2 (1,000) <0.001 0.817
Spain (2000) 3 1 (1,209) <0.001 0.799
Average 13 7
a=0.05
Notes:
1. CV countries are underlined and are bold.
2. The relationship between charitable organisation membership and political party membership is analysed in each country, and p-value and 
Gamma are provided.
3. While ‘charitable organization’ was questioned about for italicised county surveys, ‘voluntary organisations and activities for social welfare 
services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people’ was questioned about for others.
4. Active members and inactive members are consolidated for italicised country surveys.
Source: European and World Values Survey 1981-2004 (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2006).
Although it may be appropriate to regard the election campaign activity 
participation rate or the political party membership rate as an index of the quantity of 
election campaigners, the ‘price’ that parties pay to campaigners should also be taken 
into consideration in order to assess the total cost of election campaigners. This total
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cost can be calculated by multiplying the price per campaigner with the total number of 
campaigners, and the price is determined by the strength of demand for election 
campaigners and that of supply as presented in Figure 6.6 below. When Di is the 
demand line and Si is the supply line, demand and supply are in equilibrium at Ei and 
the price per campaigner is Pi and the quantity (i.e. the number) of campaigners is Qi. 
Therefore, the total cost of election campaigners is iPi*Qi.<> However, if the demand 
becomes weaker by some reason (e.g. the adoption of proper CV) and the demand line 
shifts from Di to D2, the equilibrium will shift from Ei to E2 . Therefore, the price will 
decrease from Pi to P2, and the quantity of campaigners will also decrease from Qi to 
Q2. As a result, the total cost will decrease from ‘Pi*QP to ‘P2*Q2 From this example, 
it is clear that, if the demand for election campaigners becomes weaker and the supply 
of them remains the same, the total cost of election campaigners, which draws away the 
two major parties from the median voter position, will decrease.
Figure 6.6: Demand for and Supply of Election Campaigners
Price
^ Quantity
Q2 Qi Q3
Notes:
1. D,: demand; z=l, 2.
2. Sy. supply;/=l, 2.
3. Et : equilibrium; *=1, 2 ,3 .
4. PI: price; /= 1 ,2 ,3 .
5. Qm: quantity; m =l, 2 ,3 .
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However, the price and the quantity of election campaigners are not determined 
only by the strength of demand but are also determined by the strength of supply. If the 
demand becomes weaker from Di to D2 but the supply becomes stronger from Si to S2, 
the equilibrium will shift from Ei to E3. Therefore, although the price decreases from Pi 
to P3, the quantity increases from Qi to Q3. As a result of this shift of the equilibrium, 
the total cost will change from iPi*QP to ‘P3*Q3\ Although this change in the total cost 
still looks like a decrease in Figure 6.6 above, it will actually depend on the location of 
Ei and E3 in the first quadrant of this figure and so this change can be an increase. 
Therefore, even if CV actually weakens the demand for election campaigners, a CV 
country may have strong supply of election campaigners and could have much more 
election campaigners to pay more total cost than some VV country does. Nevertheless, 
it will still be reasonable to understand that, if the strength of supply remains the same, 
a decrease in the demand for election campaigners will always diminish the total cost. 
Therefore, if CV controls the strength of demand for election campaigners and all the 
other conditions remain the same, the total cost that the parties pay for election 
campaigners will decrease and the policy positions of the two major parties will shift in 
the direction of the median voter position.
It is difficult to measure the level of supply of election campaigners. However, it 
would be reasonable to suppose that, if people in a certain county have a general 
tendency to voluntarily make contributions to social causes (or if people have 
substantial social capital), they are also likely to have a tendency to voluntarily make 
contributions to political causes (Putnam 1993, 171-76; Putnam 2000, 35). Therefore, 
the charitable organisation membership rate can be useful as an index of the strength of 
supply of election campaigners. The relationship between charitable organisation 
membership and political party membership is statistically significant at the 5% level in 
18 industrial democracies out of 22 in Table 6.6, and the relationship between them is 
positive and is generally strong in these 18 countries, judging from their gamma value. 
Therefore, it will be reasonable to conclude that charitable organisation membership has 
a positive relationship with political party membership. Moreover, it would be even 
reasonable to assume that the charitable organisation membership rate has a positive 
relationship with the strength of the supply of election campaigners.
As shown in Table 6.6, the charitable organisation membership rate in Australia is 
relatively high compared to the other industrial democracies. Therefore, it will be
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reasonable to suppose that the supply of election campaigners is strong in Australia. 
When this strong supply is compared with its moderate quantity of election campaigners 
measured by its party membership rate, the demand for election campaigners is 
supposed to be a little weak in Australia. Meanwhile, Belgium is at around the same 
order in the charitable organisation membership rate and the political party membership 
rate in-Table 6.6, and so the demand for campaigners can be interpreted as moderate in 
Belgium. Overall, the empirical evidence of Australia and Belgium is weakly supportive 
of the hypothesis that CV controls the level of demand for election campaigners, but 
available empirical evidence is not conclusive.
6.3. Conclusion
This chapter proposed a hypothesis that CV controls the demand of the two major 
parties for electoral resources in the left-right dimension. Under a two-party condition, 
the two major parties will converge around the median voter. If these two major parties 
alternate in power, the governmental policy position will stay at either of their policy 
positions. The two major parties need electoral resources (i.e. election funds and 
campaigners) to run an election campaign and to attract votes and win the election. 
These electoral resources are provided mainly by minority interests (i.e. interest groups 
and party activists), and so the major parties need to provide these minority interests 
with incentives. As a result, the two major parties are drawn away from the median 
voter position by minority interests. However, the high turnout resulting from CV would 
control the demand of the two major parties for electoral resources, first by releasing 
them from mobilising their supporters to polling places and, second, by diminishing the 
electoral uncertainty level and decreasing the number of marginal seats. Therefore, CV 
would free the two major parties from minority interests to some extent, and so the two 
major parties would shift their positions in the direction of the median voter position in 
the left-right policy dimension. This policy shift would increase the total utility of 
electors, which can be regarded as the well-being of the people.
This chapter then provided empirical evidence to the hypothesis that CV controls 
the demand of the two major parties for electoral resources. Although the empirical 
evidence is supportive of this hypothesis, it is weak. The number of industrial
144
democracies with proper CV is only two (i.e. Australia and Belgium), and the number of 
all industrial democracies in the world (i.e. high-income OECD members with the 
population more than one million) is 21. Therefore, substantial evidence for any 
hypothesis about CV is difficult to obtain. Australia and Belgium are wealthy countries, 
but it is too anecdotal to relate this fact with CV. The Netherlands abolished their system 
of CV in 1970, but it is difficult to provide sufficient evidence that this abolition has 
resulted in diminishing the well-being of the people in the Netherlands. Several rational 
choice theorists (Crain 1995; Crain and Leonard 1993; O’Toole and Strobl 1995; Yeret 
1995) have tried to find a relationship between CV and government spending. However, 
even if this relationship is verified to exist, it will still be unclear whether more 
government spending, which is unavoidably accompanied with more taxing, improves 
the well-being of the people.
The previous chapter and this chapter have jointly provided a hypothesis that CV 
improves the total utility of electors, and these chapters have also provided some 
empirical evidence to support the hypothesis. However, this hypothesis has been built 
on a particular, ideal set of social conditions and electoral rules (e.g. homogenous 
society, single-seat constituency electoral system, and two-party system), which is by 
and large different from actual industrial democracies. If CV were useful only under this 
particular set of conditions and rules, CV would not be useful for most of the actual 
industrial democracies. However, this concern about the practicability of this hypothesis 
should not be regarded as its major defect. This is merely a limitation that any theory 
has. If a hypothesis can explain major aspects of the reality and this explanation can be 
useful in practice, the hypothesis should be considered to be useful. However, it is also 
true that, if a hypothesis is robust in theory but is utterly useless in practice, this 
hypothesis will ultimately be useless. The next chapter will consider whether CV is 
likely to be useful in actual industrial democracies despite of the wide variety of their 
social conditions and electoral rules.
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CHAPTER 7 
Applicability to Actual Industrial Democracies
This chapter considers whether CV would be effective in practice in improving the total 
utility of electors in industrial democracies under globally varying conditions. Chapters 
5 and 6 formulated a hypothesis that the high turnout resulting from CV is effective in 
improving the total utility of electors, which can be equated to the well-being of the 
people. Moreover, these chapters managed to provide some empirical evidence for this 
hypothesis. However, the default environment assumed in this hypothesis is more or 
less different from actual industrial democracies. Unless CV is useful in actual industrial 
democracies, it will not ultimately be useful for these countries.
In order to estimate the potential usefulness of CV in practice, this chapter will 
first examine whether industrial democracies have problems that CV can solve or 
control. This is because, if industrial democracies do not have any problem solvable by 
CV, the introduction of CV will be pointless for these countries. Second, this chapter 
will identify the main features of the default environment in which Chapters 5 and 6 
formulated a hypothesis about the usefulness of CV. Furthermore, this chapter will 
engineer the electoral system (inclusive of CV) that improves the total utility of electors 
to the extreme in this default environment. This default environment and the best 
electoral system will be useful as a baseline to compare it with those of actual industrial 
democracies. Third, the chapter will categorise actual social conditions and electoral 
rules of industrial democracies into several types and will consider whether CV is useful 
in each type of social environment and electoral rules. Finally, the chapter will discuss 
whether the high turnout resulting from CV is effective in improving the total utility of 
electors in actual industrial democracies.
7.1. Turnout Imbalance in Actual 
Industrial Democracies
«
This section examines whether industrial democracies have problems that CV can solve 
or control. In Chapters 5 and 6, we formulated a hypothesis that the high turnout
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resulting from CV will improve the total utility of electors; this was based on the 
orthodox theory of CV (i.e. Ackaert and de Winter 1996; Lijphart 1997; Mackerras and 
McAllister 1999) and a case study of Australian CV (see Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5). Then, 
we provided empirical evidence for this hypothesis using a case study of Australia in 
comparative perspective. However, the major purpose of this thesis is to consider 
whether CV would be useful for industrial democracies under VV at present (e.g. the 
UK and the USA) rather than testing whether CV has been useful for the industrial 
democracies under CV at present (e.g. Australia and Belgium). Accordingly, this section 
will first analyse the level of turnout imbalance between electors on the political left and 
those on the political right in each industrial democracy. Second, this section will 
observe whether the turnout of electors in the centre is lower than that on the left and 
the right in each country. If these two are the case under VV, it will be reasonable to 
predict that CV would be effective in improving the total utility of electors in these 
countries.
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show the turnout imbalance along the left-right dimension and 
the statistical test results of this imbalance. In the case of Australia in 2004 this 
imbalance did not exist or was negligible under CV, and this finding is in line with the 
1997 Australian election survey analysed by Mackerras and McAllister 1999 and the 
2001 Australian election survey analysed in 5.3 of Chapter 5 (see Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 
5.5). The case of Belgium in 2003 shows a similar result and this finding is in line with 
the 1991 Belgian election survey analysed by Ackaert and de Winter 1996 (also see de 
Winder and Ackaert 1998; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998). Therefore, it will be 
reasonable to conclude that the turnout imbalance along the left-right dimension has 
been effectively controlled in these countries under CV.
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Table 7.1: Policy Position and Voting in Industrial Democracies
Left-Right Policy Position
Total (%)Left (%) Centre (%) Right (%)
Australia Voted 99 97 99 98oorq (Total Number) (380) (522) (500) (1.402)
Belgium Voted 95 95 95 95
(2003) (Total Number) (593) (674) (575) (1,842)
Canada* Voted 93 86 97 92
(2004) (Total Number) (443) (547) (503) (1,493)
Denmark Voted 95 97 97 96
(2001) (Total Number) (576) (441) (911) (1,928)
Finland Voted 82 78 87 84
(2003) (Total Number) (285) (272) (518) (1,075)
France Voted 79 73 86 80
(2002) (Total Number) (338) (237) (388) (963)
Germany* Voted 92 88 91 91
(2002 Mail-Back) (Total Number) (466) (207) (246) (919)
Great Britain* Voted 70 73 83 76
(2005) (Total Number) (183) (209) (234) (626)
Ireland* Voted 79 85 87 85
(2002) (Total Number) (335) (681) (828) (1,844)
Italy Voted 92 78 89 87
(2006) (Total Number) (317) (201) (365) (883)
Japan* Voted 83 79 84 82
(2004) (Total Number) (440) (664) J 6 9 7 ) (1,801)
Netherlands Voted 97 96 98 97
(2002) (Total Number) (570) (303) (672) (1,545)
New Zealand* Voted 93 85 91 90
(2002) (Total Count) (414) (401) (469) (1,284)
Norway Voted 86 78 86 84
(2001) (Total Number) (576) (439) (932) (1,947)
Portugal Voted 85 82 84 84
(2005) (Total Number) (769) (716) (798) (2,283)
Spain Voted 93 88 94 92
(2004) (Total Number) (562) (266) (235) (1,063)
Sweden Voted 93 78 92 90
(2002) (Total Number) (432) (201) (385) (1,018)
Switzerland* Voted 77 59 75 71
(2003) (Total Number) (428) (431) (492) (1,351)
USA* Voted 83 68 83 79
(2004) (Total Number) (209) (256) (452) (917)
Notes:
1. Each respondent’s self-claimed left-right position was surveyed on a scale from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right). However, in this table, ‘0-4 ’ are 
aggregated under the label o f ‘Left,’ ‘5’ is labelled as ‘Centre’ and ‘6-10’ are aggregated under the label o f ‘Right.’
2. CV countries (i.e. Australia and Belgium) are underlined and bold, but Italy is not because Italy does not have a proper CV system.
3. Austria and Greece are not covered by the data source.
4. Original sample weight is applied for countries with an asterisk (*), but the unmodified sample size is presented.
Source: CSES Module 2— Full Release (Comparative Study o f  Electoral Systems 2007).
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T able 7.2:%2-T est Results o f the R elationship  in T able 7.1
Left, C entre and 
Right
Left and R ight Left and C entre C entre and R ight
p-value G am m a p-value G am m a p-value G am m a p-value G am m a
Australia 12004) 0.136 _____ 0.646 _____ 0.084 _____ 0.149 —
Belgium (2003) 0.951 -------- 0.766 -------- 0.808 --- 0.948 —
C anada (2004)* <0.001 -0.213 0.002 -0.438 0.010 0.340 <0.001 -0.677
D enm ark (2001) 0.336 — 0.228 — ! 0.197 — 0.735 —
Finland (2003) 0.002 -0.162 0.064 — 0.149 — <0.001 -0.329
F ra n c e (2002) 0.001 -0.162 0.015 -0.232 0.141 — <0.001 -0.364
G erm any (2002)* 0.168 — 0.692 — 0.063 — 0.211 —
G reat Britain (2005)* 0.003 -0.246 0.001 -0.363 0.526 — 0.008 -0.299
Ireland (2002)* <0.001 -0.176 <0.001 -0.290 <0.001 -0.211 <0.001 -0.084
Italy (2006) <0.001 0.075 0.185 — <0.001 0.527 <0.001 -0.390
Japan (2004)* 0.008 -0.050 0.617 — 0.036 0.150 0.003 -0.187
N etherlands (2002) 0.315 — 0.518 — 0.357 — 0.128 —
N ew  Zealand (2002)* <0.001 0.068 0.178 — <0.001 0.422 0.006 -0.278
N orw ay (2001) 0.001 -0.029 0.894 — 0.002 0.255 0.001 -0.246
Portugal (2005) 0.147 — 0.417 — 0.052 — 0.244 —
Spain (2004) 0.018 0.048 0.612 — 0.015 0.294 0.019 -0.367
Sw eden (2002) <0.001 0.035 0.836 — <0.001 0.556 <0.001 -0.537
Sw itzerland (2003)* <0.001 0.012 0.484 — <0.001 0.409 <0.001 -0.362
USA (2004)* <0.001 -0.096 0.852 — <0.001 0.397 <0.001 -0.379
a=0.05
Note: See notes in Table 7.1.
Source: CSES Module 2— Full Release (Comparative Study o f Electoral Systems 2007).
Although CV should have suppressed the turnout imbalance along the left-right 
dimension in Australia and probably also in Belgium, this finding does not 
automatically suggest that CV will be equally effective in suppressing turnout 
imbalance in the industrial democracies that operate VV at present. First, if the turnout 
imbalance between electors on the left and electors on the right does not exist under VV, 
the introduction of CV will not make any contribution in this regard. Second, if the 
turnout of electors in the centre is not lower than that on the left and the right under VV, 
the adoption of CV will not be effective in this regard either. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the turnout imbalance along the left-right dimension in each industrial 
democracy under VV in order to predict whether the introduction of CV will make any 
substantive difference.
The turnout imbalance along the left-right dimension has a variety of patterns 
among the industrial democracies that use VV. Out of 17 VV countries in Tables 7.1 and 
7.2, the turnout of respondents on the right is higher than that of the left in nine
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countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Japan, the 
Netherlands and Spain). This relationship is statistically significant at the 5% level in 
four countries (Canada, France, Great Britain and Ireland), and the strength of the 
relationship is substantial. However, this relationship is not statistically significant at the 
5% level in the other five countries (Denmark, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands and 
Spain). Meanwhile, in Norway and the USA, the turnout of respondents on the left is 
the same as that on the right. Moreover, the turnout of respondents on the right is even 
lower than that on the left in six countries (Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, 
Sweden and Switzerland), though this relationship is not statistically significant at the 
5% level in any of these countries.
The orthodox theory about CV (i.e. Ackaert and de Winter 1996; Lijphart 1997; 
Mackerras and McAllister 1999) argues that the high turnout resulting from CV will 
diminish unequal turnout between the privileged people and the less-privileged people 
and will be useful to equalise their influence on politics. If this orthodox theory is 
applied to the left-right dimension, the turnout of electors on the left would be lower 
than that on the right under VV. However, Tables 7.1 and 7.2 suggest that this orthodox 
argument is the case in several industrial democracies under VV at present but is not the 
case for others. Moreover, even in the cases that the electors on the right are more likely 
to vote than those on the left, this relationship is weak except for several countries. CV 
would be effective in correcting the turnout imbalance between electors on the left and 
electors on the right. However, if this imbalance does not exist or is weak, the 
introduction of CV will not be useful. Judging from Tables 7.1 and 7.2, the orthodox 
argument about the turnout imbalance between the left and the right is still detectable as 
a weak tendency but it is not always the case in each of them.100 Consequently, CV is 
likely to be useful for several industrial democracies but not for others.
The industrial democracies listed in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 have a variety of electoral 
systems. However, judging from these tables, the turnout between the left and the right 
does not seem to have any relationship with electoral system types. Among the 17 VV 
countries, majoritarian electoral systems are used in four countries (i.e. Canada, France,
100 O n the basis o f  som e em pirical ev idence, several papers (B runei! and D iN ardo 2004; C itrin , S h ick ler and  S ides 2003; 
D eN ardo 1980; H ighton and W olfinger 2001; T ucker, V ed litz  and D eN ardo 1986) argue tha t the im pact o f  h igh  tu rn o u t (e.g. 100% ) 
on party  advantage and public policy w ould be lim ited  in the U SA . T ab les 7.1 and 7.2 a lso suggest tha t the  tu rn o u t im balance 
betw een electors on the left and those on the  righ t is not substantia l in the  U SA  under V V  at present.
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Great Britain and the USA), PR systems are used in 12 countries (i.e. Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and Switzerland), and a parallel system is used in one country (i.e. Japan).101 
The turnout imbalance between the left and the right is substantial in some VV countries 
(e.g. Canada, France, Great Britain and Ireland), but it is not so in others (e.g. Norway, 
Sweden and the USA). Both groups include majoritarian electoral system countries and 
PR system countries. However, it is understandable in theory that turnout patters and 
electoral systems do not have any relationship in this regard. The hypothesis that the 
turnout of electors on the right is higher than that on the left was formulated in the 
majoritarian model of democracy, and it was tested under the hypothetical VV system in 
the case study of Australia (see Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5). Nevertheless, there is no reason 
for us to predict that turnout patters between the left and the right in PR system 
countries would be different from those in majoritarian electoral system countries.
Meanwhile, the turnout of electors in the centre is lower than that on the left and 
the right in all the VV industrial democracies except Denmark, Great Britain and Ireland. 
Moreover, this relationship is statistically significant at the 5% level in nine countries 
(Canada, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA) 
out of 14. This means that the low turnout in the centre, which was identified under the 
hypothetical VV system in the case study of Australia (see Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5), is 
more common among VV industrial democracies than the turnout imbalance between 
the left and the right is. Therefore, it will be reasonable to suppose that CV is effective 
in improving the electoral importance of the centre in these countries and so CV is 
effective in approximating the policy positions of the two major parties to the median 
voter position in the left-right dimension. We could conclude that CV would be effective 
in improving the total utility of electors in these countries. It should be noted that the 
effect of CV on centre electors has been under-discussed in previous works, inclusive of 
the orthodox theory of CV (i.e. Ackaert and de Winter 1996; Lijphart 1997; Mackerras 
and McAllister 1999).
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 suggest that the relative low turnout in the centre compared to 
the left and the right is common in both majoritarian electoral system countries and PR
101 In th is  classification , M M P (m ixed m em ber proportional) and STV (single transferab le  vo ting) are  catego rised  into PR  
system s. See P in to r and G ratschew  (2 0 0 2 ,1 2 3 -5 6 ) fo r the  e lectoral system s in these  country. A lso  see  IPU  20 0 7  fo r m ore detailed  
inform ation about them .
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system countries, and this empirical finding is problematic in terms of theory. Figures 
5.7 and 5.8 formulated a hypothesis to explain the reason why electors in the centre are 
less likely to vote than those on the left and the right under a two-party system. 
However, this hypothesis is unlikely to explain the reason why the turnout of electors in 
the centre is also lower than that on the left and the right under a PR system, which is 
likely to be accompanied by a multi-party system.
Nevertheless, this hypothesis formulated in the majoritarian democracy model 
could still be useful to explain the relatively low turnout of centre electors in several PR 
system countries to some extent. If there are two major parties under a PR system (e.g. 
in Germany) or if multiple parties form two major party-blocks along the left-right 
dimension (e.g. in Sweden), the two major parties or the two major party-blocks under a 
PR system might have key features similar to the two major parties under a majoritarian 
electoral system. Upon this condition, electors in the centre might still have less 
motivation to vote than electors on the left and the right (though in the case of Germany 
the relationship is not statistically significant at the 5% level). However, in the case of 
Switzerland under a PR electoral system and a multi-party system, all major parties 
form a long-term coalition in power. Therefore, the hypothesis formulated in the 
majoritarian democracy model is not applicable to the case of Switzerland, and electors 
in the centre are likely to vote as much as electors on the left and the right in the case. 
Nevertheless, judging from Tables 7.1 and 7.2, the turnout of electors in the centre is 
lower than that on the left and the right in practice. This suggests that the relatively low 
turnout of electors in the centre under PR systems remains a puzzle.
This section will pick up four countries as typical cases and will examine them in 
detail. Canada (2004) is a case in which CV is likely to be useful in two ways. While 
Great Britain (2005) is a case in which CV is useful in one way, the USA (2004) is a 
case in which CV is useful in the other way. Meanwhile, CV is not likely to be useful in 
any way for the case of the Netherlands (2002). However, it should be noted that the 
case study of each industrial democracy is based on one election survey only, and so 
these studies might not properly reflect the general turnout pattern of each country. It 
should also be reminded that this section assesses the usefulness of CV for each country 
in the assumptive framework of majoritarian democracy. However, several industrial 
democracies (e.g. the Netherlands among the four cases below) actually have a PR 
system rather than a majoritarian electoral system. Therefore, the relevance of this
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assessment to each country should be evaluated with caution.
Case 1: Canada (2004). Among the VV industrial democracies listed in Tables 7.1 
and 7.2, CV is likely to work in two ways in Canada. Under VV at present, electors on 
the right are more likely to vote by four percentage points compared to electors on the 
left, and this relationship is statistically significant at the 5% level (p=0.002). Therefore, 
the median voter position is supposed to be clearly on the right to the median elector 
position in the left-right dimension. The introduction of CV would reduce the distance 
between the two medians. Moreover, electors on the left are more likely to vote by 
seven percentage points than electors in the centre, and electors in the centre are less 
likely to vote by 11 percentage points than electors on the right. These relationships are 
statistically significant at the 5% level (p=0.001; pO.OOl). The introduction of CV 
would diminish this turnout imbalance between electors in the centre and electors on the 
left and the right. Therefore, CV would improve the electoral importance of the centre 
policy. Overall, CV would improve the total utility of Canadian electors on these two 
grounds. In Finland and France, CV would also be useful in two ways.
Case 2: Great Britain (2005). CV is likely to be useful in approximating the 
median voter position to the median elector position in Britain. The relationship 
between the left, centre and right and voting participation is statistically significant at 
the 5% level (p=0.003). Moreover, electors on the right are more likely to vote than 
those on the left by 13 percentage points, and this relationship is statistically significant 
at the 5% level (p=0.001). Therefore, the median voter position should be clearly on the 
right to the median elector position in the left-right dimension. The introduction of CV 
would diminish the turnout difference between the left and the right and would 
approximate the median voter to the medina elector. This would result in improving the 
total utility of electors. However, the turnout of electors in the centre is not lower than 
both on the left and the right, and so CV would not necessarily be useful in correcting 
turnout imbalance in this regard. The turnout difference along the left-right dimension 
of Ireland has a similar pattern, and so CV would be useful for Ireland in the same 
manner.
Case 3: The USA (20041. Although CV is not likely to be useful in approximating 
the median voter position to the median elector position in the USA, it would be useful 
in improving the electoral importance of the centre policy. Electors on the left are likely 
to vote as much as electors on the right, and so CV would not be useful in diminishing
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the distance between the two medians. However, electors in the centre are less likely to 
vote by 15 percentage points than those on the left, and they are less likely to vote by 15 
percentage points than those on the right. These relationships are statistically significant 
at the 5% level (p<0.001; p<0.001). Therefore, the introduction of CV would improve 
the electoral importance of the centre policy and would improve the total utility of 
electors in the USA. CV would also be useful in Sweden and Switzerland by the same 
reason.
Case 4: The Netherlands (2002). Until 1970, the Netherlands had employed CV 
and had achieved turnout of around 95% of the registered electors (see Figure 3.4). 
However, the re-introduction of CV is not likely to be useful for the Netherlands. First, 
electors on the right are slightly more likely to vote than electors on the left (by one 
percentage point) but this relationship is not statistically significant at the 5% level 
(p=0.518), and so the distance between the median voter and the median elector is not 
likely to be substantial even under VV. Second, electors in the centre are slightly less 
likely to vote than electors on the left and on the right, but this relationship is not 
statistically significant at the 5% level either (p=0.357; p=0.128). Therefore, the 
adoption of CV is not likely to substantially improve the electoral importance of the 
centre policy. Taking into consideration the fact that CV is a strong measure and its 
serious administration is so costly, the re-adoption of CV seems to be unnecessary and 
even to be undesirable for the Netherlands. CV is not likely to be useful in any way for 
Denmark, either.
Judging from the examination into 17 industrial democracies that operate VV, we 
can conclude that the level of effectiveness of CV in improving the total utility of 
electors will vary considerably. There should be a gap between the median voter 
position and the median elector position in most of the industrial democracies. However, 
the size of this gap varies greatly. Meanwhile, the turnout of electors in the centre is 
clearly lower than that on the left and the right in many VV industrial democracies. 
Therefore, CV would be useful in improving the electoral importance of the centre 
policy in these countries. Consequently, CV would be useful for several industrial 
democracies that operate VV at present, but it would not be so for others. It remains a 
puzzle why turnout imbalance between the left and the right largely varies among 
industrial democracies under VV at present. It is also a puzzle why the turnout of 
electors in the centre is lower than that on the left and the right even in PR system
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countries. However, the purpose of this section was to examine whether industrial 
democracies under VV at present have problems that CV can solve or control. It would 
be reasonable to say that this section has achieved its original goal and has identified the 
problems solvable by the introduction of CV in many of these countries.
7.2. The Default Environment and 
the Best Electoral System
This section aims at laying the theoretical groundwork for further considering the 
usefulness of CV under globally varying conditions. For this purpose, this section will 
first identify the main features of the default environment in which Chapters 5 and 6 
formulated a hypothesis that CV is useful in improving the total utility of electors. Then, 
this section will engineer an electoral system (inclusive of CV) that improves the total 
utility of electors within this default environment. The combination of the default 
environment and this electoral system will be used as a baseline from which to compare 
those of the actual industrial democracies in the next section and to consider the 
usefulness of CV for these countries.
The Default Environment
CV is an instrument that can be effective only under certain conditions. Therefore, 
without having adequate understanding of these conditions, it will be impossible to 
properly predict the effect of CV. Chapters 5 and 6 argued that the effects of the high 
turnout resulting from CV would improve the total utility of electors in industrial 
democracies in two ways. The last section observed the turnout imbalance along the 
left-right dimension as a problem that CV can solve, and this turnout imbalance is a part 
of the environment within which CV operates.
It will be impossible to define the default environment or describe all features of 
it, but it will still be possible to describe the major aspects of the default environment in 
which the hypothesis of this thesis has been constructed. In terms of social conditions, 
the default environment is a homogenous society where the left-right dimension 
predominates and electors are normally distributed along this dimension. Meanwhile, in 
regard to the party system, there are two established major parties, and these parties are
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pragmatic and flexible about their policy positions in order to win elections. Finally, 
electors have a basic level of education and have sufficient social capital to ensure that 
democracy is a workable political system. In the same way that the perfect market in 
economics does not exist in reality, this ideal type of environment for electoral 
engineering is not likely to exist in reality. However, it will be useful as a virtual 
laboratory for thought experiments.
The Best Electoral System
It has been argued that it is impossible to engineer the best electoral system for two 
reasons. First, actual countries exist in a variety of environments so the best-for-all 
electoral system cannot exist, and the best electoral system will need to be tailored for a 
particular country environment (Farrell 2001, 181; Katz 1997, 308). Second, if the 
electoral system is required to meet several principles that cannot be fully achieved 
concurrently (e.g. political equality, representation of viewpoints, accountability, the 
importance of elections, govemability, party system stability, and handling social 
conflicts), it is highly unlikely to be possible to engineer the best electoral system in all 
directions even for a particular environment (Dunleavy and Margetts 1995, 13-17; 
Farrell 2001, 11-12). Therefore, it will effectively be impossible to engineer the ‘best 
electoral system’ in this theoretical framework (Harrop and Miller 1987, 43). However, 
if this theoretical framework is replaced with another theoretical framework, it might 
become possible to engineer the best electoral system.
In developing a new theoretical framework, the first problem is the variety of 
environments. It would be true that actual countries exist in a variety of environments 
and so the best-for-all electoral system cannot exist. Tailoring an electoral system for 
one particular country is one way to control the environment and to solve this problem. 
However, the major weakness of this approach is that, even if it can be tailored for a 
particular country environment, this ‘best’ electoral system is radically different from 
the one that was originally sought. Meanwhile, modelling the ideal type of environment 
is another way to control the environment for engineering the best electoral system.
The second problem is the number of principles that the best electoral system 
should try and incorporate. Even if the ideal type of environment is identified, it would 
almost be impossible to engineer the best electoral system for this environment to fully 
achieve several principles concurrently. However, if the number of principles could be
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limited to one, it would theoretically become possible to engineer an electoral system to 
achieve this single principle. 5.1 of Chapter 5 chose the total utility of electors as the 
primary value standard, and so this thesis will regard it as the sole principle that the best 
electoral system should achieve (see Bordley 1983,123; Mueller 2003, 151).
The next concern is how to engineer the electoral system so that it improves the 
total utility of electors in the default environment. Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that 
CV will be useful in improving the total utility of electors in the default environment in 
two ways. First, CV will approximate the median voter position, around which the two 
major parties converge, to the median elector position, at which the total utility of 
electors is maximised. Second, CV will encourage the two major parties to shift their 
policy positions in the direction of the median voter position. If all electoral rules are 
designed to enhance these two effects, this set of electoral rules would constitute the 
best electoral system in the default environment.
First, in order to approximate the median voter position to the median elector 
position to the extreme, the electoral system should be engineered to achieve universal 
voting. If universal voting is achieved, the median voter position will be identical to the 
median elector position. To achieve this goal, everyone should first be eligible to vote, 
and the universal franchise should be realised. Second, automatic registration based on 
the national registration system should be institutionalised in order to achieve universal 
registration. Third, CV should be adopted in order to make all registered electors turn 
out to vote. Fourth, electronic or machine voting that does not to allow any elector to 
cast an invalid vote should be introduced in order to ensure that all votes are valid. In 
practice, it may be politically difficult to adopt such a machine/electronic voting system. 
In this case, machine/electronic voting should be dismissed altogether in order to guide 
electors to cast a valid vote without reminding them that they have a choice to cast an 
invalid vote.
Second, in order to encourage the two major parties to shift their policy positions 
in the direction of the median voter, the full alternative voting (AV) system should be 
adopted. The full AV system requires electors to put consecutive numbers to all 
candidates in a single-seat constituency. It is used for the lower house election in 
Australia. The well-known electoral system that is likely to realise an election between 
the two major parties is the single-member plurality (SMP) system (Duverger [1964] 
1978, 217-28; also see Cox 2000a, 2000b). When Downs (1957) and Sartori (1976,
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185-92, 345-47) argued the centripetal nature of the two-party system and claimed that 
the two major parties would converge around the median voter position, they should 
have envisaged how this SMP system operated in the USA and the UK. However, the 
most useful electoral system in utilising the nature of the median voter position as the 
Condorcet winner and in encouraging the two major parties to shift their policy 
positions in the direction of the median voter is the full AV system rather than the SMP 
system. Under the SMP system, tactical electors may realise that their votes will be 
wasted if they vote for minor parties and so most of them may vote for one of the two 
major parties as Duverger ([1964] 1978, 226) argues. Nevertheless, these two major 
parties will not be able to approximate their policy positions very close to the median 
voter because extreme electors on their side might become disgusted at the closeness of 
the two major parties and might abstain or vote for extreme minor parties (Downs 1957, 
117, 131).102
If every voter puts a preferential order to all candidates in a single-member 
constituency under the full AV system, all votes will ultimately be transferred to the two 
major party candidates whatever the actual number of candidates and parties. This 
electoral system will effectively bring about a perfectly two-candidate election setting 
and will be more useful in utilising Duverger’s law than SMP driven by tactical voting. 
The most important consequence of the full AV system is that the two major parties 
converging around the median voter position do not need to pay much attention to their 
own extreme voters and so these parties can confidently approximate their policy 
positions to the median voter. So long as extreme left-wing electors give an earlier 
preferential order to the left-wing major party than to the right-wing major party, their 
votes will ultimately be transferred to the left-wing major party. This is also the case for 
the right-wing major party and its extreme voters. Therefore, the two major parties do 
not need to be worried that extreme voters on their side might vote to extreme party 
candidates (e.g. candidates on the ticket of an ultra-socialist party or an ultra-nationalist 
party) rather than their candidates. This shift of policy positions of the two major 
parties in the direction of the median voter will improve the total utility of electors.
102 A lso  see C ox  (1 9 9 7 ,3 5 -1 4 8 ) for tactical voting.
103 It is techn ically  possib le  fo r ex trem e vo ters to  g ive an earlie r p referential o rder to  the  m ajo r pa rty  cand idate  on the  o ther 
side  in o rd e r to  punish the  m ajor party  on th e ir  side  w hen they th ink  that the  party  on  th e ir side  has sh ifted  its po licy  position  too
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However, if the AV system does not require voters to put a preferential order 
against all the candidates, some votes may fail to be transferred to either of the two 
major-party candidates and may end up invalid. If all voters are tactical and they include 
at least one of the two-major party candidates in their preferential order, all votes will 
ultimately be transferred to the two major-party candidates through the vote-transfer 
procedure and so the median voter position will remain the Condorcet winner. However, 
all voters would not be tactical in this manner in reality. Therefore, some votes would 
end up invalid under the non-full AV system, and so the Condorcet winner might not be 
located at the median voter position. If these invalid votes have some relationship with 
the left-right dimension, the distance between the two medians could be substantial. In 
this case, the full AV system will be more useful in realising a two-candidate election 
and in encouraging the two major parties to converge around the median voter position 
than the non-full AV system and in improving the total utility of electors.
Universal voting will also be useful in encouraging the two major parties to shift 
their policy positions in the direction of the median voter. This is because universal 
voting will relieve the two major parties from their concern over abstention among 
extreme electors on their side (see Downs 1957, 117). With universal voting, the two 
major parties will be able to confidently approximate their policy positions to the 
median voter. It is technically possible for extreme electors on the left or on the right to 
cast an invalid vote even under CV if voting is secret and invalid voting is not 
mechanically barred. However, once they go to the polling place, the vast majority will 
cast a valid vote in practice. Among the various electoral rules designed to achieve 
universal voting, CV will be particularly useful for this purpose. If electors in the centre 
are less likely to vote than electors on the left and on the right under VV (see Tables 7.1 
and 7.2; also see Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 for the Australian case), CV will be useful in 
improving the electoral attractiveness of the centre policy position and in encouraging 
the two major parties to shift their policy positions in the direction of the median voter.
However, it should be remembered that this thesis has consistently used the 
majoritarian model of democracy as its underlying assumption as its introduction 
explained. This majoritarian assumption is characterised by a two-party system, in 
which the two major parties alternate in power, and is also featured by a majoritarian
close to the m edian  vo ter position  (see C ox  2000c, 300). H ow ever, th is type o f  p ro test vo ting  w ould  be rare ly  exercised  because  o f
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electoral system. The choice of this underlying assumption inevitably limits the research 
scope of this thesis. Although this section has engineered the best system (i.e. the 
combination of the universal voting system and the full AV electoral system) in the 
default environment, this system might not be the fit-for-all system in the real world. 
Moreover, it should be noted that this ‘best’ system was designed in the assumptive 
framework of majoritarian democracy, and this thesis has ruled out alternative forms of 
democracy, such as consensus democracy (see Lijphart 1999). Therefore, the reader 
should, with caution, treat its desirability even in theory.
7.3. Compulsory Voting under Globally 
Varying Conditions
This section considers how CV would work in a variety of environments in order to find 
how it would be useful in actual industrial democracies. The first section of this chapter 
deliberately ignored the actual environment and electoral rules of each industrial 
democracy and assessed the usefulness of CV in regard to the turnout imbalance along 
the left-right dimension. The last section identified the main features of the default 
environment and then engineered an electoral system to improve the total utility of 
electors in this default environment (i.e. the ideal type of environment). However, the 
combination of the default environment and the engineered electoral system does not 
exist in any actual democracy. Therefore, if CV is introduced, its effect will depend on 
the actual set of social conditions and other electoral rules in each country. This means 
that it is necessary to take into consideration the social conditions and electoral rules to 
evaluate the usefulness of CV.
For this purpose, it is possible to modify the combination of social conditions and 
electoral rules in order to simulate the effect of CV under different sets of conditions 
and rules. However, it would be impractical to simulate all possible combinations. 
Therefore, this section will first replace the full AV system with other majority/plurality 
representation systems and proportional representation (PR) systems and will simulate 
of the effect of CV in the new sets of conditions and rules. These two types of electoral
th e ir ideological conscience.
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systems are identified because they are widely-used in industrial democracies.104 Then, 
this section will replace the single policy dimension of the default environment with the 
multiple policy dimensions, as well as replacing the homogenous society with the 
fragmented society. Finally, there is a general assessment of the usefulness of CV for 
actual industrial democracies under globally varying conditions.
Majority/Plurality Representation Systems (Centripetal Electoral Systems)
Although no actual industrial democracy has a perfect two-candidate election, it will be 
reasonable to suppose that, in an environment similar to the perfect two-candidate 
election setting, CV will work as hypothesised in Chapters 5 and 6. Although the full 
AV system is the best electoral system to be combined with universal voting in order to 
realise a two-candidate election and to improve the total utility of electors, other 
majority/plurality representation systems (e.g. the non-full AV system and the SMP 
system) would also have similar effects though these systems would be less effective in 
this regard than the full AV system. This subsection will first consider the usefulness of 
the non-full AV system and will then consider the SMP system.
While the full AV system requires electors to order all candidates in the 
single-seat constituency, the non-full AV system allows electors not to put a preferential 
order to all candidates or limits the number of ordered preferences that electors may put 
(e.g. the first preference and the second preference only). Even under the non-full AV 
system, CV and other electoral rules for universal voting will control abstention. 
Therefore, the two major parties can shift their policy positions in the direction of the 
median voter without concerning the abstention of extreme electors on their side. 
However, under the non-full AV system, some votes may fail to get transferred to either 
of the two major-party candidates and may end up invalid. Some electors may tactically 
put a preferential order to the major party candidate on their side in order to avoid 
wasting their vote, but others may not give any preferential order to either of them if 
they were disgusted by both major parties. In that circumstance, it would be difficult for 
the two major parties to totally ignore the wishes of the extreme electors on their side 
and to approximate their policy positions very close to the median voter. It will be 
reasonable to understand that the non-full AV system is centripetal in its nature, but it is
104 For o ther electo ral system s, see  C ox  1990. This paper sy stem atically  investigates how  electoral law s affec t the
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less centripetal than the full AV system. Papua New Guinea uses a non-full AV system, 
and only first three preferences can be counted (IPU 2007). However, the non-full AV 
system is not widely used in the world.
Even under the SMP system, CV and other electoral rules for universal voting 
will control abstention. The two major parties can shift their policy positions in the 
direction of the median voter without concerning the abstention of extreme electors on 
their side. However, the combination of universal voting and the SMP system will be 
unable to bar extreme voters from voting for extreme party candidates. Under the 
non-full AV system, electors can express their real first preference and can still avoid 
missing a chance to influence the electoral outcome by adding one of the two major 
party candidates in their preferential order. Meanwhile, under the SMP system, electors 
have to think whom they will support and, they also have to think who has a real chance 
of being elected in order to be tactical and avoid wasting their vote. Some electors will 
give precedence to expressing their real first preference, but others will give precedence 
to avoiding missing the chance to influence the electoral outcome. However, the 
majority of electors will vote for one of the two major party candidates under SMP 
because they sincerely support one of the two major parties or because they want to 
avoid voting to unlikely candidates in vain (Cox 2000c; Duverger [1964] 1978, 217-28).
If all electors know what two parties are major and they decide to cast a tactical 
vote for one of the two major party candidates, all votes will be cast to the two major 
party candidates and none will be cast to unlikely candidates. However, in reality, some 
electors would vote for unlikely candidates in order to express their first preference or 
to express their dissatisfaction with both of the two major parties. Moreover, the number 
of votes cast for unlikely candidates under SMP would tend to be more than the number 
of wasted votes under non-full AV. If the votes cast to unlikely candidates have some 
relationship with the left-right dimension, these votes would result in some distance 
between the median voter position and the median elector position. Moreover, the two 
major parties would need to pay some attention to the policy preferences of extreme 
electors on their side, and so it would be difficult for the parties to shift their policy 
positions very close to the median voter. Therefore, it will be reasonable to consider that 
the SMP system is centripetal, but less so than the full/non-full AV system. SMP is used
centripetal/centrifugal position-taking  incentives for parties and candidates.
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in many countries, and the USA, the UK, Canada and India are several examples (IPU 
2007).
In combination with any of majority/plurality representation systems, CV will be 
effective in improving the total utility of electors by approximating the median voter 
position to the median elector position in the left-right dimension. Although all 
majority/plurality representation systems are more or less centripetal in their nature and 
encourage the two major parties to converge around the median voter position, CV 
would amplify their centripetal nature by releasing the two major parties from their 
concern over the abstention of extreme electors on their side. Moreover, if  electors 
around the median are less likely to vote under VV (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2; also see 
Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5), CV will be useful in improving the electoral attractiveness of 
the median voter position and will encourage the two major parties to shift their policy 
positions in the direction of the median voter. Australia, the USA and the UK have 
majority/plurality representation systems and two-party systems though their systems 
are a little different from each other. Australia already has CV and it will be reasonable 
to suppose that CV has been effective in improving the total utility of electors in 
Australia. Furthermore, it would be sensible to predict that CV will have similar effect 
in the USA and the UK if proper CV is introduced in these countries.
PR Systems (Centrifugal Electoral Systems)
A PR system is unlikely to result in a two-candidate election setting and is likely to 
result in a multi-party system (Duverger [1964] 1978, 239-45). Consequently, the 
median voter position is unlikely to be the Condorcet winner under the PR system, and 
so party policy positions would not necessarily converge around the median voter 
position (Cox 1990, 919-22; Downs 1957, 127-132; Sartori 1976, 342-51). Moreover, 
the government is likely to be formed from a coalition of two or more parties, and the 
coalition government would adopt a wider spread of policies to attract the support of the 
majority of voters than the government under the two-party system does (Downs 1957, 
142-63; Lijphart 1999, 34-41). Although multi-party systems will not always be 
centrifugal and could be centripetal particularly if helped by pivotal centre parties (see 
Green-Pedersen 2004; Hazan 1997; Keman 1994), the multi-party system under the PR 
system would tend to be more centrifugal than the two-party system under
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majority/plurality representation systems.105 Therefore, the government is unlikely to 
approximate their policy position to the median voter, and so the government would fail 
to sufficiently improve the total utility of electors under the combination of the PR 
system, the multi-party system and the coalition government.
Even with a combination of the PR system, the multi-party system and the 
coalition government, CV would make some contribution to the improvement in the 
total utility of electors. If the PR system is hypothesised to secure perfect proportional 
representation of voters in parliament, the median parliamentarian position will be 
identical to the median voter position and will be the Condorcet winner in the left-right 
policy dimension in parliament. In this situation, CV will approximate the median voter 
position (equal to the median parliamentarian position) to the median elector position. 
Parliamentarians would form parties in reality, and they would vote in accordance with 
their party line. Therefore, the median parliamentarian position may not be the 
Condorcet winner in the party politics of the real parliament. However, the centre policy 
position would still tend to be important in any decision making in parliament. 
Therefore, the approximation of the median voter position to the median elector position 
by CV would still be useful in improving the total utility of electors.
Furthermore, if electors around the median voter are less likely to vote than 
electors on the left and those on the right under VV as 7.1 of this chapter demonstrated, 
CV would improve the electoral attractiveness of the median voter position. Under the 
multiple party system, parties would have more incentives to shift their policy positions 
in the direction of the median voter. Even if they do not change their policy positions, 
centre parties would gain more votes and seats and would have more influence on the 
formation of the coalition government. Therefore, centre parties would have more 
political clout about policy making in the coalition government (Green-Pedersen 2004; 
Hazan 1997; Keman 1994). As a result, CV would have an effect of improving the 
importance of the centre policy position and improving the total utility of electors even 
under the PR system.106
However, it should be noted that this thesis has consistently used the majoritarian
105 F o r em pirical ev idence con trary  to  th is  argum ent, see H uber and  Pow ell 1994.
106 I f  the  tu rnou t o f  electors in the  centre is h igher than tha t o f  the  left and the  righ t under V V , the  in troduction  o f  C V  w ill 
reduce  the  num ber o f  seats allocated  to  cen tre  parties and will d im in ish  the ir in fluence on po licy  m ak ing  in the  coalition  governm ent.
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model of democracy as its underlying assumption as its introduction explained. This 
majoritarian assumption is characterised by a two-party system, in which the two major 
parties alternate in power, and is also featured by a majoritarian electoral system. This 
means that this thesis has ruled out alternative forms of democracy, such as consensus 
democracy characterised by a PR system and is appreciated by some leading scholars 
(e.g. Lijphart 1999). The underlying assumption of this thesis inevitably limits its 
research scope. This sub-section has assessed PR systems and the usefulness of CV 
under PR systems by utilising the hypotheses formulated in the majoritarian framework 
and the value standard chosen in the framework. However, the reader should be aware 
that this assessment of PR systems might have missed some useful features of PR 
systems in the real world.
The Multi-Dimensional Society
The single dimensionality of the left-right dimension is one feature of the default 
environment. If the society has one or more additional dimensions to the left-right 
continuum, it would be difficult to find the optimal combination of policy positions in 
these dimensions to improve the total utility of voters. However, this optimal 
combination is still the Condorcet winner in a two-candidate election, and so the two 
major parties will try to converge around this optimal combination. CV will 
approximate this optimal combination of policy positions for voters to that of electors. 
If the PR system is used in the multi-dimensional society, which has two or more major 
policy dimensions, a multi-party system is likely to emerge. For example, in addition to 
the left-right dimension, religion, ethnicity and language may provide other major 
dimensions though none of these is likely to constitute a continual dimension. The 
Netherlands may be appropriate as an example.
However, even under the multi-party system, this optimal combination of policy 
positions for the total utility of voters will still be a strategically important position for 
the formation of the coalition government and for policy making in the coalition 
government. As Cox (1990, 908) argues, the multi-dimensionality of the policy space 
would not radically change the degree to which parties and candidates converge around 
the centre or disperse fairly widely. Furthermore, CV would be useful in improving the
T herefore, in th is  case, C V  w ill decrease the  total utility  o f  electors. H ow ever, such a  case is not found  in any  industria l dem ocracy
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strategic importance of the optimal combination of policy positions even more if 
electors around the optimal combination position in the multiple dimensions are less 
likely to vote than extreme policy seekers under VV.
The Fragmented Society
The homogenous society, in which people share political ends and means (Almond 1956, 
398), is another feature of the default environment. This is an ideal type and so it is not 
likely to exist in reality, but the UK and the USA have been mentioned as examples. If 
the society consists of several major fragments, which do not share political ends and 
means, the maximisation of the total utility of electors by approximating the 
governmental policy position to the median elector will not be useful as a guiding 
principle for electoral engineering (Lijphart 1999, 32-33). Instead, the achievement of 
consociation between significant fragments will be regarded as the guiding principle. 
The fragmented society is likely to employ some type of PR system rather than some 
winner-take-all electoral system (i.e. the majority/plurality representation system) like 
AV or SMP in order to reduce the risk level of a hard crash between the fragments. Any 
majority/plurality representation system could exasperate minorities and could be 
hazardous to the unity of the society. Meanwhile, the PR system will properly reflect the 
social fragmentation in parliament and will provide a precondition for the post-electoral 
negotiation between elites representing each social fragment to achieve and maintain 
consociation between fragments (Lijphart 1969, 217-19). The Netherlands, Belgium and 
Switzerland are examples of fragmented societies that have been successful in achieving 
consociation between social fragments.
If CV is combined with the PR system, the fragmentation of the society will be 
more precisely reflected in parliament and it will provide a fairer condition for the 
post-electoral negotiation between fragment elites. Therefore, CV will be useful even in 
the fragmented society. Moreover, CV might be useful in controlling the level of 
conflict between fragments. CV would mostly nullify the usefulness of encouraging 
their fragment members to vote and discouraging electors in the other fragment 
members from voting. CV could therefore be useful in peacefully registering the
exam ined  in T ables 7.1 and 7.2.
166
fragmentation in the society.107
7.4. Conclusion
This chapter found that CV and its resulting high turnout will be useful for several 
industrial democracies but will not necessarily so for others. Many industrial 
democracies have problems that CV can solve or control. Turnout imbalance between 
the left and the right is substantial in several industrial democracies under VV. Moreover, 
the turnout of electors in the centre is substantially lower than that on the left and the 
right in most of the industrial democracies now operating VV. The high turnout 
resulting from CV will suppress these two types of turnout imbalance along the 
left-right dimension and will improve the total utility of electors. Therefore, it will be 
reasonable to conclude that CV is useful for many industrial democracies though not for 
all. However, it should be noted that this hypothesis is formulated on the basis of the 
default environment. In the default environment, this chapter then engineered an 
electoral system that maximises the total utility of electors as follows: universal 
franchise, automatic registration based on the national registration system, CV, 
electronic/machine voting without a choice of invalid voting, and full AV.
In practice, industrial democracies have a variety of sets of social conditions and 
electoral rules, and so the introduction of CV would result in a variety of effects. 
Nevertheless, this chapter found that CV is versatile and would be useful in a variety of 
environments. For example, even under the combination of the PR system, the 
multi-party system and the coalition-govemment, CV would correct the turnout 
imbalance between the left and the right and would approximate the median voter 
position to the median elector position, which is the focal policy position even in this 
condition though its strategic importance would be much less than that of the default 
environment. Moreover, CV would be useful in improving the electoral importance of 
the centre policy, and so CV would encourage parties to shift their policy positions in 
the direction of the median voter in the left-right dimension. Even if parties do not shift
107 H ow ever, it is also possible to  im agine ano ther scenario. E scalated  in tra-fragm ent conflic t could  resu lt in ex trem ism  in each 
fragm ent. Som e leaders in each  fragm ent m igh t try  to  show  o f f  how  they  are in to le ran t to  the o ther fragm ent in o rder to  gain m ore 
vo tes in th e ir own fragm ent. A s a result, the conflic t betw een fragm ents could esca la te  in add ition  to  the  in tra-fragm ent conflict.
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their policy positions, CV would increase the political influence of centre parties. 
Ultimately, CV would improve the total utility of electors even under the combination 
of the PR system, the multi-party system and the coalition-govemment.
The high turnout resulting from CV will be useful for some industrial 
democracies in increasing the total utility of electors but not so for others. This chapter 
analysed election surveys of 17 industrial democracies now operating VV (Tables 7.1 
and 7.2) and reached this general conclusion. However, for the actual introduction of 
CV, it would be necessary to assess the usefulness of CV in each country by analysing 
more past surveys and by taking the social/political/electoral conditions and rules of 
each country into consideration. The next and the last chapter will present a cost-benefit 
analysis of CV for industrial democracies.
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PART IV 
Evaluations
CHAPTER 8
Reassessing Compulsory Voting
This final chapter aims at assessing the extent to which this thesis has answered its 
major question, namely whether CV would be useful for industrial democracies in 
improving the total utility of electors, which can be equated to the well-being of the 
people. In order to answer this major question, this thesis conducted a cost-benefit 
analysis of CV. The argument recognised that CV needs to be effective on two levels for 
it to be useful. First, it needs to be effective in improving turnout. Second, the high 
turnout resulting from CV needs to be effective in improving the total utility of electors. 
For each level of effectiveness, this thesis formulated a hypothesis by utilising rational 
choice theory and then provided empirical evidence for this hypothesis. This thesis also 
tried to identify the necessary conditions and adjustments for CV to be effective on 
these two levels. Moreover, this thesis assessed whether CV would be useful for 
industrial democracies under globally varying conditions.
In order to assess the extent to which this thesis has answered its major question, 
this chapter will first summarise the points that this thesis has made for a cost-benefit 
analysis of CV and will clarify what has been found. Second, this chapter will identify 
the points missing from this thesis for the cost-benefit analysis to clarify its limitations 
and will then discuss how the gaps could be filled. Finally, this chapter will assess the 
values and limits of this thesis and will discuss the future course of research on CV.
8.1. The Major Findings
This section will summarise the points that this thesis has made regarding a cost-benefit 
analysis of CV. For this purpose, this section will first review the problem of low 
turnout among industrial democracies, which CV could solve. Then, this section will 
summarise the findings about the influence of CV on turnout. Third, this section will 
summarise the findings regarding the effectiveness of the high turnout resulting from 
CV in improving the total utility of electors. Last, this section will sum up the findings 
about the applicability of CV to actual industrial democracies.
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The Problem of Low Turnout
According to Huntington (1991, 13-26), democratisation has not been gradual but has 
fluctuated. Democratisation during the last quarter of the twentieth century was 
overwhelming and he calls it the third wave of democratisation. Although his argument 
is based on robust empirical evidence about the global trend, it is also true that the 
industrial democracies, which can be regarded as the democratic core, have been 
experiencing a long-term decline in turnout since the end of World War II (Dalton 1996, 
44-45; Gray and Caul 2000, 1094-95; Pintor and Gratschew 2002, 85; Topf 1995, 
40-41; Wattenberg 2000, 71). The decline in turnout was particularly substantial during 
the last quarter of the twentieth century, which was the very time when democracy 
spread most rapidly. If politics is open to the public but the public do not participate in 
politics, politics would end in minority rule rather than majority rule and so the country 
would hardly be a democracy in any proper sense of the term. Therefore, the decline in 
turnout has naturally been a concern of political scholars and others who are interested 
in democracy.
When scholars recognised abstention as a problem, they first tried to identify the 
causes of the phenomenon. Despite their best efforts, including many survey analyses 
(e.g. Campbell et al. [1960] 1980; Miller and Shanks 1996) and rational choice theory 
works (e.g. Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968), the causes of abstention have not 
yet been clarified (Niemi and Weisberg 2001, chap. 2) and turnout has continued to slide 
(see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1). Meanwhile, since the 1980s, some political scholars have 
taken a different approach to low turnout. They have measured the effectiveness of 
possible countermeasures against low turnout by utilising statistical methods, and their 
studies have found that CV is outstandingly effective in improving turnout compared to 
other options (Blais and Carty 1990, 176-77; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, 246-77, 250; 
Franklin 2002, 158-60; R. Jackman 1987, 412, 416; R. Jackman and Miller 1995, 474, 
476). Its outstanding effectiveness in improving turnout had been anecdotal by then, 
although anecdotal counterargument had also lingered. However, these statistical 
analyses provided substantial scientific evidence for this conventional wisdom. 
Nevertheless, there have been several persistent concerns around CV, and CV has not 
been widely-used among industrial democracies so far.
To summarise, the major concern about CV is whether it will be useful for
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industrial democracies. CV needs to be effective on two levels. First, it needs to be 
effective in increasing turnout. Second, the high turnout resulting from CV needs to be 
effective in improving the well-being of the people, otherwise CV will not ultimately be 
useful (see thick lines in Figure 8.1 below). However, CV may fail to achieve high 
turnout. And even if it achieves high turnout, this high turnout may fail to improve the 
well-being of the people (see thin lines in Figure 8.1 below). In fact, CV has achieved 
very high turnout in several countries but it has not in others (see Table 2.1 and Figure 
3.1). Moreover, even in countries where CV has achieved high turnout (e.g. Australia 
and Belgium), it is unclear whether the high turnout resulting from CV has improved 
the well-being of the people. Furthermore, it is a matter of argument what the 
well-being of the people is.
Low Turnout Less Well-Being 
of the People
Figure 8.1: Expected Consequences of CV and Unexpected Ones
N o te s:
E xpec ted  C ourse: 
U nexpected  Course:
CV High Turnout More Well-Being
CV in itself is an instrument and does not have any intrinsic value. However, 
when CV as an instrument is applied within an environment, it may cause several 
effects. Some of them would be advantageous for the people, but others would be 
disadvantageous. Therefore, in order to know whether CV would be ultimately useful 
for industrial democracies, it is appropriate to perform a cost-benefit analysis of CV. 
Robson argued that cost-benefit analysis was the proper course of research on CV 
(Robson 1923), but he could not perform it because of the then methodological 
limitations. Hughes examined parliamentary records in Australia and listed major 
arguments for and against CV (Hughes 1966). His work provided a checklist for an 
overall assessment of CV. Since the end of World War I I , scientific research methods
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for political studies have developed considerably. Lijphart combined scientific methods 
with a value standard of democracy and admired the usefulness of the high turnout 
resulting from CV (Lijphart 1997), but it was only a partial assessment of the usefulness 
of CV. The provision of a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of CV has been the 
purpose of this thesis.
Effectiveness of CV in Improving Turnout
In theory, CV will achieve virtually universal turnout. While an election involves a 
collective action, voting in itself is an individual action. Therefore, unless individual 
electors are sufficiently motivated to vote, high turnout will not be achieved. Rational 
choice theorists have explained voting as a function of the costs and benefits for each 
individual (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). While the costs of voting have 
been identified by rational choice theorists, the benefits remain a matter of conjecture. 
However, it is a general understanding that the cost of voting is small for the vast 
majority of electors in industrial democracies (Aldrich 1993, 261-62; Niemi 1976, 
115-16). Therefore, if an incentive to voting (or a disincentive to abstention) is more 
significant than the small cost of voting, the provision of incentive/disincentive will 
make voting more beneficial (or less disadvantageous) than abstention for the vast 
majority of electors. As a result, this provision would overwhelmingly increase turnout. 
For example, if some minor and material sanction against abstention (e.g. a moderate 
fine) is applied, turnout will largely improve. This thesis formulated a model of voting 
under CV, and then it applied the model to reach this conclusion.
In regard to the effectiveness of CV in improving turnout, there is a wide gap 
between the theoretical finding and the empirical evidence. The effectiveness of CV in 
improving turnout is overwhelming in theory, and CV is expected to achieve almost 
universal voting. Meanwhile, statistical analyses have, since the 1980s, found that CV is 
effective in improving turnout by between 6 and 15 percentage points if all the other 
conditions are controlled (Blais and Carty 1990, 176-77; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, 
246-47, 250; Franklin 2002,158-60; R. Jackman 1987, 412, 416; R. Jackman and Miller 
1995, 474, 476). This empirical finding is modest compared to the theoretical finding of 
this thesis. Moreover, CV has achieved very high turnout in several countries (e.g. 
Australia and Belgium), but it has not in others (see Table 2.1). Nevertheless, the gap 
between theory and practice does not necessarily mean that the theory is wrong. While
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the theoretical finding is a solution reached in ideal conditions, the empirical evidence 
reflects globally varying actual conditions. Therefore, it is natural that there is some gap 
between them. However, it should be noted that this gap between theory and practice 
suggests that some conditions and adjustments (e.g. real sanction and serious 
administration) are necessary for CV to effectively improve turnout in reality, as Robson 
(1923, 571) argued.
There are three major conditions necessary for CV to achieve high turnout. The 
adoption of CV with minor and material sanction against abstention (e.g. a moderate 
fine) is the first condition to be met. If CV is not actually adopted, its potential for 
improving turnout cannot be realised. However, it is generally difficult to introduce CV 
because of three psychological barriers: popular commitment to freedom, path 
dependence of parliamentarians, and that of electors. Effective administration is the 
second condition to be met. Unless CV is seriously administered and minor, material 
sanctions are systematically imposed on offenders, CV would fail to achieve its goal of 
mobilising reluctant electors to polling places. In general, industrial democracies are 
more privileged in administrative resources than developing countries, and people tend 
to be law-abiding. Therefore, industrial democracies would have sufficient potential for 
seriously administrating CV. Persistence of CV is the third condition to be met. If CV is 
not continuously operated, CV cannot continue achieving high turnout. However, 
because of path dependence of parliamentarians and electors, it would not be difficult to 
maintain CV once it was introduced and had gained widespread acceptance.
Effectiveness of CV in Improving the Total Utility of Electors
Although it is a matter of argument what the well-being of the people is, this thesis has 
defined it as the total utility of individuals. Furthermore, for technical reasons, this 
thesis chose to limit it to the total utility of electors. CV has been criticised mostly by 
liberal theorists (Abraham 1955, 31; Hughes 1966, 86; JSCEM 1997, xix-xxi, 23-27; 
Minchin 1996a, 1996b; Rydon and Goot 1989, 7), and it has been admired mainly by 
the standard of democracy that it achieves (Hughes 1966, 81; Lijphart 1997). Liberalism 
and democracy have been respected in many industrial democracies; however, 
human-beings do not exist for liberalism or democracy, but liberalism and democracy 
should exist for human-beings. In other words, liberalism and democracy have 
secondary values. Therefore, this thesis tried to identify and use a human-oriented value
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standard as the primary one rather than using some secondary value standard. Although 
the Pareto efficiency, which does not accept any system reform that makes some 
individuals worse off even if this reform makes many individuals better off substantially 
(Suzuki 1994, 154-55), and the Nash efficiency, for which individual utilities are 
multiplied together (Nash 1950; Suzuki 1994, 157-67), are also human-oriented value 
standards, this thesis chose to use the utilitarian efficiency (or the total utility of 
individuals), for which individual utilities are summed up (Mill 1879, chap. 2, paras. 10, 
21; Mueller 2003, 151-52; Suzuki 1994, 156-57), as the primary value standard. The 
Pareto efficiency is humane, but it is ineffective in reforming a matured society tangled 
with vested interests. The Nash efficiency is fair in theory, but it is impractical. 
Meanwhile, the utilitarian efficiency is effective in theory and workable in practice 
though it is not flawless.108
If electors on the left are less likely to vote than electors on the right under VV, 
the median voter position will stay some distance from the median elector position to 
the right in the left-right dimension. However, CV will achieve very high turnout and 
will mostly diminish turnout imbalance between electors on the left and those on the 
right, and this will result in diminishing the distance between the median elector 
position and the median voter position. The utility for each elector can be measured as a 
function of the distance between their optimal policy position and the governmental 
policy position. The total utility of electors is maximised when the governmental policy 
position is at the median elector position in the left-right dimension. The two major 
parties will converge around the median voter position rather than the median elector 
position because the median voter position is the Condorcet winner in a two-candidate 
election setting, and a major party at the median voter position will surely gain more 
votes than the other party that takes a policy position other than the median voter 
position (Hinich and Munger 1994, 50-51). Therefore, the approximation of the median 
voter position to the median elector position will improve the total utility of electors. In 
this regard, the high turnout resulting from CV will be effective in improving the total 
utility of electors.
5.3 of Chapter 5 analysed survey data from the 2001 Australian election and 
found that this analysis supported the hypothesis described in the last paragraph.
108 See 5.1 o f  C hapter 5 for m ore argum ents over the  three  types o f  efficiency.
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Moreover, this analysis found that the turnout of electors in the centre is as high as that 
on the left and the right under CV in Australia but that it would not be as high as that of 
the left and the right under simulative VV. Electors in the centre are expected to have 
less differential benefit from the electoral success of their preferential major party over 
the other major party than electors on the left and the right (see Figure 5.8). Therefore, 
electors in the centre are assumed to have less motivation to vote. If CV were to be 
abolished in Australia, the turnout of centre electors would decline more than that of 
electors on the left or the right. As a result, the electoral attractiveness of the centre 
policy position would diminish, and the two major party positions would shift away 
from the median voter position. The two major parties alternate in power under the 
two-party system, and so this outward policy shift of the two major parties would result 
in a decrease in the total utility of electors in Australia. On the contrary, the adoption of 
CV would improve the total utility of electors in the industrial democracies now under 
VV.
The two major parties will converge around the median voter position in the 
left-right dimension, but they will stay some distance from it (Downs 1957, 115-17; 
McLean 1982, 124-29; McLean 1987, 70-71). The policy position of each major party 
can be regarded as an equilibrium between the centripetal vector and the centrifugal 
vector. The median voter position is the Condorcet winner in a two-candidate election, 
and so each major party has a motivation to shift their policy position towards the centre. 
However, each major party needs electoral resources (i.e. election funds and 
campaigners) to run an election campaign to win more votes than the other major party. 
Therefore, each party has a motivation to shift their policy position outward in order to 
appeal to the minority interests that provide electoral resources. In the left-right 
dimension, the policy position of each party will stay at a position where the centripetal 
vector and the centrifugal vector are in equilibrium (see Figure 6.1). The introduction of 
CV would release the two major parties from the need to mobilise their supporters to 
polling places and would diminish the level of uncertainty about the election result in 
constituencies. As a result, the two major parties would have less demand for electoral 
resources under CV. Therefore, the two major parties would become relatively free from 
the influence of minority interests, and so their policy positions would shift inward in 
order to recover equilibrium between the two vectors. In the end, CV would increase the 
total utility of electors even more.
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A comparison of industrial democracies provided empirical evidence for the 
hypothesis that CV will diminish the demand of the two major parties for electoral 
resources. Although it is difficult to make international comparisons about election 
funds in order to test this hypothesis, it is possible to test it with respect to election 
campaigners. First, data analysis about the industrial democracies indicates that electors 
in the centre are less likely to actively participate in election campaigns than electors 
who are further to the left or to the right (see Table 6.5). This finding suggests that 
extreme electors are the major source of election campaigners and so the two major 
parties need to appeal to them in order to undertake election campaign activities. 
However, CV would diminish the level of demand for electoral resources and would 
make the two major parties relatively free from the policy preferences of more extreme 
electors. Second, data analysis indicates that the demand of the parties for electoral 
resources is weaker in CV countries (i.e. Australia and Belgium) than in VV countries 
(see Table 6.6 and Figure 6.6). This finding suggests that CV has controlled the demand 
of the parties for electoral resources in these countries and has encouraged the two 
major parties to shift their policy positions inward. In the end, this finding indicates that 
CV has improved the total utility of electors in this regard.
Adaptability of CV to Actual Industrial Democracies
In theory, the ideal type of CV in the default environment will first be effective in 
improving turnout, and the high turnout resulting from CV will second be effective in 
improving the total utility of electors. However, the crucial point is whether CV will be 
useful in actual industrial democracies under VV at present. The orthodox theory about 
CV (i.e. Ackaert and de Winter 1996; Lijphart 1997; Mackerras and McAllister 1999) 
argues that the high turnout resulting from CV will diminish unequal turnout between 
the privileged people and the less-privileged people and will be useful to equalise their 
influence on politics. If this orthodox theory is applied on the left-right dimension, the 
turnout of electors on the left would be lower than that on the right and the median voter 
position would stay some distance from the median elector to the right under VV. 
However, the data analysis shows that this orthodox argument is not the case for all 
industrial democracies (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2).
The gap between the median elector position and the median voter position is 
substantial in several industrial democracies, but it is smaller in others. This finding
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suggests that CV would be substantially effective in improving the total utility of 
electors in several countries but would not, in this regard, be so effective in others. 
However, the turnout of electors in the centre is significantly lower than those on the 
left and the right in many industrial democracies under VV. Therefore, CV would, in 
this regard, be effective in improving the total utility of electors in many industrial 
democracies. As a whole, the effectiveness of CV in improving the total utility of 
electors would vary among the industrial democracies.
In the default environment, which consists of a homogenous society, a left-right 
single policy dimension and a two party system, it is possible to engineer an electoral 
system to improve the total utility of electors.109 This electoral system should be 
engineered first to approximate the median voter position close to the median elector 
position and, second, to approximate the two-major party positions to the median voter 
position. First, in order to place the median voter position close to the median elector 
position, the electoral system should achieve universal voting. In order to realise it, a 
universal franchise, automatic registration based on the national registration system, CV 
and an electronic/machine voting system without a choice of invalid voting should be 
implemented. By the implementation of this set of electoral rules, every person will be 
eligible to vote, every eligible person will be registered, every registered person will 
cast a vote, and every vote will be valid. In effect, everyone will count as one, and 
no-one will count as less than or more than one.
Second, in order to reinforce the two-party system and approximate the 
two-major party positions to the median voter position, the full alternative voting (AV) 
system should be adopted. By the adoption of full AV, all valid votes will ultimately be 
transferred to the two most successful candidates in each constituency. In this regard, 
the full AV system is more effective in utilising Duverger’s law and realising a 
two-party system than the single-member plurality (SMP) system (Cox 1997, 35-148; 
Cox 2000a; Cox 2000c; Duverger [1964] 1978, 226). Moreover, under the condition of 
universal voting and full AV, the two major parties would effectively ignore the policy 
preferences of extreme electors and would shift their policy positions to the median 
voter in the centre. This policy shift of the two major parties will improve the total 
utility of electors.
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Although CV is a component of the best electoral system, the real challenge is 
whether CV will also be useful in other social conditions and with other electoral rules. 
If CV is useful only in the particular set of social conditions and electoral rules 
described in the last paragraph, CV would be useless in most (or all) of the industrial 
democracies. However, CV is versatile and is likely to be useful in a variety of 
circumstances. First, under the condition of a majority/plurality representation electoral 
system other than full AV, CV would still be useful in approximating the median voter 
position to the median elector position and in encouraging the two major parties to shift 
their policy positions in the direction of the median voter position. Therefore, CV would 
still be useful in improving the total utility of electors upon the condition that full AV is 
replaced with another majority/plurality representation system (e.g. non-full AV or 
SMP).
Second, the majority of industrial democracies have a PR electoral system, and 
this electoral system tends to be accompanied by a multi-party system and coalition 
governments (IPU 2007; Lijphart 1999, 34-41; MOFAJ 2007). However, the median 
voter position would still be a strategic policy position for election and for the formation 
of the coalition government, and CV will be effective in approximating the median 
voter position to the median elector position even in the PR-system condition. Moreover, 
CV would encourage parties to shift their policy positions in the direction of the median 
voter position or would give more political clout to centre parties. Therefore, CV would 
be useful in improving the total utility of electors even under the combination of PR, a 
multi-party system and the coalition government largely different from the ideal 
electoral/party/govemment system.
Third, even in a multi-dimensional policy environment, two major parties would 
try to identify the combination of policy positions as the Condorcet winner in the 
multiple dimensions (Cox 1990, 908). CV would be effective in approximating the 
Condorcet-winner combination of policies to the policy combination at which the total 
utility of electors is maximised. Moreover, CV would be effective in encouraging the 
two major parties to shift their policy combinations in the direction of the 
Condorcet-winner combination of policies. Therefore, CV would be effective in 
improving the total utility of electors under the multi-dimensional policy condition.
109 In th is  context, a  ‘hom ogenous socie ty ’ m eans a  society  in  w hich  people share  political m eans and ends (A lm ond  1956,
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Fourth, in a fragmented society, the maximisation of the total utility of electors 
would not be useful as a guiding principle for electoral engineering and the median 
elector position would not necessarily be the ideal policy position for the government to 
remain in office. In these circumstances, consociational arrangement between 
significant social fragments would be useful as a guiding principle for electoral 
engineering (Lijphart 1999, 32-33). However, CV could still be useful here: the 
fragmented society would not adopt any winner-take-all electoral system like AV and 
SMP but would adopt some form of PR in order to properly reflect the social 
fragmentation in parliament and provide a precondition for the post-electoral 
negotiation between elites representing each social fragment to achieve or maintain 
consociation between fragments (Lijphart 1969, 217-19). Under this condition, CV 
would be useful in precisely registering the fragmentation among the people. Moreover, 
CV would mostly nullify the usefulness of encouraging their fragment members to vote 
and discouraging electors in the other fragment members from voting. CV could 
therefore be useful in peacefully registering the fragmentation in the society.
8.2. Limitations of This Thesis
This thesis aimed at conducting a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of CV for 
industrial democracies. For the purposes of this thesis, all major costs and benefits from 
CV should have been taken into account, but several major ones are missing from this 
analysis. A major limitation of this thesis is the fact that the cost-benefit analysis of CV 
could only be partially tested. Table 2.2 listed the major advantages and disadvantages 
of CV; some of them are deleted in Table 2.3 as being unimportant, and the others are 
retained for a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. This thesis has researched the 
advantages of CV in Table 2.3 and has briefly mentioned the administrative difficulty 
and administrative costs of CV as one of its major disadvantages. However, this thesis 
has mostly left out the other major disadvantages of CV, namely, the restriction on 
freedom, the quality of government, and the administrative costs.
There are three major reasons why this thesis ended up only partially testing these
398).
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aspects of CV. First, although this theisis aimed at performing an objective analysis, 
some subjective judgement needs to be introduced to make an overall cost-benefit 
analysis. For example, it is difficult tto objectively evaluate the significance of the 
freedom not to vote. Second, despite recent methodological advances in political 
science, it is still technically difficult to> measure some types of costs and benefits from 
CV. The potential degradation of government by the introduction of CV is a case in 
point. The introduction of CV in itsellf is a change in the electoral rules. However, this 
change in the rules will result in a change in how the game (i.e. the election) is played. 
This change in the nature of the game is not necessarily predictable, and it is difficult to 
find a proper means for measuring tthe advantages/disadvantages of CV for the total 
utility of electors. Third, it is doubtful whether the ‘total utility of electors,’ which this 
thesis chose as a value standard, is a  practical means for measuring the costs and 
benefits from CV. This thesis has used several figures to represent the quantity of utility 
and demonstrate the usefulness of CV in each category of its advantages. However, it is 
difficult to actually measure the quantity of utility each individual receives, as a 
common value standard. Therefor?, It i§ difficult (probably impossible) to compare the 
total utility of electors between different types of costs and benefits from CV. Money is 
a widely-accepted value standard, but it would be difficult to measure and compare all 
advantages and disadvantages of CV by the standard of money. Therefore, a full-scale 
cost-benefit analysis of CV is difficul t to perform. Nevertheless, this thesis will still try 
to extend the argument over the remaining elements for the cost-benefit analysis of CV.
Restriction on Freedom
Under CV, electors have to go to a podling place though they may be allowed to cast an 
invalid vote there. In this respect, CV is a restriction on their physical freedom (or their 
freedom of movement) and this should be counted as a cost of CV. Some people may 
even claim that CV is a violation of the right not to vote. Nevertheless, this claim does 
not automatically undermine CV because rights can be restricted. For example, property 
rights can be restricted, and taxes can be levied. Civic rights can also be restricted in 
some cases in liberal democracies, and even if the right not to vote is accepted it could 
still be restricted. However, some people may think that there is no substantial reason to 
justify CV as a necessary restriction against the right not to vote. Furthermore, some 
people may argue that the right not to vote is inalienable. Overall, the significance of the
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restriction on the freedom not to vote is a matter of argument and one of subjective 
judgement (see Lardy 2004; Minchin 1996a, 244-45).
In 2.2 of Chapter 2, this thesis suggested that normative arguments (i.e. arguments 
based on liberalism and democracy) should be integrated into the cost-benefit analysis 
of CV in order to reach an overall assessment. This thesis has integrated democracy into 
this cost-benefit analysis by employing the value standard of utility. The freedom not to 
vote should also be assessed by the standard of utility and should be integrated into this 
cost-benefit analysis. However, its objective assessment is difficult, and a subjective 
judgement is necessary for integrating freedom into this cost-benefit analysis. If the 
freedom not to vote is judged to be an inalienable right, CV would not be a matter of 
cost-benefit analysis and this thesis would not make sense. If the freedom not to vote is 
not judged to be inalienable but is seen to be highly valuable, the total expected benefits 
from CV would have no chance of exceeding the total expected costs of CV. Meanwhile, 
if this freedom is not judged to be extremely significant, its restriction will be counted 
as a cost but there would be a chance for the total expected benefits from CV to exceed 
the total expected costs of CV.
Quality of Government
While liberalism tends to be deployed as a major emotional argument against CV, the 
quality of government is argued as a major practical concern in relation to the 
introduction of CV. If CV succeeds in achieving high turnout but fails to improve the 
total utility of electors, CV will not be useful in the end (see Figure 8.1). This thesis 
formulated a model and reached a conclusion that CV will be effective in improving 
turnout and the high turnout resulting from CV will also be effective in improving the 
total utility of electors in the model. However, it is still questionable whether CV will 
not severely damage the quality of government in any way. This kind of concern has 
been addressed in the process of franchise expansion in history, such as reduction in 
property and taxpaying qualifications, a universal male suffrage and enfranchisement of 
women. Even suffragists argued that several suffrage qualifications, which are 
unaccepted in modem democracies, were necessary (e.g. Mill 1862, chap. 8). 
Nevertheless, this historical experience does not necessarily mean that this kind of 
concern should be simply dismissed. This subsection will consider three concerns about 
the quality of government in relation to the introduction of CV. These three concerns are
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(1) the degeneration of votes, (2) political inactivity, and (3) the degradation of party 
policies.
Degeneration of votes. According to Hughes (1966, 83), the degeneration of votes 
is the other of the two most common arguments against CV. All electors are not equally 
interested in politics and are not equally informed about politics. Electors who are more 
interested and more informed about politics are more likely to vote than electors who 
are less interested and less informed. However, CV would bring these less-interested 
and less-informed electors to polling places. Their participation in voting would weaken 
the quality of the electoral decision-making and so would harm the quality of 
government. Therefore, CV, which forcibly achieves high turnout, might not be 
desirable (Abraham 1955, 31; Rydon and Goot 1989, 7-8). When CV was debated in the 
Australian parliament in 1924, Senator Gardiner (Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates. Senate. 17 July 1924, 2182-83) argued, ‘I hold the view that the opinions of 
the negligent and apathetic section of the electors are not worth obtaining.’ This 
potential risk of degeneration of votes needs to be counted as a cost in the analysis of 
CV.
Table 8.1 shows that voters are more knowledgeable about political issues than 
abstainers in industrial democracies under VV. Electors who know less about political 
issues are less likely to vote under VV in all 16 industrial democracies in Table 8.1. 
However, the introduction of CV would mobilise electors less knowledgeable about 
politics to polling places. If the forced participation in voting stimulates their interest in 
politics and results in educating these people in politics (Hughes 1966, 82; Lijphart 
1997, 10; Mill 1862, chap. 3, para. 2; Pateman 1970, 42-43), it would not cause any 
major problem. However, the less knowledgeable and less interested electors might 
participate in voting without improving their knowledge of and interest in politics.
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T able 8.1: Political K now ledge and V oting in Industrial D em ocracies under W
Number of Correct Answers
Total (%)
X2-Test
Result0 (%) 1 (%) 2 (%) 3 (%)
Canada* Voted 78 91 97 97 91 p=<0.001
(2004) (Total N.) (381) (512) (483) (298) (1,674) G—0.589
Finland Voted 43 68 81 87 81 p=<0.001
(2003) (Total N.) (21) (203) (454) (509) (1,187) G=-0.363
France Voted 71 77 83 85 79 p=0.013
(2002) (Total N.) (118) (407) (351) (121) (997) G=-0.201
Germany Voted 90 96 97 98 95 p<0.001
(2002) (Total N.) (535) (764) (585) (116) (2,000) G=-0.435
Great Britain* Voted 48 70 80 89 70 p<0.001
(2005) (Total N.) (215) (264) (242) (139) (860) G=-0.495
Ireland* Voted 63 75 82 89 83 p<0.001
(2002) (Total N.) (63) (534) (756) (1,013) (2,366) G=-0.347
Italy Voted 61 74 86 87 81 p<0.001
(2006) (Total N.) (190) (163) (548) (455) (1,356) G=-0.375
Japan* Voted 75 82 86 95 81 p<0.001
(2004) (Total N.) (664) (795) (433) (85) (1,977) G=-0.273
Netherlands Voted 94 97 98 98 97 p=0.007
(2002) (Total N.) (406) (385) (440) (342) (1,573) G=-0.307
New Zealand* Voted 81 83 91 91 87 p<0.001
(2002) (Total N.) (246) (582) (631) (215) (1,674) G=-0.269
Norway Voted 64 83 88 92 83 p<0.001
(2001) (Total N.) (431) (456) (710) (453) (2,050) G=-0.471
Portugal Voted 67 75 84 90 81 p<0.001
(2005) (Total N.) (372) (556) (1,053) (732) (2,713) G--0.377
Spain Voted 81 91 91 94 89 pO.001
(2004) (Total N.) (285) (400) (273) (249) (1,207) G=-0.334
Sweden Voted 82 86 93 93 88 p<0.001
(2002) (Total N.) (229) (320) (319) (192) (1,060) G—0.315
Switzerland* Voted 40 61 79 94 68 p<0.001
(2003) (Total N.) (171) (594) (451) (201) (1,417) G=-0.563
USA* Voted 44 73 81 91 76 p<0.001
(2004) (Total N.) (140) (225) (387) (314) (1,066) G=-0.534
a=0.05
Notes:
1. Three political knowledge questions are different in each country, and so the level o f  their difficulty varies.
2. The total number is the sum o f ‘voted’ and ‘not-voted.’
3. When answers are not given to any o f  three questions, the respondent is included in the category o f ‘0 correct answer.’
4. Australia and Belgium are excluded from this table because they are CV countries.
5. The relevant data are unavailable about Denmark (2001) and Germany (2002 Mail-Back), and Germany (2002 Telephone) is used in this table.
6. Austria and Greece are not covered by the data source.
7. Original sample weight is applied for the countries with an asterisk (*), but the unmodified sample size is presented.
Source: CSES Module 2— Full Release (Comparative Study o f  Electoral Systems 2007).
Even the electors who vote under VV may not be sufficiently knowledgeable 
about politics and they may not have sophisticated judgements about it. However, most 
of their votes are channelled into established parties, so their votes are not likely to
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cause major problems in the framework of established party politics. However, the 
voters who are newly mobilised by CV are more likely to be less knowledgeable about 
and less interested in politics than current voters under VV. Therefore, they are less 
likely to have a party identification than the voters under VV, and their votes may not be 
properly channelled into the established parties. These new voters might give more seats 
and bargaining power to extreme parties in parliament. Therefore, their voting 
participation could be a threat to the stability of party politics in liberal democracies. 
Table 8.2 indicates that electors without any party identification are less likely to vote 
than electors with a party identification in industrial democracies under VV.
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T able 8.2: Party Identification and V oting in Industrial D em ocracies under W
Party Identification X2-Test
Yes (%) No (%) Total (%) Result
Canada* Voted 40 17 38 pO.OOl
(2004) (Total N.) (1,473) (149) (1,622) G=0.536
Denmark Voted 98 94 96 pO.OOl
(2001) (Total N.) (936) (932) (1,868) G=0.551
Finland Voted 91 72 81 p<0.001
(2003) (Total N.) (544) (622) (1,166) G=0.592
France Voted 85 73 79 pO.OOl
(2002) (Total N.) (551) (436) (987) G=0.346
Germany* Voted 96 84 90 p<0.001
(2002 Mail-Back) (Total N.) (480) (486) (966) G=0.621
Great Britain* Voted 83 64 71 pO.OOl
(2005) (Total N.) (302) (551) (853) GO.471
Ireland* Voted 90 80 83 pO.OOl
(2002) (Total N.) (668) (1,644) (2,312) G=0.393
Italy Voted 96 71 82 pO.OOl
(2006) (Total N.) 1 (503) (632) (1,135) G=0.826
Japan* Voted 90 71 82 pO.OOl
(2004) (Total N.) (1,030) (682) (1,712) 0=0.591
Netherlands Voted 99 96 97 p=0.002
(2002) (Total N.) (616) (947) (1,563) GO.497
New Zealand* Voted 91 82 87 pO.OOl
(2002) (Total N.) (917) (737) (1,654) GO.393
Norway Voted 88 79 83 pO.OOl
(2001) (Total N.) (833) (1,186) (2,019) G=0.335
Portugal Voted 88 76 82 pO.OOl
(2005) (Total N.) (1,196) (1,446) (2,642) G O A  10
Spain Voted 95 79 89 pO.OOl
(2004) (Total N.) (715) (448) (1,163) G O .683
Sweden Voted 93 84 89 pO.OOl
(2002) (Total N.) (511) (536) (1,047) GO.433
Switzerland* Voted 88 54 68 pO.OOl
(2003) (Total N.) (630) (772) (1,402) GO.719
USA* Voted 83 68 77 pO.OOl
(2004) (Total N.) ___ (603)___ (458) (1,061) G O .381
a=0.05
Notes:
1. The total number is the sum o f  ‘voted’ and ‘not-voted.’
2. Australia and Belgium are excluded because they are CV countries.
3. Austria and Greece are not covered by the data source.
4. Original sample weight is applied for countries with an asterisk (*),  but the unmodified sample size is presented.
Source: CSES Module 2— Full Release (Comparative Study o f  Electoral Systems 2007).
However, there is another possibility. If they are enforced to vote, they might 
acquire a party identification as a shortcut in order to control the cost of information in 
relation to voting (Downs 1957, 98-100) and, as a result, most of their votes might be 
channelled into the established parties. Nevertheless, they might not acquire a party
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identification with the established parties (Lundell 2007), and so this risk of instability 
of democracy should be counted as a potential cost of CV in the cost-benefit analysis.
Political inactivity. The introduction of CV might result in political inactivity, and 
this might erode the foundations of democracy. Democracy would not be guaranteed 
solely by the existence of democratic institutions, and it would be reasonable to suppose 
that some sort of political culture congruent with democracy is necessary to animate the 
democratic system. Although it is difficult to identify the characteristics and 
preconditions of the political culture, one of them would be the orientation towards 
active participation. According to Almond and Verba ([1963] 1989, 19), active 
participation is not the sole condition for stable and effective democracy but a particular 
mixture of participant orientations and other orientations is necessary for it. However, 
this does not mean that they disregarded the participant orientations. According to their 
theoretical framework, it would be necessary to maintain the level of the participant 
orientations to a certain degree in order to avoid losing a balanced political culture 
congruent with democracy.
CV would weaken parties, by making parties less active. First, parties will lose 
their motivation to conduct positive election campaigns for mobilising their supporters 
to polling places though they might still try to convert potential supporters to their side. 
Second, the prediction of election results would become easier and so parties would 
have fewer marginal seats. Therefore, parties would be involved in election 
campaigning only in a limited number of marginal-seat constituencies and would ignore 
other safe-seat constituencies. Overall, parties would become inactive and the function 
of parties as liaison between the people and politics would wither (Hughes 1966, 93-95; 
Jones 1954, 35; JSCEM 1997, 24; Minchin 1996a, 246).
CV would also result in making electors, who are already passive, be even more 
passive in politics, undermining the foundation of democracy. With the introduction of 
CV, electors would become less active and more passive in voting and election 
campaign on two counts. First, CV will officially and effectively deprive electors of a 
choice not to vote, and so electors would stop thinking whether they should vote. They 
do not need to motivate themselves to turn out in order to fulfil their civic duty, and they 
do not need to motivate themselves to vote in order to meet their political duty to the 
party with which they identify. Second, they would not need to ask other people to turn 
out to vote for the party they support because all electors are expected to vote under CV,
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and electors would find less necessity to become actively involved in fund raising and 
campaign activities for their favourite party because this party would have less demand 
for electoral resources (i.e. election funds and campaigners) under CV.
The political inactivity of electors and parties, which would result from the 
introduction of CV, might disturb the balance between several political orientations and 
might undermine the quality of government. Therefore, this political inactivity might 
have negative impact on the total utility of electors (Hughes 1966, 94-95; Jones 1954, 
35; JSCEM 1997, 24; Minchin 1996a, 246). Once CV damages the participant 
orientation of electors as an essential component of the political culture congruent with 
democracy, the abolition of CV might not restore them. In other words, CV might 
irreversibly harm the political culture for stable, effective democracy. Although it is 
difficult to identify the characteristics and preconditions of political culture congruent 
with democracy, it would be even more difficult to manipulate them and so it would be 
a safe choice to leave them alone.
Degradation of party policies. The introduction of CV might result in the 
degradation of party politics, and it might impair the overall quality of decision-making. 
This problem would result from the quality of target electors for election campaigns 
rather than the general quality of voters (Abraham 1995, 31; Rydon and Goot 1989, 7-8). 
The two major parties would try to target electors during campaigns and formulate their 
campaign strategy to appeal to these electors in order to make most of their electoral 
resources. Under VV, their target electors would be the people who may vote but may 
not vote in marginal seats. However, once CV is introduced, the target electors for the 
two major parties would change to floating voters in a limited number of marginal seats. 
Many of these target electors would be former abstainers under VV who are less likely 
to be knowledgeable about politics (see Table 8.1) and are less likely to have a party 
identification (see Table 8.2) than voters under VV. Therefore, they would be more 
vulnerable to electoral manipulation. The two major parties would try to appeal to these 
limited number of less-qualified electors.
If parties cater to these less-qualified floating voters, the quality of party policies, 
which is not illustrated in the left-right dimension model, might be reduced. Even under 
VV, the two major parties may have a motivation to make easy promises because of 
escalation in competition with each other. However, under CV, these parties would have 
a strong motivation to make easier promises in order to appeal to the less
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-knowledgeable voters (Rydon and Goot 1989, 8). This might damage the coherence 
and effectiveness of their party policies. Moreover, rather than formulating and 
addressing their party policies, each of the two major parties might utilise negative 
campaign as a useful instrument to put floating voters off their rival party and to gain 
their votes in the end (Minchin 1996a, 247; Rydon and Goot 1989, 8). Under VV, 
negative campaign might be useful to discourage electors who support their rival party 
from voting. Meanwhile, under CV, the discouraged electors still have to vote and so 
negative campaign might not be a useful campaign measure (Lijphart 1997, 10). 
However, negative campaign could be even more effective under CV than under VV. 
CV might result in more floating voters (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2) who are less interested 
in politics and are not identified with any major party. Under CV, floating voters may be 
put off one major party by negative campaigning but, having to vote for somebody, the 
other major party that campaigned negatively may expect to benefit from these voters 
(Ballinger 2006,18).
Administrative Costs
The administrative costs of CV should be taken account of in the cost-benefit analysis 
of CV. Although Chapter 4 (mainly its 4.2) mentioned the administration of CV, it did 
not count it as a cost. Effective administration is a necessary condition for CV to 
substantially improve turnout, and, in order to achieve this, the government (or tax 
payers in the end) must spend financial and human resources. It is obvious from the 
Australian case that substantial resources are consumed to investigate all abstainers and 
to continue this investigation until all cases are settled after each election.110 However, 
some industrial democracies could not afford to allocate so many resources to the 
administration of CV. CV would be useful to approximate the governmental policy 
position to the median elector position in the left-right dimension. However, its costs 
should be controlled as much as possible in order to spare sufficient resources for policy 
measures. In other words, the administration of CV should be effective but should also
110 A fter the 1996 election, 29,154 electors paid  A us$20 adm in istra tive  penalty  and  6,027 cases w ere  dealt w ith by  courts (as 
o f  31 July 2001). A fter the  1998 election, 40 ,396  electors paid  A us$20 adm in istra tive  penalty  and 6 ,246 cases w ere  dealt by courts 
(as o f  31 Ju ly  2001). This inform ation w as provided by  an official le tter from  the A ustra lian  E lectoral C om m ission  (A E C ) dated  9 
A ugust 2001. This docum entation suggests th a t they carry  ou t a fu ll-dress investigation  into absta iners  and  its adm in istra tive  costs 
are substantial.
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be efficient.111
Although the effective administration of CV is desirable to maximise turnout, it is 
costly and may not be cost-efficient for several countries. The necessity of allocating 
resources for the administration of CV and the availability of them would be different in 
each industrial democracy. If electors are generally law-abiding, most of the electors 
would comply with CV and the administrative costs would not be overwhelming. 
Moreover, if the notion of CV in itself is widely-accepted by electors, the administration 
of CV would work smoothly and its administrative costs would not be enormous. 
Meanwhile, if the budget of the government is under pressure, it would be difficult for 
the government to allocate sufficient resources to the administration of CV. Because of 
the financial limitations or for the purpose of the best allocation of resources, the level 
of administration of CV might need to be compromised (like the case of Belgium) in 
several countries.112 Furthermore, if the administration of CV encounters serious 
difficulties (e.g. neglect, incompliance and resistance), the administration of CV could 
need to be curtailed or dropped altogether. The administrative costs of CV should be 
estimated in each industrial democracy and should be counted in the cost-benefit 
analysis.
Costs of Voting for New Electors
While voters bear the cost of voting, abstainers do not bear it under VV. However, under 
CV, all electors have to vote and have to bear the cost of voting. Therefore, the 
introduction of CV will increase the total costs of voting in the society. This is not a cost 
that the government bears, but a cost that new voters must bear. The cost-benefit 
analysis of CV should be performed not for the government but for the whole society. 
Therefore, the additional costs of voting resulting from CV should be taken account of 
in the cost-benefit analysis of CV. Nevertheless, Tables 2.2 and 2.3 did not list this cost, 
and this thesis has not dealt with it. This cost can be calculated by multiplying the
111 A dm in istra tive  cost is an old concern  (H ughes 1966, 83) on the  exercise  o f  C V , and  it has m ostly  been argued in re la tion  to 
the sustainability  o f  the  C V  system  (A braham  19 5 5 ,1 6 -1 7 ; Phillips 2 0 0 1 ,2 1 -2 2 ). H ow ever, it has ra re ly  been argued  from  the 
view point o f  ju s tifiab ility  o f  the  costs (H ealy  and  W arden 1 9 9 5 ,2 ,2 9 -3 0 ) .
112 T he B elg ian  governm ent random ly selects several districts a fte r each e lection , and  the  investigation  into abstainers in these 
d istricts is serious. T h is inform ation abou t the  random  selection  w as firs t prov ided  by  M s M aria  G ra tschew , In ternational ID E A , at 
the interview  w ith  her (19  April 2002), and  it w as la te r confirm ed by  em ail co rrespondence w ith M r E dw in  L efebre, M in istry  o f  
H om e A ffairs, B elg ium  (14 O ctober 2002).
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estimated cost of voting per person and the expected number of new voters mobilised 
by the adoption of CV together. This calculation should be exercised in each industrial 
democracy because the estimated cost of voting and the expected number of new voters 
are different in each country.
8.3. Conclusion
This thesis aimed to assess the overall usefulness of CV for industrial democracies. It 
recognised that CV must be effective on two levels for it to be useful for the people. 
First, CV needs to be effective in improving turnout. Second, the high turnout resulting 
from CV needs to be effective in improving the total utility of electors, which can be 
equated to the well-being of the people. For assessing the overall usefulness of CV, this 
thesis also understood that a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of CV should be 
performed as William Robson argued in 1923 (Robson 1923, 576). In regard to the first 
level of effectiveness, this thesis built a model of CV in order to clarify the mechanism 
by which CV achieves high turnout, and then it provided empirical evidence for the 
Robson hypothesis that real sanction and serious administration are two major 
conditions for CV to operate like this model (Robson 1923, 571). However, in regard to 
the second level of effectiveness, the cost-benefit analysis of CV could only be partially 
tested by this thesis. The partiality indicates that this thesis has failed to achieve its goal 
of assessing the overall usefulness of CV for industrial democracies.
Nevertheless, this thesis has advanced the research on CV in the direction 
towards its comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Further research on CV will be 
necessary for assessing the usefulness of CV for industrial democracies more precisely 
and more comprehensively. However, general arguments over the usefulness of CV, 
like that of this thesis, will inevitably be abstract rather than being practical for the 
actual introduction of CV in each country. As this thesis has argued, CV in itself is an 
instrument and does not have any intrinsic value. However, CV might cause several 
effects when it is applied within an environment. The findings of this thesis also 
suggest that CV would be useful for some countries but would not be so for others (see 
Chapter 7). Therefore, for the actual introduction of CV in a country, the usefulness of 
CV should be assessed in the context of the country and a comprehensive case study
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should be performed. Nevertheless, it would be impossible to perform a perfect 
cost-benefit analysis of CV even in each country environment. Nonetheless, the 
cost-benefit analysis of CV is a proper research framework, and so it should be 
attempted for each country environment in order to provide useful references for 
decision-making on the introduction of CV.
It should be remembered that this thesis has consistently used the majoritarian 
model of democracy as its underlying assumption as its introduction explained. This 
assumption is characterised by a two-party system, in which the two major parties 
alternate in power, and is also featured by a majoritarian electoral system. The choice of 
this underlying assumption inevitably limited the research scope of this thesis. All 
hypotheses of this thesis were formulated and were comparatively tested in this 
assumptive framework. Therefore, although this thesis analysed several countries and 
systems that do not share many characteristics with this majoritarian model, the reader 
should assess the relevance of this thesis to them (e.g. PR systems) with caution.
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